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UNITED STATES-BRITISH DIPLOMACY OVER MEXICO, 1913
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
For the most part, the history of the diplomatic 
negotiations between the United States and Great Britain 
over Mexico in 1913j has been ably done. Some of the major 
diplomatic historians in the United States have written on 
this subject, as have many Wilson scholars. Memoirs, auto­
biographies, diaries, edited letters and papers, and count­
less secondary works have been devoted to various aspects 
of this interesting period. They have all suffered from 
the same limitation; they were written basically from United 
States documents. Even the materials from those individuals 
intimately connected with the events reflect this one-sided 
approach. Some of the principal participants did not know, 
in many cases what was going on behind the scenes; there­
fore, on occasion their letters and documents actually lead 
the historian astray. There has also been a tendency to 
gloss over some of the events because the details were not 
available,
2On January 1, 1964, with the official opening of the 
1913 British Foreign Office documents, answers to many of 
these questions were revealed for the first time. In ad­
dition, the availability of certain private papers such as 
those of Lord Cowdray, John Bassett Moore, and the recently 
published letters of Sir Cecil Spring-Rice, to mention a 
few, have provided a better understanding of the diplomacy. 
Even fuller use of records long available, such as the Navy 
Records in the National Archives, have helped provide a 
clearer picture of certain events.
This study is an attempt to clarify, explain, and 
even to correct some of the misconceptions about the diplo­
macy between the United States and Great Britain that took 
place in the period from the February revolution through the 
naval controversy in December 1913  ^ What were the main prob­
lems involved? A few examples should suffice to answer this 
question. The official documents from Henry Lane Wilson, 
the United States Ambassador to Mexico, indicate that Great 
Britain withheld recognition from the new Mexican govern­
ment headed by General Victoriano Huerta at least temporarily 
because of the assassinations of the former president and 
vice-president. The British documents indicate that quite 
to the contrary, the assassinations had nothing to do with 
the delay. Statements have been made to the effect that the 
visit of Sir William Tyrrell to the United States in November 
1913, resulted in a "deal" whereby Great Britain would support
3the United States in Mexico in return for repeal of the 
objectionable exemption clause in the Panama Canal Act of 
1912, Not only is there no evidence to support such a 
theory, but definite proof exists to refute such claims. 
Moreover, Great Britain denied that Sir Lionel Carden was 
sent to Mexico in the fall of 1913 to thwart the United
States efforts to unseat Huerta. But the documents re­
veal that even before leaving England Carden was dedicated
to a policy of sustaining the Mexican President. While
British policy changed, there is every indication that 
Carden did not. Other illustrations abound, but they 
are reserved for their proper place in the narrative.
From 1876 to 1910, Mexico was under the heavy hand 
of General Porfirio Diaz. When Diaz came to pcwer Mexico 
had for years been the scene of turmoil and strife. Revo­
lution, counterrevolution, civil war, foreign invasion, had 
all played their part. Armed bandits haunted the highways 
and byways, so that travel without a strong escort was 
hazardous. With the exception of gold and silver, the rich 
natural resources of the country had hardly been touched. 
This was to change under the new leadership.
Eager to see the material development of the country, 
Diaz encouraged investment by foreigners. In return for 
their capital investments and technical skills he gave 
lucrative concessions in such fields as mining, industry, 
transportation, and eventually petroleum. Businessmen from
4the United States came into this bonanza at an early period, 
so before long Mexico was looked upon as little more than a 
commercial appendage of its northern neighbor. Diaz recog­
nized this too and deliberately began to encourage investors 
and contractors from other countries, particularly Europe.
The natural result was competition and rivalry. Unfortunate­
ly for Mexico, most of the profits from these enterprises 
were leaving the country. Only a small elite element in 
Mexico was benefitting from this industrial and commercial 
development. The vast bulk of the population was living at 
the subsistence level or at best little above it. Some 
Mexicans saw and felt the need for change. Seeing and 
feeling it was one thing, but doing something about it was 
something else. The old General had ways and means of deal­
ing with trouble-makers, Diaz, however, was not getting any. 
younger, and by 190? and 1908 there was talk of a successor.
Seemingly, the President encouraged the idea, and 
Francisco Indalecio Madero, the son of a wealthy family from 
northern Mexico, sought the presidency. Madero soon dis­
covered that he had been a little precipitate and fled to 
Texas. Although a visionary and an idealist, he had de­
veloped a following in Mexico, and in 1910 headed the revo­
lution that deposed Diaz. Madero was then elected president 
of the republic in 1911.
Quite popular at first, the new president did not 
have the administrative or military ability to rule effective­
5ly. Disorders soon broke out in various parts of the 
country» Conditions seemed to get worse, and dissident 
factions sprang up until finally a full scale revolt 
occurred in the capital in February 1913» This uprising 
was headed by Felix Diaz, who was soon joined by General 
Victoriano Huerta, Their victory brought Huerta to power 
as the new leader in Mexico. As these events occurred, 
the United States and Great Britain became involved.
CHAPTER II
HENRY LANE WILSON AND THE MEXICAN CRISIS
One of the most unusual chapters in the story of 
the Mexican Revolution during 1913 was the part played by 
the United States Ambassador to Mexico, Henry Lane Wilson. 
Much has been written about his role in Mexican affairs 
from February to July, but now additional facts have come 
to light. Evidence is available, for example, which in­
dicates that he exerted a heavy influence on Sir Francis 
William Stronge, the British Minister to Mexico, and that 
he played a hitherto unknown part in the removal of Miguel 
Covarrubias, the Mexican Minister to Great Britain. It is 
common knowledge that he actively collaborated with General 
Victoriano Huerta, the new Mexican President, but one of 
the Ambassador’s plans to force United States recognition 
of Mexico has been concealed in the British Archives for 
over fifty years. Other details concerning the United 
States and Great Britain have likewise been undisclosed.
But like many such tales, these events must be told in the 
context of the Mexican Revolution and the diplomatic crises 
it produced.
7The revolt against President Francisco Indalecio 
Madero on February 9-l8> 1913, crystallized to a great ex­
tent because Madero failed to provide vigorous and firm 
leadership. The situation degenerated until near anarchy 
was the order of the day. It culminated in the cuartelazo 
in Mexico City. Even before the fighting had begun in the 
capital, Ambassador Wilson sent the State Department a 
stinging indictment of the Mexican government and its fail­
ure to restore order.^ After the actual battle opened in 
the city, Wilson and other members of the diplomatic corps 
became extremely alarmed at the destruction of property and 
the loss of life. Within a few days they were convinced 
that the Mexican President was incapable of ending the 
slaughter. Acting under the leadership of the American 
Ambassador, the British, German and Spanish Ministers agreed 
that the solution to the problem was for Madero to resign.
Bernardo de Cologan, the Spanish Minister, delivered their
2
request to the President. Madero was incensed and not only 
refused, but told Cologan that the diplomatic corps had ab­
solutely no business becoming involved in the internal
^Henry Lane Wilson to Secretary of State, February 
4, 1913, U. S., Department of State, Papers Relating to the 
Foreign Relations of the United States [19131 (Washington; 
Government Printing Office, 1920), 696-99 (hereafter cited 
as Foreign Relations 1913)«
2
Strong© to Sir Edward Grey, Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs, February I6 , 1913, F,0. 371/1671, Foreign 
Office Archives, Public Record Office, London, England 
(hereafter cited as PRO).
8affairs of Mexico. Ambassador Wilson without approval from 
Washington decided to adopt a sterner course and dropped 
thinly veiled hints of United States intervention if the
3
President did not resign*
Madero suspected the Ambassador was bluffing, and 
telegraphed President William Howard Taft to find out. He 
informed Taft that the situation was not as bad as some re­
ports indicated, referring undoubtedly to the Ambassador's 
alarming comments to the State Department. Madero asked 
for assurances that United States troops would not be landed, 
and is said to have remarked, "Now you will see how the in- 
trigues of this evil ambassador are dealt with." When 
Ambassador Wilson learned of the message he immediately 
cabled the State Department advising them that Madero's 
telegram was misleading and inaccurate.^ Despite his most 
determined efforts Wilson could not get the President or
3
Stanley R. Ross, Francisco I. Madero Apostle of 
Mexican Democracy (New York; Columbia University Press,
1955) , l?2ff. ïÿuis Meza Morton, "The Close of an Era: Act
One of the Mexican Tragedy" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. 
Dept, of History, University of Texas, 1956), contains very 
little on the post-Madero period, but appears to have in­
sight into the problem. He calls Ross' biography of Madero 
"eulogistic."
^Ross, Madero, 297-98; Secretary of State to American 
Ambassador (Mexico City), February 15, 1913, Foreign Re­
lations 1913. 713-14, contains Madero's message. For an ex­
cellent condensation of Ambassador Wilson's part in the en­
tire affair see, Arthur S. Link, Wilson The New Freedom 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956 ) , 353, f.n. 21.
^Wilson to Secretary of State, February 15, 17, 1913, 
Foreign Relations 1913, 712-13, 715-16.
9the State Department to Issue an ultimatum to Madero. He 
decided then to turn to his British colleague.
At Wilson's urging Stronge sent several messages 
in an attempt to get British support for the American 
Ambassador's plan. Stronge advised the British Embassy in 
Washington that he could see no solution for the problem 
except for Madero to resign, and indicated that Wilson would 
like for these sentiments to be passed on to the White House. 
It was felt that a threat of United States intervention 
might force the Mexican President's resignation, and the 
Foreign Office was asked to use its influence in support of 
such a declaration.^ Stronge's and Wilson's appeals were 
part of a scheme to have President Taft assume a "get tough" 
attitude with Mexico.
The British Foreign Office was reluctant to have 
Stronge involved in the demands for Madero's resignation.
Sir Edward Grey, British Foreign Secretary, considered this 
purely a matter of internal Mexican politics, but because 
of the unusual circumstances and his intimate knowledge of 
the immediate problems Stronge was left to be the judge of 
the situation. He was, however, cautioned to be careful. 
Grey warned him that it would be best not to say anything
^Stronge to Grey, two dispatches dated February l6, 
1913, F.O. 371/1671, PRO; Isidro Fabela, Historia Diplo- 
matica de la Revolucion Mexicana (2 vols.; Mexico: Fondo
de Cultura Economica, 195H-1959)» I , 84-92, gives additional 
details of the part played by Stronge and Carden.
10
to Ambassador Wilson which might be interpreted as encourag­
ing United States military intervention. For this the United 
States would have to assume sole responsibility, and the 
Foreign Office concluded that neither side in Mexico would
7
appreciate British meddling. Events would shortly bring 
an end to the necessity for the Machiavellian intrigues of 
the two diplomats.
Secret meetings between the revolutionary leaders 
and some members of Madero's staff had been going on for 
several days. On February l8. General Huerta, the commander 
of the army in Mexico City and in charge of the government's 
defense there, openly went over to the rebels. That after­
noon the president, vice-president, and certain cabinet 
officers were arrested. In the evening Huerta and General 
Félix Diaz met at the American Embassy at the invitation 
of Ambassador Wilson. There the two generals agreed upon 
a plan, later known as the Pacto de la Ciudadela, whereby 
Huerta would become provisional president within seventy- 
two hours. Diaz was given the major hand in selecting the 
new cabinet, but he declined a place in the government in 
order that he might be free to campaign for president at 
the next election. No date was set at this time for the
PRO.
^Grey to Stronge, February 19, 1913, F.O. 371/1671,
g
Félix Diaz was the nephew of the deposed dictator




On the following day, Madero and José Maria Pino 
Suarez, the vice-president, while still in custody tendered 
their resignations to the Congress, According to the 
Mexican Constitution the presidency then devolved on the 
Minister of Foreign Relations, Pedro Lascurain, who immed­
iately took the oath of office. Lascurain did not name a 
Minister of Foreign Relations, but did appoint General 
Huerta as Minister of Gobernacion, the secretary next in 
line for the presidency. After less than an hour Lascurain 
resigned, and Huerta as Minister of Gobernacion succeeded
9
him as president. But this series of acts propounded a 
searching question. Under what constitutional right had
9
The principal messages from Wilson to the Secretary 
of State are found in Foreign Relations 1913, 720-26; the 
British equivalent are Stronge to Grey, February l8, 19, 20, 
1913> F.O. 371/1671, PRO. An unconfirmed report later held 
that Rafael Hernandez, Secretary of Gobernacion under Madero 
had never resigned his office and, therefore, Huerta's ap­
pointment to that post was illegal, Edwin Ludlow to E. M. 
House, September 12, 1913, National Archives, State Depart­
ment Papers (hereafter cited as SDP). President Woodrow 
Wilson to Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan, August 
26, 1913, SDP, is a summary of the legal aspects of Huerta's 
presidency asserting that he never became legitimate presi­
dent; there is also a study by a contemporary Mexican lawyer, 
Juan Neftall Amador, which argues against any legal basis 
for Huerta's accession, Isidro Fabela (ed.). Documentes 
Historicos de la Revolucion Mexicana: Revolucion y Régimen
Constitucionalista (4 vols»; Mexico: Fondo de Cultura
Economica, I96O), I, 17-21. Link, Wilson The New Freedom, 
348, has inadvertantly transposed the sequence of events 
which occurred on February I8 . The correct sequence follows 
in this order: Madero's arrest, Huerta's message to Taft,
Pacto de la Ciudadela; on February 19, resignation of Madero 
and Pino Suarez, Lascurain assumes presidency and resigns, 
Huerta elevated to president.
12
Huerta arrested the president and vice-president, and just 
how valid were the resignations submitted under such obvious 
circumstances of duress? Even though constitutional require­
ments were subsequently followed, it is apparent that a cloud 
of suspicion had been cast on the legitimacy of Huerta's 
title to office.
Immediately following the successful revolution two 
questions were paramount. First, was Huerta legally the 
constitutional president of Mexico, and would the United 
States and Great Britain formally recognize him as such?
The State Department was receiving contradictory advice on 
the constitutional issue.
Ambassador Wilson notified the Department a few hours 
after the inauguration that the provisional government had 
taken "office in accordance with the Constitution and pre­
cedents." He also asked for instructions regarding recog­
nition of the new government. The following day, Irwin 
Laughlin, Charge d'affaires of the United States Legation 
in London, wired that he had just been in conference with 
the Mexican Minister to Great Britain, Miguel Covarrubias, 
Covarrubias had informed him that there was no constitutional­
ly legal way in which Huerta could become president through 
the forced resignation or execution of the president and 
vice-president. The Mexican Minister also advised Laughlin
^^Wilson to Secretary of 3tate, February 20, 1913j 
Foreign Relations 1913, 725.
13
that he had just come from the British Foreign Office where
he had given Sir Louis Mallet the same advice* Mallet had
replied that the British "would not recognize any president
in Mexico except one chosen by the legal method of election.
The State Department was interested in getting the British
reaction first-hand*
As a result, Secretary of State, Philander Chase
Knox, instructed Laughlin to discuss the matter discreetly
with M a l l e t T h i s  he did and Mallet told him that the
British would "carry on" with the Mexican government* Formal
recognition would not be extended, however, until the King
was advised that the Mexican president had been elected in
13accordance with constitutional methods* The Mexican Minis­
ter had also been in touch with the Foreign Office again* 
Covarrubias stated that Madero was being held 
prisoner in order to extort his resignation and feared that 
he would be shot unless he complied* He was anxious to get 
the British to intercede on behalf of the president, but 
the Foreign Office was not disposed to intervene in any
^^Laughlin to Secretary of State, February 21, 1913, 
SDP. Sir Louis de Pan Mallet was the Assistant Under­
secretary of state for Foreign Affairs. Whitelaw Reid, the 
United States Ambassador to Great Britain, had died in 
December 1912. The new ambassador Walter Hines Page did 
not arrive until May 1913» Laughlin was in charge of the 
Legation during the interim*
12Knox to American Embassy (London), February 24,
1913, SDP.
^^Laughlin to Secretary of State, February 25, 1913,
SDP*
Ik
manner between the rival Mexican factions. Information 
received from Mexico indicated that Madero and Pino Suarez 
were not to be harmed, and this served as an additional 
reason why the British were reluctant to make any repre­
sentations to H u e r t a , D e s p i t e  the guarantees which were 
given by the Mexican government, Madero and Pino Suarez 
were assassinated on the night of February 22. The fears 
which Covarrubias expressed were now realities, and his 
conversations with Laughlin and Mallet would shortly be 
used against him.
On March 3, Knox forwarded copies of Laughlin's 
messages containing the statements by the Mexican Minister 
to Ambassador Wilson in Mexico City.^^ Wilson considered 
Covarrubias' comments as disparaging and his attitude as 
inimical to the new Mexican government and so informed the 
Mexican Minister for Foreign Affairs Francisco de la Barra, 
Based on this information from the American Ambassador, de
la Barra relieved Covarrubias of his post, and plans were
17made for his transfer to Russia. Without intimating that 
l4Minute of Covarrubias' visit to Foreign Office, 
number 8?94, February 24, 1913, F.O. 37l/l6?l, PRO. This 
meeting apparently took place on February 20 or 21.
^^Stronge to Grey, February 20, 24, 1913, F.O, 371/ 
1671, PRO,
^^Knox to American Embassy (Mexico City), March 3, 
1913, SDP,
17The information about Wilson's part in this episode 
was revealed to Stronge by de la Barra, Stronge was com-
15
he had been the informant, Ambassador Wilson on March 8, re­
ported "he [Huerta] informed me that he [Huerta] had assur­
ances that the British Government had been misled as to the 
constitutionality of this Government by the Mexican Minister
to London, who has been removed, and that recognition by
18that Government would soon be made." There is no indication 
that the information supplied by Covarrubias had any more 
than a momentary effect on the Foreign Office. Huerta's 
claim to Wilson of British recognition, while well-founded, 
came only after days of diplomatic activity.
On the evening of February 20, Ambassador Wilson re­
ceived word that General Huerta would like to meet with the 
diplomatic corps at noon the next day. The Belgian Minister 
Paul May pointed out that attendance at such a reception 
would imply recognition of the new government. Acting on 
May's advice, Wilson called a meeting of the foreign 
ministers to discuss this development. They all realized 
that they were acting without instructions from their govern-
pletely in the dark not having been advised by either Wilson 
or the Foreign Office. Stronge to Grey, March 6, 11, 17,
1913; Grey to Stronge, March 8, 1913, F.O. 371/1671, PRO;
Bryan to American Embassy (London), March 13, 1913; Laughlin 
to Secretary of State, March l4, 1913, SDP; C. Romero, Mexi­
can Legation (London), to British Foreign Office, April 2,
1913, F.O. 371/1672, PRO, Ambassador Page later revealed 
that Covarrubias was unfriendly to Huerta, and that he had 
said he hoped and expected Huerta's fall, adding that he was 
glad the United States had not recognized him. Page to 
Secretary of State, July 25, 1913, SDP,
1 O
Wilson to Secretary of State, March 8 , 1913,
Foreign Relations 1913, 76O.
l6
ments, but it was unanimously decided that it was desirable 
for them to attend. The reasons given for their decision 
were: interest in reestablishing order under the new govern­
ment; the new government had followed constitutional forms, 
the president and vice-president had resigned, all the re­
quired formalities had been met, and the new government was 
considered as legally installed; the new cabinet was ex­
pected to inspire confidence in the administration; no 
obstacles should be thrown in the path of the government 
which might arise by their refusal to attend; and the new
government should benefit from the measure of recognition
19which their presence might imply.
The reception took place at noon on February 21* 
Ambassador Wilson as doyen of the diplomatic corps de­
livered a speech on behalf of the ministers. He congrat­
ulated President Huerta on assuming the office of "Interim
President of the Republic, in accordance with the laws that
20exist in Mexico." Wilson stressed the restoration of law 
and order by the new government. The British Minister was
^^Stronge to Grey, February 21, 1913, F.O. 371/1672, 
PRO, contains more detail on this meeting than any of Am­
bassador Wilson's dispatches about it. Thomas Beaumont 
Hohler, one of the secretaries at the British Legation pre­
pared a memorandum which Stronge enclosed with his message. 
This memorandum contained an excellent resumé of each new 
cabinet officer. Wilson to Secretary of State, February 21, 
1913, Foreign Relations 1913, 726-27.
20Ross, Madero, 326.
17
21happy to note that Huerta dwelt on this point in his reply. 
The Mexican President was obviously pleased with the meeting 
and especially by the friendly sentiments expressed. Al­
though Stronge and Wilson were in agreement on this matter, 
they were not in accord on the government statement over 
the assassinations.
Ambassador Wilson accepted the official explanation 
that Madero and Pino Suarez were killed "in an attempt to 
escape" more readily than the British Minister. Wilson ad­
vised the Secretary of State on February 24, that he accept­
ed the government's version of the deaths and considered it 
a closed incident. Knox thought it best, however, to await 
the report of the promised thorough investigation by the
22Mexican government before making any official statement. 
Stronge in his report elaborated on the American Ambassador’s 
attitude, "he [Wilson] accepts the official version of death 
of President and Vice-President, and has urged his Govern­
ment to do so too, as he thinks that the new administration 
will effect pacification of the country." Stronge was in­
clined to suspend judgement until the investigation was
^^Stronge to Grey, February 21, 1913, F.O, 371/l6?2, 
PRO. Victoriano Huerta to His Majesty King of England, 
February 19, 1913, F.O. 37l/l6?l, PRO, indicates the im­
portance which Huerta attached to guarantees for foreign 
interests, "Peace at last your subjects interests respected 
protected."
22De la Barra to the Mexican Embassy (Washington), 
February 23,1913» Foreign Relations 1913, 732; Wilson to 
Secretary of State, February 24, 1913, ibid., 736; Secre­
tary of State to Wilson, February 28, 1913, ibid., 747-48.
18
2 3
completed. If the implication of the British Minister's 
statement is clear, then Wilson accepted the government's 
account not so much because he believed it but because he 
thought the government could restore peace and order. By 
thus glossing over the affair there was a possibility that 
United States recognition would be extended without undue 
delay. Recognition by the Taft administration was with­
held, but not because of the murders.
Secretary Knox accepted Wilson's counsel as to the 
constitutional legality of the new government. But he de­
clined to recommend formal recognition until satisfactory 
arrangements could be made on certain outstanding grievances 
which existed between the United States and Mexico. These 
included: resolution of the Tlahualilo controversy, settle­
ment of the Chamizal tract, a convention arranging for the 
equitable distribution of the waters of the Colorado River, 
settlement of the border claims growing out of the battles 
at Aguaprieta and Juarez in 1911, and adjustment and com­
pensation of claims for the death of American citizens and 
the disturbances there. Ambassador Wilson was directed to 
advise the new government that recognition hinged on the
24satisfactory settlement of these problems. Wilson even
^^Stronge to Grey, February 24, 1913, F.O. 371/1671,
PRO.
24Knox to Wilson, February 21, 1913, Foreign Re­
lations 1913. 728-29»
19
told Stronge that recognition was being withheld pending
2 5settlement of these matters. The Mexican government 
assured the American Ambassador that the stated problems 
were receiving its attention and that there was no reason 
to believe that they could not be amicably resolved. 
Unfortunately, no concrete details were worked out before 
the Republicans left office in the United States. Secre­
tary Knox some years later told Wilson that he would have 
recommended recognition as late as ten o'clock on the 
morning of March 4th, if the Huerta government had conceded
27
the United States demands in full.
While the United States was holding out for the 
settlement of the grievances, the British also hesitated 
to extend immediate recognition but for different reasons. 
Ambassador Wilson's reports from February 24 through March 
1, indicated that British recognition was being withheld
^^Stronge to Grey, February 23, 1913, F.O. 371/1671,
PRO,
^^Wilson to Secretary of State, February 24, 1913, 
Foreign Relations 1913, 736-37*
27Henry Lane Wilson, Diplomatic Episodes in Mexico, 
Belgium and Chile (Garden City; Doubleday, Page and Company, 
1927), 297* President Taft some eight months later wrote 
"There was no time to recognize the Huerta Government before 
I left office. The battle was on in Mexico City until two 
or three days before I left office. All I could pray for 
was that I could turn over the situation to my successor." 
Taft to J, C. Schmidlapp, November I6 , 1913, William Howard 
Taft Papers, Library of Congress, Manuscripts Division,
Taft's account is not an exact statement of the circum­
stances .
20
r 28because of the deaths of Madero and Pino Suarez„ Stronge's
reports to the Foreign Office, however, clearly certified
that Huerta had assumed office through constitutional means,
and there was no indication that recognition should be with-
29held because of the assassinations. Several months later 
while dining together Stronge told Wilson that the British 
government had never considered Madero’s assassination after
30his resignation as in any way pertinent to recognition,
28Wilson to Secretary of State, February 24, 25,
March 1, 1913, Foreign Relations 1913, 736, 738, 750,
Edith 0'Shaughnessy, wife of the United States Charge 
d'affaires in Mexico City later wrote "Mr, Stronge did not 
counsel his government against recognition. He quite simply 
realized, as did the other diplomats, that Madero had but 
paid the normal though high price of political failure in 
Mexico. Recognition was given, not of course, at the moment, 
but with that decent regard for 'les convenances' which 
stamps British diplomacy with such dignity, when the affair 
was literally cold in its grave, and the protocolic amount 
of grass and weeds had grown above it,--nicely watered with 
oil." Edith 0'Shaughnessy, Intimate Pages of Mexican History 
(New York: George H, Doran Company, 1920), 235-36.
29Stronge to Grey, February 20, 21, March 1, 1913,
F,0, 371/1671, PRO, In the March 1 message he reported 
"United States Ambassador has informed his Government that 
present Mexican Government is a duly constituted and legal 
one. In this opinion I concur," Grey to Stronge, March 3, 
1913, F.O. 371/1671, PRO, instructed him "You should mean­
while not give any reason for supposing that recognition 
will be refused or that we shall bring into our consideration 
of the matter the death of Madero under circumstances of 
which we cannot have accurate knowledge."
30Henry Lane Wilson to Bryan, May 13, 1913, Woodrow 
Wilson Papers, Library of Congress, Manuscripts Division,
An example of the traditional account in which Great Britain 
withheld recognition because of the assassination and later 
reversed itself is in Ray Stannard Baker, Woodrow Wilson,
Life and Letters (8 vols,; Garden City: .Doubleday, Page and 
Doubleday, Doran & Co,, Inc., 1927-1939), IV, 240-43o
21
The Foreign Office as early as February 21, indicated 
that formal recognition would be extended to Huerta as soon 
as he notified the King in writing of his legal right to 
office, The only dissenting note had come from the Foreign 
Office, American Department, on February 19? and it merely 
suggested to the Foreign Secretary that recognition be with­
held until it had been determined that Huerta had been duly 
selected^ This comment was probably a direct consequence 
of Covarrubias' visit» Stronge's messages cleared up that 
point, and the only reference subsequently made to with­
holding recognition concerned the "provisional” aspect of 
the president's title.»^^
There was a little confusion over the title of 
"provisional" president which seemed to indicate that Huerta 
must still be confirmed in office, and Grey recommended that 
the proper time for him to write the King would be after he 
was finally installed» Stronge was able to resolve this 
problem by explaining that Huerta was president ad interim 
and, as such, ineligible for the office of president. The 
date of election for a permanent president would be set by 
Congress and it was anticipated that it would be held in
31Foreign Office, American Department, minute number 
8275? February 21, 1913? F.O. 371/1671? PRO, contains the 
dissenting opinion; see especially Foreign Office minute 
number 8310, February 21, 1913? F.O. 371/1671? PRO, in 
which the question of recognition is fully discussed with­
out any dissenting opinion; Grey to Stronge, February 22,
25? 1913? F0O» 371/1671? PRO; Stronge to Grey, February 25? 
1913? F»0o 371/1671? PRO.
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April.o Stronge also reported that Huerta would announce
32his accession to the presidency within a fortnighto
Things at least for the moment were at a stalemate. 
The United States refused recognition until Huerta agreed 
to the solution of the specific problems enumerated by 
Knox. Great Britain had promised recognition as soon as 
Huerta's letter was received, but that was at least some 
weeks awayo Based on the information given it by Laughlin 
and Wilson, the State Department was still under the im­
pression that Great Britain did not plan to recognize 
Huerta because of the assassinations. The situation left 
the diplomatic corps in Mexico in suspense.
On March 3, two weeks after Huerta had assumed 
office, the various foreign representatives in Mexico de­
cided to draft a statement which would define the position 
of the diplomatic corps in its relations with the Mexican 
government. Wilson, Stronge, and the German Minister 
Admiral Paul Von Hintze drev up the desired memorandum which 
stated, "The Diplomatic Body has in fact entered into commu­
nication with the Mexican Government reserving at the same 
time to the respective Governments the privilege of formally 
recognizing the provisional Government at whatever moment
^^Grey to Stronge, February 25, 1913, F.O. 371/1671» 
PRO, raises the question of the "provisional" title; Stronge 
to Grey, February 28, 1913, F.O, 371/1672, PRO, clears up 
ad interim part of title.
23
33they may consider opportune." The statement was agreed 
to by the heads of the other missions, and presented to 
de la Barra, Even though the diplomatic corps had clarified 
its position the failure of Great Britain to grant immediate 
recognition created problems for some of its commercial 
representatives in Mexico.
Jo Bo Body, director of the Mexican interests of the 
British Firm of So Pearson and Son, attempted on March 1 to 
reopen negotiations with the Mexican government. Body was 
informed that until Great Britain recognized the new govern­
ment, it "could hardly contemplate with satisfaction the
continuance of such business relations with a British 
34firm," At almost the same time the Minister of Justice
informed Luis Riba, legal adviser of the Mexican Light and
Power Company, that the United States, Germany, and France
3 5had already granted recognition. This was, of course, 
absolutely false. Stronge was at a loss to determine why 
these Mexican officials had taken such an attitude unless
3 3Stronge to Grey, two dispatches, March 3» 1913,
F.O, 371/1671 and F.O. 371/1672, PRO, The original state­
ment in French is included in Stronge*s letter of March 3» 
The British translation differs somewhat in wording but not 
in thought from the American. See Wilson to Secretary of 
State, March 3, 1913, Foreign Relations 1913, 753»
^^Stronge to Grey, March 3, 1913, F.O, 371/1672,
PRO. S, Pearson & Son was an English company with ex­
tensive interests in Mexico, especially oil. Weetman 
Dickinson Pearson, the head of this organization, was the 
First Viscount Cowdray, normally referred to as Lord Cowdray, 
See Chapter IX,
35Riba was one of Lord Cowdray's attorneys.
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they were trying to force the British to move faster on the
o A
recognition issueo They certainly accomplished nothing 
by it, and they took the risk of alienating the only govern­
ment which had promised to recognize them. Chances of United 
States recognition were at the same time beginning to dim.
The inauguration of President Woodrow Wilson on March 
4 brought no relief for the Mexican problem. Huntington 
Wilson, Assistant Secretary of State, with other state de­
partment officials had urged President Wilson a day or so 
after he assumed office to recognize Huerta without results.
On March 7, at the first cabinet meeting Mexico was discussed,
37but nothing was decided. ' Three days later, on March 10,
the new Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan, indicated
that the United States had no immediate plans in regard to
the recognition of the Mexican government. He informed the
British that the United States intended to maintain the
status quo, and meanwhile would closely observe the situ- 
38ation. This was followed by President Wilson's first 
policy statement on Latin America, which, while not spe­
cifically mentioning Mexico, certainly had that country in
^^Stronge to Grey, March 3, 1913, F.O, 371/l6?2,
PRO.
37Philip Holt Lowry, "The Mexican Policy of Woodrow 
Wilson" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. Dept, of Inter­
national Relations, Yale University, 1949), 4$. Lowry's 
excellent dissertation covers the entire eight years, 1913- 
1921, of the Wilson administration.
38Huntington Wilson, Assistant Secretary of State, 
Memorandum, March 10, 1913, SDP.
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mind.
The President's statement which was drafted with­
out the benefit of advice or counsel from the State Depart­
ment or from members of his cabinet revealed Wilson's pre-
go
possession with democratic forms and appearances.
Co-operation is possible only when supported at 
every turn by the orderly processes of just govern­
ment, based upon law and not upon arbitrary or ir­
regular force. We hold, as I am sure all thought­
ful leaders of republican government everywhere 
hold, that just government rests always upon the 
consent of the governed, and that there can be no 
freedom without order, based upon law and upon the 
public conscience and approval. We shall look to 
make these principles the basis of mutual inter­
course, respect, and helpfulness between our 
sister republics and ourselves.
The President pledged to use the influence of the United 
States to see that these objectives were realized. He 
emphasized that no sympathy would be shown toward those 
who seized office for their own personal interest or am­
bition. "As friends , , . we shall prefer those who act
in the interest of peace and honor, who protect private 
rights and respect the restraints of constitutional pro­
vision." He denied that the United States sought anything 
except what was best for the people and nations of Central 
and South America. The President stated that this public 
communique set forth as much of his policy toward Latin 
America as it was deemed necessary to announce at the
^^Baker, Wilson. IV, 64-69.
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kotime» Its overriding theme could easily be discerned. 
Ballots not bullets were the orderly processes which clothed 
governments with an aura of respectability.
It is impossible to understand United States-British- 
Mexican relations during this period without first under­
standing Woodrow Wilson. Wilson's thought, politics, and 
diplomacy were all deeply rooted in morality. Morality to 
Wilson was epitomized by the Christian religion, but the 
political reflection of morality was best characterized by 
popular sovereignty and self-government. He believed that 
the democratic process had reached its peak of perfection 
in the United States, The mission of the United States then 
was to encourage the development of democratic forms of 
government throughout the w o r l d , B u t  Wilson would go 
even farther. The moral force of the United States would 
be used to carry this doctrine to the rest of the world.
42This was a new kind of imperialism--"moral imperialism,"
40New York Times, March 12, 1913, 1:7, Editorial 
comment concluded that the statement was directed more to­
ward the pending revolutionary movement in Central America 
than toward Mexico, but it would apply equally well in 
either place. The Times (London), March 12, 1913, ?c, 
quoted only that part of the statement which reflected on 
trade relationships between the United States and Latin 
America overlooking completely the President's sentiment 
on constitutional government.
41Samuel Flagg Bemis, The Latin American Policy of 
the United States; An HistorTcal Interpretation (New York : 
Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc,, 1943), 168-69.
42Lowry, "The Mexican Policy of Woodrow Wilson,"
43-44.
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As applied to the recognition of governments which came to 
power through revolutionary means it gave birth to yet 
another term--’'constitutional legitimacy." In the case of 
Mexico it meant more than merely meeting the constitutional 
requirements* It inquired into the motives of the newly 
installed leaders. Were they motivated by high ideals or
was it only personal gain and ambition that had inspired
^ 3the overthrow of the old government? In addition, and 
perhaps even more important, did the government enjoy 
popular approval? Huerta might have complied with the 
letter of the law, but he could never pass Wilson's other 
tests. With this insight into the President's philosophy 
of foreign affairs it is easier to understand why the 
United States decided to maintain the status quo and observe 
the situation in the face of almost urgent appeals from Am­
bassador Wilson to extend recognition to the Huerta govern- 
ment,
Even before the President's statement of March 12, 
in regard to the United States' attitude toward Latin 
America, the Mexican government knew that de facto recog­
nition would be extended by Great Britain. The autograph
k 3Howard F. Cline, The United States and Mexico 
(Cambridge : Harvard University Press, 1953), 142. See
also, Arthur S. Link, Wilson the Diplomatist; A Look at 
his Major Foreign Policies (Baltimore; The Johns Hopkins 
Press, 1957), 3-291 for an analysis of Wilson's approach 
to foreign policy matters.
44Link, Wilson The New Freedom, 348, f.n. 5.
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letter from Huerta which the British were awaiting was dis­
patched on March 5» and a copy was cabled to the Mexican 
Embassy in London. When the copy was communicated to the 
King, the Embassy was informed that the King would await 
the original letter and that upon its receipt recognition 
would be granted to General Huerta, as interim president. 
Instructions from the Foreign Office to the various British 
embassies, specifically emphasized that recognition had been 
promised, and advised them to notify the governments to which 
they were accredited. There was some delay in transmitting 
this information to Washington and Mexico City which added 
to an already confused situation.
The State Department learned from Ambassador Wilson 
on March 13, that de la Barra had received word that Britain 
would recognize the Huerta government. This information 
must have come from the Mexican legation in London. Neither 
Stronge nor Lord James Bryce the British Ambassador to 
Washington had as yet received the instructions sent them 
about advising the governments to which they were accredited
^^De la Barra to the Mexican Legation (London), March 
11, 1913, FoO, 371/1671, PRO; Huerta to King George V, Febru­
ary 19, 1913, copies of the original in Spanish and the 
translation, F.O. 372/448, PRO. This message was dated Febru­
ary 19, but was not dispatched from Mexico until March 5®
Louis Mallet to Mexican Minister (London), March 6 , 1913,
F.O. 371/1671, PRO, noting receipt of Huerta's message of 
the 5th,, and informing him that they must await the arrival 
of the actual letter. Grey to Bryce (Washington), March 12, 
1913, F.O. 371/1671, PRO, is a copy of Grey's message in­
structing the several embassies to inform the government to 
which they were accredited.
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that the British government had promised recognition to
Huerta, Getting no information on the subject from Bryce,
Bryan instructed the American Embassy in London to inquire
into the matter and to learn just what position the British 
46had taken, Laughlin confirmed that Great Britain would
formally extend recognition to Mexico on receipt of the
k7official letter from Huerta, The Mexican government, 
however, was interested in speeding up the publicity 
surrounding the British decision.
De la Barra cabled their embassy in London on March 
11 to ascertain when the decision could be made public.
Grey advised the Mexican charge d'affaires that no pub­
licity could be given the British action until the letter
was received by the King and he had given the necessary
48directions regarding the appropriate reply to be made, 
Huerta's letter was finally received on March 25i and the 
King's formal reply was signed on the 31st, On that date 
Grey advised Stronge that he could inform Huerta that the 
King's reply would be sent shortly, and permission was
46Bryan to American Embassy (London), March 13, 1913,
SDP.
^^Laughlin to Secretary of State, March l4, 1913,
SDP.
48De la Barra to the Mexican Legation (London),
March 11, 1913, F.O. 371/l6yi, PRO; Mexican Charge d'affaires 
to Sir Edward Grey, March 20, 1913, F.O, 371/1671, PRO, 
acknowledging Grey's verbal note of March 19, in regard to 
publicity restrictions.
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granted to the Mexican government to make the information
public. This also cleared the way for Bartolomé Carbajal
y Rosas to replace Covarrubias as the new Mexican Minister
k9to Great Britain. The King's letter was not actually 
delivered to Huerta until May 3 ■> 1913»^^ This official 
act seems to have touched off an exchange between Mexico 
and the United States.
The negotiation of the outstanding problems ex­
isting between Mexico and the United States referred to 
previously as a condition of recognition had been agreed 
to in principle by Mexico as early as February 24.^^ How­
ever, this attitude of cooperation had begun to wane by 
early May. On the 7th Huerta and Ambassador Wilson con­
ferred on the question of United States recognition. After 
the meeting Huerta issued a rather pointed statement to the 
effect that the Mexican government was willing to arrange 
for the disposition of the pending questions, but the
L q
See Foreign Office minute number I3809, March 25, 
1913» F.O. 372/448, PRO, autographed copies of Huerta's and 
the King's letters are not in the Foreign Office Archives 
in the PRO; Grey to Stronge, March 31, 1913, F.O. 371/1672, 
PRO; Secretary of State to American Embassy (London), March 
28, 1913, SDP; Laughlin to Secretary of State, March 31, 
1913, SDP; C. Romero, Mexican Chargé d'affaires to Foreign 
Office, April 2, 1913, F.O. 371/1672, PRO; the British 
Ambassador to the Secretary of State, March 31, 1913, 
Foreign Relations 1913, 784-85.
5°Stronge to Grey, May 3, 1913, F.O. 372/448, PRO.
^H/'ilson to Secretary of State, February 24, 1913, 
Foreign Relations 1913, 736-37»
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failure of the United States to recognize the current govern-
52ment prevented a discussion of any except urgent matters,, 
Ambassador Wilson and the British Minister later discussed 
his meeting with the General»
Wilson had pointed out to Huerta that there were 
probably three things delaying recognition; "First, the 
circumstances attending the overthrow of the Madero Adminis­
tration; second, the claims of American citizens for losses 
incurred since disturbances began, about which no agreement 
had been arrived at; and third, the unsettled state of parts 
of the c o u n t r y . H u e r t a  had replied that it would be im­
possible to settle any of the outstanding questions without 
first obtaining recognition. Stronge felt that Huerta had 
put it in such a way that "he rather sought to elicit Mr. 
Wilson's opinion as to the effect that this attitude would 
produce." Without specifically giving any answer to this 
statement the United States Ambassador had offered a plan 
whereby he believed recognition would almost certainly re­
sult. Ambassador Wilson said that if the five major problems 
were settled both in principle and fact, and the United 
States still did not extend recognition he would apply what
S^stronge to Grey, May 12, 1913, F.O. 4l4/235, PRO, 
contains a translated copy of Huerta's statement. Wilson 
to the Secretary of State, May 8, 1913, Foreign Relations 
1913, 799-800, is Wilson's account of his meeting with 
Huerta.
^^Ibid. Stronge'8 account of the Wilson-Huerta 
meeting relates many facts not mentioned in Wilson's re­
ports.
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pressure he could by offering his resignation. He 
reasoned that the government would be unwilling to leave 
matters in the hands of a charge d'affaires, and they could 
not very well send a new ambassador without extending recog­
nition. Stronge was cautioned not to let word reach Washing­
ton that he [Ambassador Wilson] planned to use his intended
threat of resignation as a lever to force recognition of
5 5Huerta. As the Ambassador was to learn the new adminis­
tration in Washington was not predictable.
Ambassador Wilson's recommendations and advice were 
discounted almost from inauguration day for at least three 
reasons : a newspaper crusade against him because of his
alleged involvement in the Ten Tragic Days, a growing dis­
trust of his optimistic reports about the restoration of 
peace and order by Huerta, and the knowledge that he per­
sonified the "dollar diplomacy" of the Republican party.
Yet Washington hesitated to recall him because it would 
necessitate sending a new ambassador, and would thus force 
the question of recognition. On this point the Ambassador 
and Washington agreed. Unwilling any longer to rely on 
the Ambassador, the President turned to another means for 
information. The reports from William Bayard Hale, one of
54Certain members of the State Department were also 
advocating recognition. See John Bassett Moore, Memorandum 
to Secretary of State, May l4, 1913> SDP; Link, Wilson The 
New Freedom, 348-49, 351»
^^Stronge to Grey, May 12, 1913, F.O. 4l4/235, PRO.
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several executive agents sent to Mexico, began to arrive
in early June and were highly critical of Huerta and the
American Ambassador. Hale recommended forcing Huerta's
resignation after which new elections should be held with
the United States recognizing the new government. Hale
also recommended that :
the President should explain the reasons for his 
action to the European governments and appeal on 
high moral grounds for their acquiescence. He was 
convinced, Hale concluded, that the European govern­
ments would cooperate and that Huerta would yield 
peacefully, provided the American government made 
it plain that it was prepared to use force to obtain
its demands.56
In this instance Europe meant principally England, and the
President was already suspicious of the motives behind
57British recognition.
President Wilson relied a great deal more on personal 
diplomacy than he did on State Department channels in the 
handling of delicate foreign problems. The Hale mission to 
Mexico was one example, A second was the trip to Europe in 
the summer of 1913, of Colonel Edward Mandell House. House 
was a close personal friend of Wilson's and served as an 
unofficial adviser to the President on many matters. In
^^Link, Wilson The New Freedom, 35^-55*
^^Baker, Wilson, IV, 256, British oil interests 
especially Lord Cowdray were alleged to have been behind 
British recognition. Sir Edward Grey, under direct question­
ing in Parliament as early as May 30, denied that Cowdray 
had influenced British recognition. Grey did admit that 
Cowdray as well as others had made representations on the 
matter. The Times (London), May 30, 1913, 13b.
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England, on July 3, House had an opportunity to discuss 
the Mexican situation with Sir Edward Grey the British 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. The central thought 
which he left with the Foreign Secretary according to his 
own account was that it really didn't matter which faction 
was in control in Mexico as long as order was maintained.
He even suggested that Huerta might have been recognized 
if he had carried out his promise to have an early election. 
At least one historian concludes, and quite properly it 
seems, that House had completely misconstrued Wilson's 
attitude toward Mexico. He had created the impression that 
the President was no different than the vested interests in 
his approach to the Mexican problem. Namely, that the most 
important thing to be achieved there was order. It is also 
argued that if Grey had really known the President's feel­
ings then he might have taken a different course than the
m Q
one he pursued. At any rate a week after his meeting 
with House, Grey called the United States Ambassador Walter 
Hines Page to the Foreign Office.
He asked Page whether it was possible for the Presi­
dent to recognize the Mexican government? After the meeting 
Page expressed surprise that Grey had told him that British 
recognition of Huerta was only provisional and would be re­
considered after the election of the new Mexican president
^®Baker, Wilson. IV, 258-6O.
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on October 26, the date which had finally been set for the
election. What Page did not understand was that Huerta had
been recognized as president ad interim, or until the
election of a permanent president could be held. The
question of continued recognition would then be taken under 
59advisement.
In reply to Grey's inquiry about the possibility of 
the United States recognizing Huerta, Bryan informed Page 
that Ambassador Wilson had been summoned to Washington for
consultation on July 17» Under the circumstances Page was
instructed to avoid any discussion of the matter until the 
Department had talked with the Ambassador, and had decided 
on the policy which it would f o l l o w . N o n e t h e l e s s ,  Page 
intimated to Grey that he did not believe President Wilson 
would recognize Huerta because the proposed election was 
so near at hand. The Foreign Secretary was also informed 
that the close proximity of the United States and Mexico 
introduced conditions that the British did not fully apprec-
^^Page to Secretary of State, July 11, 1913, SDP.
^^Bryan to American Embassy (London), July 19, 1913, 
SDP; Nelson 0'Shaughnessy, Charge d'affaires to Secretary 
of State, July 1?, 1913, Foreign Relations, 1913, 812, ad­
vising of the Ambassador's departure, and announcing that 
he [0'Shaughnessy] had taken charge of the embassy. Wilson 
left Mexico on July 1?, and arrived in New York on July 26. 
New York Times, July 17, 1:8; l8 , 2:6; 26, 1913, 1:1. The 
Ambassador in his book. Diplomatic Episodes in Mexico, 312, 
states he did not arrive in New York until August 1. New 
York Times anticipated that his resignation would be accepted 
at the end of the conferences, July 25, 1913, 1:6.
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iatco Grey agreed and indicated that there was no desire 
on his part to " p u s h , P a g e ' s  comments were confirmed in 
a telegram from the British Embassy in Washington. Sir 
Edward Grey was informed that there was little chance the 
United States would recognize Huerta, and also that Ambassador 
Wilson would not return to Mexico because of his outspoken 
sympathy for H u e r t a T h u s ,  even the influencé of the 
British Foreign Office coupled with Ambassador Wilson's re­
commendations had not been enough to move the American Presi­
dent .
The recognition controversy was continually in the 
news, and the events of the summer of 1913 gave it even 
greater prominence. Ambassador Wilson's recall for "con­
sultation," the Hale and House missions, Huerta's almost 
defiant attitude toward Washington, the Constitutionalist 
movement in Northern Mexico, and the talk of possible inter­
vention had all contributed to the publicity. Great Britain 
came in for some criticism over having recognized Huerta, 
and it was even insinuated that the British decision had 
been influenced by powerful financial interests.
Such accusations concerning the reasons for Britain's 
recognition of the Mexican government finally brought a re-
^^Page to Secretary of State, July 25, 1913, SDP.
^^Grey to Stronge, July 26, 1913, F.O. 204/420, PRO, 
repeating Washington to Foreign Office, July 25, 1913.
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buttai from the Foreign Office. The decision was defended 
not in an official government statement, but rather in an 
anonymous article which oneared in the press in mid-August. 
Criticism of the British policy, it was asserted, was based 
on a misconception of the facts, and charges that financial 
interests had been behind recognition were repudiated.
The recognition of President Huerta was the recog­
nition of a Provisional President pending an election.
It was done on the advice of the British Minister to 
Mexico as being likely to assist in the restoration 
of order--an important consideration in view of the 
large British interests involved.
The French and German Governments also recognized 
President Huerta after a reception by him of the whole 
diplomatic party at which a congratulatory speech was 
made in their behalf by the American Ambassador.
The New York Times account created a stir in Washing­
ton and Page was asked to determine whether or not it had 
originated in the British Foreign Office. Bryan expressed 
particular concern over that part of the statement which 
implied that Ambassador Wilson's congratulatory speech had 
influenced not only the British but the French and German 
decisions too. Page confirmed that the press release had
6kbeen inspired by the Foreign Office.
In an interview two days after the statement was 
published, Ambassador Wilson was asked whether he believed 
reports that the Foreign Office was responsible for the
^^New York Times. August 12, 1913, 3:4.
64Bryan to American Embassy (London), August 13,
1913, SDP; Page to Secretary of State, August 14, 1913,
SDP.
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news release» The Ambassador who was thoroughly familiar 
with British diplomatic practice could not believe that 
the Foreign Office had based their recognition of Huerta 
on anything that he had said. Therefore, he categorically 
denied that his remarks had in any way influenced the 
British decision, but rather he claimed recognition had 
been extended to assist in the restoration of order. In 
any event, the speech, the Ambassador asserted, had actual­
ly been drawn up by the Spanish and British Ministers at 
the suggestion of all the diplomats, and he declined to 
accept the responsibility for its wording.
The Spanish Minister admitted that he and Stronge 
had drafted the speech, and expressed the opinion that it 
had not influenced British policy. Stronge refused to 
comment "due to illness." Other diplomats generally felt 
that it was the strong representations from the British 
Minister in Mexico City, and not the Ambassador's speech 
which brought about British recognition.^^
President Wilson was thoroughly upset by the 
Ambassador's comments which he felt cast a reflection on 
the British Foreign Office. The President considered 
them a serious breach of propriety. He immediately in­
structed Bryan to disclaim any responsibility for Ambas-
1 :2 .
^^New York Times, August l4, 1:1; August 15» 1913, 
G^ibid., August 15, 1913, 3:2-3.
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sador Wilson’s interview and to advise Sir Edward Grey
6 7
that it was very much to be regretted.
Bryan also reacted quite angrily over the affair.
He wanted to discharge the Ambassador immediately, but was 
advised by John Bassett Moore, Counselor of the State De­
partment, that since there seemed to be some provocation 
summary dismissal was rather extreme. In reality the ad­
ministration had already accepted Wilson's resignation, 
but it was not to be effective until October l4« The only 
question was whether it should be made to take effect at 
once. Since about fifteen hundred dollars in salary was 
at stake, it would amount to a substantial penalty. Bryan 
then askecT Moore about the advisability of a reprimand with 
a warning that a repetition of like offense would bring 
immediate dismissal. Moore did not agree with this pro­
cedure either because he felt it might look like they were 
trying to strike a bargain with the Ambassador to keep him 
quiet, Moore’s able arguments calmed Bryan, and they then 
turned to the wording of the message to London repudiating 
the Ambassador’s interview which President Wilson had in­
structed the Secretary of State to prepare,
Bryan had already made a draft of the telegram, but 
its wording was so blunt that Moore recommended some changes 
before it was transmitted. In so doing he gave the Secre-
^^Bryan to American Embassy (London), August l4,
1913, SDP; New York Times, August 15, 1913, 1:2.
4o
tary of State some extremely sage advice, "it should al­
ways be borne in mind that a government as compared with 
an individual, occupied a position of advantage, and that 
it was therefore incumbent upon it to speak with dignity 
and moderation and avoid a tone of petulance and resent­
ment o" Even though Moore had moderated the apology to 
London the wording of the message indicated quite force­
fully that the United States government could not accept
68the responsibility for such outbursts. This still left 
Bryan with an unfinished task. He had to write Ambassador 
Wilson and advise him that his statements to the press had 
been officially denied.
Bryan's letter of admonition to Ambassador Wilson 
was quite mild in comparison to the message to Page which 
he delivered to the Foreign Office. A few weeks later 
Ambassador Wilson obtained a copy of the Department's 
telegram to Page and realized just how emphatic the govern­
ment had been in repudiating his statements. After realiz­
ing that he had been denounced in no uncertain terms he 
wrote Bryan a blistering letter in which he justified his 
own action and severely criticized both Bryan and the
69President for their attitude in regard to the entire affair.
^^Moore, Memorandum, August l4, 1913, John Bassett 
Moore Papers, Library of Congress, Manuscripts Division.
^^Henry Lane Wilson to W. J. Bryan, August 28, 1913, 
in Wilson, Diplomatic Episodes in Mexico, 378-86.
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President Wilson's regrets over the incident as 
expressed by Page were accepted by Grey, although he in­
dicated surprise at the President's apology* The inter­
view reportedly had not caused the least ill-feeling 
70there* The British Foreign Secretary could deny the 
importance which he attached to Ambassador Wilson's re­
marks to Huerta in February, but he had found occasion to 
mention them at least twice before the newspaper article 
appeared.
Grey's first reference to it on May 21, was similar 
to the August 12 press release, but was not made public.
In a message to Sir Cecil Spring-Rice, the British Ambas­
sador to the United States, Grey indicated that the speech 
had inferred a certain measure of recognition. A week 
later in an exchange with a member of Parliament, Grey 
gave the Ambassador's remarks an entirely different con­
notation. "In February last," he said, "the whole diplo­
matic body attended a reception of General Huerta at which
a congratulatory speech was made on their behalf by the
71American Ambassador." The difference in emphasis between
^^Page to Secretary of State, August l8 , 1913, SDP; 
New York Times, August l6 , 1913, 3:7»
^^Grey to Sir Cecil Spring-Rice, May 21, 1913, F.O. 
4l4/235, PRO, which in part states "entire Diplomatic Body 
paid him [Huerta] a complimentary visit, at which the United 
States Ambassador pronounced a speech of congratulation.
This in itself constituted a certain measure of recognition, 
and it was understood that all the foreign representatives 
were agreed as to the advisability of doing everything
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the two comments is quite obvious. The important question 
was not really the remarks themselves, but whether they had 
been instrumental in the British decision to recognize Huerta.
The Ambassador's reference to the reestablishment of 
peace merely expressed sentiments shared by members of the 
diplomatic corpso Prospects of the restoration of order no 
doubt played some part in the British decision, but the 
evidence also indicates that Grey was completely satisfied 
with the legal aspects of the situation. In all fairness 
to both parties, Ambassador Wilson's speech certainly did 
nothing to discourage British recognition, nor is it reason­
able to assume that it played any significant part in such 
an important decision. It must, however, be admitted that 
Ambassador Wilson was a powerful influence on Stronge, the 
British Minister.
Ambassador Wilson seemed constantly to take the 
initiative on matters, and Stronge frequently followed 
suit. The British Minister's messages to the Foreign Office 
are heavily flavored with references to the American Am­
bassador's views and his own agreement with the action or
72
policy recommended. Undoubtedly, this was recognized by
possible to diminish difficulties of Huerta's Government, 
which seemed only one likely to restore tranquillity. In 
these circumstances, and having regard to extensive British 
interests in Mexico, His Majesty's Government took the step 
they did." See also Grey's reply to queries from one of the 
members of Parliament about British recognition of Huerta,
The Times (London), May 30, 1913, 13b.
72One example among a number is Strong to Grey,
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Grey and may well have been a factor in Stronge’s own re­
call, which had been planned even before the Foreign Office 
was aware that Ambassador Wilson would not return to Mexico.
The February revolution had given Mexico a new Presi­
dent but it had created almost as many problems as it had 
solved. From the diplomatic point of view the problems can 
be telescoped to a few basic issues. Great Britain and a 
number of other nations after satisfying themselves that 
Huerta was the de facto president of Mexico extended recog­
nition. The question of United States recognition was com­
plicated by a change in administrations, and by an ambassador 
who advocated a policy contrary to that held by his superiors 
in Washington. Events in Mexico did nothing to help solve 
the problem, and finally led to Ambassador Wilson's recall.
He had hardly reached home before he became involved in an 
open disagreement with the British government.
In spite of this disagreement it was evident that the 
Ambassador was more sympathetic with the British policy than 
with that of his own government. This may also explain why 
he and the British Minister were able to work so compatibly. 
He had cooperated closely with the new Mexican government-- 
so much so that it was reflected in Washington's attitude 
toward the Ambassador, Wilson's efforts to secure recog-
March 1, 1913, F,0, 371/1671, PRO, "United States Ambassador 
has informed his Government that present Mexican Government 
is a duly constituted and legal one. In this opinion I con­
cur," Stronge's association with Ambassador Wilson during 
the Ten Tragic Days was noted earlier.
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nition for Huerta had failed» He had been unable to under­
stand or appreciate the new moral philosophy of the Demo­
cratic administration, but for that matter neither had the 
British» The recall of the American Ambassador ended one 
phase in the Mexican imbroglio. The change of British 
Ministers was to introduce another phase»
CHAPTER III 
SIR LIONEL CARDEN
On July 185 1913, it was reported that Sir Lionel 
Edward Greasley Carden had been appointed British Minister 
to Mexico to replace Francis William Stronge. This was 
confirmed the following day by Page, who advised that the 
formalities of the appointment still needed to be com­
pleted o ^
Carden was a veteran of over thirty-five years in 
the British diplomatic service, all of which had been 
spent in Latin America and the Caribbean. He began his 
service in Cuba in 1877 and was transferred to Mexico in 
1882 or 1883, where he remained until I898. He returned 
to Cuba in I898 as Consul-General and in 1902 was appoint­
ed Minister. In 1905, he became Minister to Guatemala,
and by April 1913 was also Minister to Honduras, El
2
Salvador and Nicaragua.
^Washington Star, July I8 , 1913, clipping in SDP; 
New York Times, July 19,1913, 2:3; Page to Secretary of 
State, July 19, 1913, SDP.
2
Who's Who 1907 (London: Adam and Charles Black,
1907), 290; Laughlin to Secretary of State, April 11, 1913, 
SDP, Carden died in London, October I6 , 1915, New York 
Times, October 17, 1915, 15:5.
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During his years of service Carden had created the 
impression that he was "anti-American," leading to com­
plaints about him by the State Department to the British 
Foreign Office. The Foreign Office replies had taken the 
general tone that he was not really so much anti-American 
as pro-British. His appointment to Mexico at this par­
ticular time created a stir and resulted in a request that 
Page try to delay it. Page read the earlier correspondence 
on Carden between the Embassy and the Foreign Office which 
the latter rejected, and concluded that unless some new
3
facts could be obtained the request '.'ould be denied. The 
State Department decided to drop the matter and to consider 
it a closed incident. But events in Mexico delayed Carden’s 
arrival for several months.
On July 21, Stronge was asked to see if Carden's 
appointment as his successor would be agreeable to the 
Mexican government. A few days later Lord Cowdray received 
a wire from Luis Riba requesting that he do everything
^Bryan to J. P. Tumulty, July 19, 1913» SDP; Boaz 
W. Long to the President, "Statement Regarding Sir Lionel 
Carden Great Britain's Newly Appointed Minister to Mexico," 
July 19, 1913, SDP; Tumulty to J. B, Moore, July 24, 1913» 
SDP; Bryan to American Embassy (London), July 25» 1913»
SDP; Page to Secretary of State, July 29, 1913» SDP; Russell 
H, Fitzgibbon, Cuba and the United States 1900-1935 (Menasha, 
Wisconsin; George Banta Publishing Company, 1935)» 108-109» 
relates the United States' problems with Carden in Cuba.
4
SDP,,
Bryan to American Embassy (London), July 31» 1913
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possible to keep Stronge in Mexico because of Stronge's 
great assistance to the Mexican government» Stronge's 
impending departure was delayed for some w e e k s T h e  
immediate need for Stronge's retention in Mexico is un­
certain, but he soon became an invaluable intermediary be­
tween the Mexican government and President Wilson's new 
agent extraordinary to Mexico, John Lind.
After Ambassador Wilson's recall to Washington the 
President did not want to send a new ambassador, but he 
did want a personal representative in Mexico. Ex-Governor 
:ahn Lind of Minnesota, a long-time friend of the Secretary 
of State was selected for the mission. Lind's goal was to 
secure the early elimination of Huerta and to serve as con­
ciliator between the Constitutionalists in the North and 
the government in Mexico City. Other governments, in­
cluding the British, were asked to use their good offices 
to get Huerta to give serious consideration to the Lind 
proposals. Unfortunately, the Mexican President learned 
of the forthcoming visit through the newspapers and im­
mediately announced that he would ignore Lind unless he
^Grey to Stronge, July 21, 1913, F»0. 204/420, PRO; 
Riba to Lord Cowdray, July 27, 1913, Cowdray Papers, these 
papers are in the custody of S» Pearson & Son, Limited, 
London, England. Cowdray was suspected as having heavily 
influenced the British government in its recognition of 
Huerta, and of having engineered Carden's appointment there, 
Stronge did not return to England until October 4, The Times 
(London), October 6 , 1913, 9a»
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arrived with credentials as ambassador. Huerta rejected 
any plan to come to terms with the Constitutionalists.^ 
Stronge offered to use his special friendship with Huerta
7
to avoid further friction over the impending mission.
The Foreign Office, however, preferred to move cautiously, 
not willing to jeopardize Mexican good will, and advised 
Stronge that it was best not to intervene unless asked to
Q
by both sideso
Huerta's opposition to the Lind mission created an 
unfavorable reaction in the United States. Grey modified 
his instructions to Stronge after he was warned by the 
British Embassy in Washington that if this attempt at 
mediation failed, armed intervention by the United States 
appeared inevitable. The British Minister was advised to 
discuss the matter unofficially with the Mexican government, 
and to inform Huerta that it would be a serious mistake not
^Arthur S. Link, Wilson The New Freedom (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1956), 356-59; Ray Stannard 
Baker, Woodrow Wilson, Life and Letters (8 vols.; Garden 
City: Doubleday, Page and Doubleday, Doran & Co., 1927-
1939), IV, 264-69; stronge to Grey, August 6 , 1913, F.O. 
414/235, PRO.
^Stronge to Grey, August 7, 1913, F.O. 371/1674,
PRO,
O
Grey to Stronge, August 9, 1913, F.O. 371/1674,
PRO. Grey had been informed by the British Embassy in 
Washington on August 6 , that President Wilson's plan was 
destined to failure because the elections for a new Mexi­
can president would not be accepted by the contending 




to receive Lind and hear him out.
A few days after Lind's arrival in Mexico City 
Stronge found an opportunity on August l6 to meet him and 
to discuss in general some of the problems. During this 
meeting Lind accepted Stronge's offer to arrange a meeting 
with Huerta. That same evening at a dinner party given in 
his honor by Huerta, Stronge was able to work out the 
arrangements whereby Lind would receive an audience with 
the Mexican President. The British Minister was instru­
mental in smoothing the way for Lind and did what he could 
to ease tensions between Mexico City and W a s h i n g t o n . T h e  
best tribute to Stronge's efforts was made by Lind when he 
related that if Stronge had remained in Mexico he believed 
a settlement could have been reached.
9
Grey to Stronge, two dispatches dated August 11, 
1913, F.O. 204/420, PRO. Grey was still opposed to the 
idea of the British acting as mediator unless requested to 
do so by both parties. Page to Secretary of State, August 
22, 1913, SDP. Cowdray was convinced that the Lind mission 
would do no good as it would make the Mexicans feel like 
they were being dictated to. He also feared intervention 
might cause a shutdown of his operations there. Cowdray to 
Herbert J. Carr, in charge of the New York office of S. 
Pearson & Son, August 9, 1913, Cowdray Papers.
^^Stronge to Grey, August 19, 1913, F.O. 4l4/235,
PRO. Cowdray who was well informed on Mexican matters re­
ported that "I saw the Foreign Office yesterday and they 
told me that Stronge is doing all he can--of course un­
officially and in friendly spirit--with Huerta so as to 
cause as little irritation to Washington as possible." 
Cowdray to Guillermo de Landa y Escandon, August 21, 1913, 
Cowdray Papers.
^^Lind to Bryan, November 1, 1913, Wilson Papers.
The high regard in which the Mexicans held Stronge was re-
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The question naturally arises as to why Stronge was
replaced by Carden. Carden was transferred, the Foreign
Office claimed, because a crisis existed in Mexico and he
12was asked to take over the post. Conditions in Mexico 
during the summer of 1913 were in a turmoil, and undoubted­
ly the British concluded that they needed a firmer hand 
there. It has already been noted that Stronge was in­
fluenced by Ambassador Wilson, and the Foreign Office may 
well have wanted someone to take the lead instead of follow­
ing in the footsteps of the American representative. Carden 
had more experience in Latin America and particularly in 
Mexico than Stronge. His well-known sympathy for and pro­
tection of British interests and his willingness to "stand 
up" to the United States, no doubt served as factors in his 
selection. British commercial interests were suspected of 
having had a hand in the matter too. Lord Cowdray was ac­
cused, but repeatedly denied any part in Carden's appoint­
ment. Lind remained convinced, however, that Cowdray and 
the English government were after a monopoly of Mexican oil.
lated on several occasions. At a farewell banquet in his 
honor Huerta eulogized him and stated that he would never 
forget all that Stronge had done for him. The Times (London), 
August 8, 1913, 8c. The Foreign Office also received a 
formal note of thanks for delaying Stronge's departure.
Grey to Carden, November 12, 1913, F.O. 204/420, PRO.
^^The Times (London) Weekly Edition, March 20, 1914, 
233b. It should be noted that this statement was not forth­
coming until almost eight months after the appointment was 
made.
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and that Stronge was just not big enough to pull it off;
13hence Carden's appointment. It was evident Carden thought
the: overthrow of Madero and the establishment of a strong
government under Huerta would end the anarchy and bring
l4order to Mexico. In a memorandum to Grey just before he 
left for Mexico, Carden unburdened himself on the situation 
there and how it could best be handled.
The document was a condemnation of United States 
policies in Latin America, and a clear expression of British
Cowdray to American Ambassador [Page], November 
17, 1913, copy in Cowdray Papers; copy of an undated state­
ment to the editors of certain newspapers from Cowdray, 
Cowdray Papers; Lind to Bryan, October 25» 1913» Wilson 
Papers, This same view was expressed by Henry Cl^y Pierce, 
President of the Pierce Oil Co., and a Cowdray competitor 
in Mexico, Memorandum, Long to Bryan, November 3» 1913»
SDP. The head of the Pierce interests in Mexico, J. N. Gal­
braith, was known to have been filling Lind with much anti- 
Cowdray propaganda. One report asserted that the Pierce 
[Galbraith] and Standard Oil interests were backing the 
Constitutionalist revolution against the Huerta government, 
and were also influencing the United States government in 
its opposition to Huerta. The Mexican government, there­
fore, highly resented the close association and intimacy 
between Lind and Galbraith, and asked that Bryan so inform 
Lind. C. F. Z. Caracristi to Honorable John H. Stephens, 
Democratic Representative from Texas, September 21, 1913» 
SDP; Another claimed, "Strictly confidentially learned to­
day from American attache that Galbraith has been month 
past assuring Lind that you are endeavouring by a loan to 
make General Huerta resistance to United States possible," 
and that Carden's support of Huerta was due to your in­
fluence, Fred Adams to Lord Cowdray, November 25» 1913, 
Cowdray Papers.
l4Carden's views on this were revealed in an inter­
view in London, March 15» 1913, see Inclosure A to letter, 
Covarrubias to Page, October 26, 1913, SDP. Covarrubias 
stated that the interview was reported in the Evening 
Standard, March 15» 1913.
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economic imperialism. It could have been considered a 
perfect rejoinder to President Wilson's statement of March 
12, In Carden's opinion United States' policies in Mexico 
from 1910 to 1913» had been inept, in bad faith, and had 
already been responsible for huge losses to British in­
vestors. He feared American intervention might mean the 
complete destruction of British economic interests there. 
Huerta, Carden stated, appeared able to restore order, and, 
in fact, had already made some progress toward that end.
The United States on grounds completely unrelated to 
Huerta's ability to govern or to provide guarantees to 
foreigners was determined to force his resignation. Carden 
considered it utter madness to think of substituting a new 
and untried man for Huerta, and concluded that to give 
"moral support to such a policy would be absolutely sui­
cidal to our interests."
Britain must now, he argued, turn its attention to 
a policy which would provide protection for her investments 
in Mexico, Such a step would free the British from ac­
quiescing in a policy which was not in the best interests 
of the Empire, The solution was to give Huerta a free 
hand and all the moral and financial support possible.
Such a plan Carden believed would best serve Great Britain 
and British interests. The memorandum reveals that in 
sending Carden to Mexico Grey was well aware that a new 
and risky game was about to be played. Carden hoped to
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thwart President Wilson’s idealistic crusade.
Carden departed from Southampton on September l8, 
and reached Veracruz, October 7, where he met Lind for the 
first time at a luncheon given by United States Rear Ad­
miral Frank Friday Fletcher, commanding the naval forces 
in Mexican w a t e r s , S o  far Lind had been unsuccessful 
in reaching any agreement with Huerta, and he tried to 
impress on Carden the wisdom of President Wilson's policy.
He told Carden that if Huerta would eliminate himself as 
a candidate in the October 26 presidential election, then
he did not believe there would be any objection if Huerta
17later resumed the office. Carden interpreted this to
^^Carden to Grey, September 12, 1913» F.O, 414/235» 
PRO5 and "Memorandum by Sir L. Carden," attached.
^^Ibid., Carden to Grey, October 21, 1913, F.O. 4l4/ 
235» PRO; Burton K. Hendrick, The Life and Letters of Walter 
H, Page (3 vols.; New York: Doubleday, Page & Company,
1924-1926), I, 197* Hendrick indicates Carden stopped in 
New York enroute to Mexico where the New York World pub­
lished an interview with him in "which he was reported as 
declaring that President Wilson knew nothing about the 
Mexican situation and in which he took the stand that 
Huerta was the man to handle Mexico at this crisis," Hen­
drick is one year off on this reported interview which was 
published on September 17» 1914, after Carden had been re­
lieved of his post in Mexico and had been assigned as 
Minister to Brazil, This is one of two Carden interviews 
quickly repudiated by the Foreign Office, New York Times, 
October I6 , 1914, l8:l. Hendrick contains several other 
minor errors in his account of Carden, I, 196-98.
^^Lind most likely meant that he could see no reason 
why the United States would object to Huerta's candidacy at 
some subsequent election, as long as he did not run in 
October,
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mean that President Wilson was looking for some way in 
which to extricate himself with dignity from the impassé»
Lind also tried to convey to Carden the necessity for the 
government to come to terms with the Constitutionalists. 
Carden was quite skeptical of the revolution in the North 
and doubted that Carranza exercised any real control over 
the widely scattered rebel bands. He was convinced that 
these men were satisfied with their life of fighting and 
looting, and in all probability would not be willing to 
abandon it for whatever government might be established
18in Mexico City, Carden countered by attempting to enlist 
Lind to the British cause.
The British Minister advocated support of Huerta on 
the grounds that he was the kind of strong man Mexico need­
ed at this time. He argued that the country was in no con­
dition to hold an election and that it would only make things 
worse. He did not say so but he meant that the election 
would not solve anything unless Huerta was permitted to be 
a candidate. Carden offered two alternatives: recognize
Huerta until elections could be held at a later date, or 
permit him to stand as a candidate in the October 26 
election and then resign after a suitable successor was 
decided upon. Lind did not have authority to accept either 
proposition. He then asked Lind what attitude Washington
1 8
Carden to Grey, October 21, 1913, F.O. 4l4/235,
PRO. Venustiano Carranza, Chief of the Constitutionalists.
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would take if Mexico was pacified even though the election
of October 26 was not successful? Lind could not say how
Washington might react. In any event, he gathered from
conversations with Carden that either the elections would
19be postponed or, if held, set aside as void.
The evidence that Carden was aware of Huerta's
plans at this early date came only from his conversations 
with Lind. Lind knew that the British Minister had talked 
with Fred Adams on the day he [Lind] and Carden met. Adams 
was in charge of engineering contracts for Lord Cowdray in 
Mexico, and Lind was convinced that Adams was the man be­
hind the Mexican throne. Adams was no doubt well informed
and probably told Carden that he suspected the election 
would be annulled one way or another, and that Huerta in­
tended to remain president ad interim for the forseeable 
future.^^
President Wilson agreed fully with the course Lind 
had taken in his meeting with Carden. He recommended that 
Lind do his best to bring Carden around to the United 
States point of view, indicating that there had been no
John Bassett Moore to American Embassy (London), 
October 11, 1913, copy in Wilson Papers, quoting Lind's 
account of the meeting.
20Ibid. In reality Carden had two separate meet­
ings with Lind on October 7, in between which he met with 
Adams. There is no way to "prove" that Huerta had al­
ready formulated his plan to insure the election would 
not be valid, but the evidence to support such a theory 
will be introduced in the succeeding pages.
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change in his attitude toward Huerta. The President in­
sisted on "a moral as well as a physical basis for govern- 
21ment there," As a result of the Lind-Carden meeting the
President asked Page to adroitly impress on Grey "that
moral considerations should be put before material at
every point in the treatment of the Mexican situation,"
and it was hoped that the Foreign Office would encourage
22Carden to take this broader view. Events in Mexico City 
were destined to pull the United States and Great Britain 
even farther apart on the Mexican question than they seemed 
at this point.
The dissolution of the twenty-sixth national Congress 
by General Huerta on October 10, 1913j is invariably re­
counted as if it was a sudden and totally unanticipated 
stroke. Related in that fashion it appears that President 
Wilson was completely unprepared and shocked by it. But 
a review of the correspondence Nelson 0'Shaughnessy, United 
States Charge d'affaires in Mexico City, sent during the 
preceding month contains a number of warnings in which he
21Moore to American Ambassador (London), October 11, 
1913, SDP, quoting the President's reply to Lind of October
10, 1913.
22 Ibid. Bryan suggested to the President that Page 
be instructed to explain Carden's attitude to the Foreign 
Office and to explain the reasons for the President's 
position. Beyond this he felt that nothing further could 
be done except to watch developments. Manton M. Wyvell, 
Bryan's private secretary, to Joseph P. Tumulty, October 
10, 1913, Wilson Papers,
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predicted this very thing* In fact, he advised the State 
Department several days before the session began on 
September l6 that the Huerta government looked on Congress
with apprehension and "if Congress becomes uncontrollable
2 3Huerta will dissolve it»" The session was barely under­
way when the expected trouble between the Chamber of Depu­
ties and Huerta broke into the open» 0'Shaughnessy again 
warned "if the Chamber perseveres in opposing the Chief 
Executive there will be a dissolution of the Chamber and 
a military dictatorship," Huerta during one of the crises 
did tell 0'Shaughnessy that he had no intention of dis­
solving the Chamber, but to 0'Shaughnessy it was apparent
24that things could not long go on as they were» Relations 
between Huerta and the Congress went from bad to worse 
until finally the showdown came on October 10.
The incident which brought about the dissolution
230'Shaughnessy to Secretary of State, September 9, 
1913» Wilson Papers; Bryan to American Embassy (Mexico 
City), October 13,1913, SDP» Many of the members of this 
Congress were opposed to Huerta. They had been elected on 
June 30, 1912, while Madero was President. That election 
is often acclaimed as the most honest and free ever held 
in Mexico to that time. Mexican Herald (Mexico City),
June 30, 1912, 3:3-4; July 1, 1912, 1:3; for an evaluation 
of the conditions at the time of the election in 1912 see 
Charles Curtis Cumberland, Mexican Revolution, Genesis 
under Madero (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1952),
248-50; Stanley R. Ross, Francisco I. Madero Apostle of 
Mexican Democracy (New York: Columbia University Press,
1955), 225-26; Jose C. Valades, Imaainacion v Realidad de 
Francisco I. Madero (2 vols.; Mexico: Antigua Liberia
Robredo, I960), II, 248-49.
240 *Shaughnessy to Secretary of State, two dis­
patches dated September 19, 1913, Wilson Papers.
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of the Congress was the disappearance of Senator Belisario 
Dominguez from the State of Chiapas. Dominguez had planned 
to deliver an anti-Huerta speech on September 23? but he 
was ruled out of order and the speech was made a matter of 
record. Dominguez disappeared and rumors were that he was 
dead. The Chamber of Deputies on October 10 passed a reso­
lution to form a commission to investigate the matter; the 
general tone of which was a reflection on the government.
It was even threatened that if the members could not de­
pend on the government to protect them, then they would 
be forced to hold their sessions where protection would 
be available--presumably behind Constitutionalist lines.
This resolution was just one in a series of Chamber 
actions to which Huerta objected. Failing to get the 
Deputies to reconsider the resolution, Congress was dis­
solved and 110 deputies were imprisoned. Elections for 
the new Congress were set for October 26, the same day the 
presidential election was to be held. Shocked by such to­
talitarian action and at the undisguised dictatorship.
President Wilson notified O 'Shaughnessy that the results
25of the proposed elections would not be recognized.
25U. S., Department of State, Papers Relating to
the Foreign Relations of the United States |l913l (Washing­
ton; Government Printing Office, 1920), 83o-46 (hereafter
cited as Foreign Relations 1913); Bryan to American 
Embassy (Mexico City), October 13» 1913» SDP; Mexican Herald, 
October 10, 1913, 1:6-7; October 11, 1913, 1:6-7; Fidencio 
S. Soria, Las Tempestuosas v Mémorables Sesiones Habidas en 
la Camara de Diputados del Congreso de la Union las Noches
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It is interesting to compare the reactions of 
0 ’Shaughnessy and Carden to the dissolution of the Congress. 
While 0'Shaughnessy had anticipated Huerta's action, still 
his reports contained an element of surprise and indict­
ment* He informed Bryan, for example, "Huerta may now be 
considered an absolute military d i c t a t o r . C a r d e n ' s  re­
ports on the other hand were quite matter of fact, and 
one concluded that "The general opinion amongst Heads of 
Missions seemed to be that the action of the President 
was justified by circumstances & more than one of them
seemed surprised that this action had not been taken 
27earlier." This appears to have been Carden's reaction
del 9 V 10 de Octobre de 1913 (Mexico: Tipografxa de
Fidencio S. Soria, 1914), is an account of the last two 
meetings before the Congress was dissolved. Lind gave 
what in his opinion were two important reasons for Huerta's 
action: the Congress had blocked the bill to postpone the
October 26 elections which Huerta had earnestly wanted them 
to pass. If the elections were postponed Huerta in his 
role as provisional president would continue in office un­
til new elections could be held. If the elections were 
not postponed he could not legally be a candidate, and it 
would necessitate him stepping aside unless for some other 
reason the results were annulled. The other was that the 
Congress had proposed a one dollar per ton tax on oil.
Since this would have struck a blow at the Cowdray oil 
interests, Lind implies that pressure was exerted to have 
the Congress dissolved before it could pass the measure, 
Lind to Bryan, October 10, 23» 1913, Wilson Papers; New 
York Times, October 21, 1913, 3:1, reported it as one peso 
per ton of crude oil.
^^0'Shaughnessy to Secretary of State, October 11, 
1913, Foreign Relations 1913, 836-3?.




If the dissolution of the Congress upset President 
Wilson, it was mild compared to his reaction when on 
October 11 the new British Minister presented his cre­
dentials to the Mexican President» Carden arrived in 
Mexico City on October 10» Feeling no compulsion to 
postpone his official duties, Carden at noon the follow­
ing day, was formally presented to Huerta in a ceremony 
at the National Palace» After the exchange of salutations, 
Carden made a short speech in which he said that on behalf 
of the King he was asked to "assure Your Excellency of the 
warm and sympathetic interest which His Majesty takes in 
the welfare of Mexico»" As for himself he stated:
Under any circumstances Your Excellency may rest 
assured that my very best efforts will be directed 
towards maintaining and strengthening, if possible, 
the friendly relations so happily existing be­
tween England and Mexico, and towards promoting, 
in every way in my power, their mutual interests, 
a task in which I feel sure I may rely on Your 
Excellency's cooperation and on that of the members 
of your government.
Huerta's reply was equally warm, and fully endorsed the de­
sire that the friendly relations between their respective 
countries be strengthened. It was obvious from the press 
reports that Huerta intended to make the most of the
28event. American reaction was sharp and decidedly pointed,
Lind denounced both Carden and Great Britain over
28Mexican Herald, October 12, 19131 1:2; El Im- 
parcial (Mexico City), October 12, 1913, 1:3-5*
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the incidente He felt certain that the timing had been 
no accident, and anticipated action by Huerta which would
29
be extremely favorable to English interests= O'Shaugh­
nessy expressed regret that one so out of sympathy with
the United States should now be representing Great Britain 
30in Mexico, President Wilson commented, "The bottom was 
about to drop out when Sir Edward [sic] Carden appeared 
on the scene and took charge of its [Huerta's government] 
rehabilitation.
O 'Shaughnessy's evaluation of Carden during the next 
week or ten days more than confirmed the suspicions to which 
his arrival had given rise. The presentation of Carden's 
credentials the day after Huerta dissolved Congress had 
boosted British stock in the eyes of the Mexican government. 
Carden was outspoken in his support of Huerta and in his 
belief that Huerta could restore peace in Mexico. In con­
versations with 0'Shaughnessy he let it be known that the 
policy which the United States was following could only 
lead to intervention, and this Carden believed would be 
fatal to British interests. Such partisan support of the 
government was returned in full measure, and made Carden
^^Lind to Bryan, October 15, 23, 1913, Wilson
Papers.
30O'Shaughnessy to Secretary of State, October l4, 
1913, ibid.
31Quoted in Philip Holt Lowry, "The Mexican Policy 
of Woodrow Wilson" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. Dept, 
of International Relations, Yale University, 19^9), 65.
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very important there. These reports caused concern in
the State Department, and led Bryan to direct 0'Shaughnessy
32to keep him informed on what Carden was saying and doing. 
Carden's penchant for saying the wrong thing which had in 
the past led to complaints about him was to make this 
warning unnecessary.
In an interview on October 21, Carden criticized 
United States' policies in dealing with Mexico. Publi­
cation of his comments landed like a bombshell on Washing­
ton, It excited a great deal of editorial comment and 
official reverberations too.
He emphatically refused to make any comment on 
the coincidence of his presenting his credentials 
to President Huerta simultaneously with the dis­
solution of Congress, merely saying that he had 
carried out the orders he had received. He said 
it was not incumbent upon him to investigate what 
President Huerta had done the night before he pre­
sented his letters.
Sir Lionel made it plain that he did not con­
sider it right for foreigners to constitute them­
selves a committee of investigation into the in­
ternal affairs of Mexico. He also expressed his 
belief that Great Britain did not intend to with­
draw its recognition of President Huerta.
. . . I do not believe that the United States
fully realizes the seriousness of the situation 
here .
The present revolt, he said, has no leader whom 
all recognized and with whom foreign Governments 
could treat. . . .
While professing not to criticize the Washington 
policy, he intimated that he considered its deal­
ing with the situation here superficially, with­
out full knowledge of the real causes of the
32O 'Shaughnessy to Secretary of State, October l4,
20, 1913, Wilson Papers; Bryan to American Embassy (Mexico 
City), October 20, 1913, SDP.
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trouble, as complicating affairs rather than contri­
buting to their solution.
Regarding the comments upon his action contained 
in dispatches from Washington, Sir Lionel said;
These comments have been made, and that is 
sufficient; no answer is forthcoming.
He showed, however, that he considered the Wash­
ington criticisms of his actions childish.
He evaded all questions related to intervention 
on the part of the United States. He said his 
Government had not asked his opinion on this matter, 
and he did not understand that the United States 
had any intention of intervening. Consequently he 
had done nothing to block the American policy.33
Most of his comments were a reiteration of those he had
made to Grey in his memorandum of September 12, but it was
the first time that they had been so blatantly advertized.
Bryan immediately renewed his complaints of the 
previous summer against Carden's strong anti-American at­
titude. He left no doubt that he believed Carden was
3kacting as an unofficial adviser to the Mexican President.
The New York Times while acknowledging the truth of 
some of Carden's statements expressed surprise that they 
did not result in his recall. The Times got to the heart 
of the controversy when it pointed out that "The more 
serious aspect of the matter is the appearance, though we
^^New York Times, October 22, 1913, 1:1; for crit­
icism of the interview see, October 23, 3:2; 25, 1913, 1: 
1,3; in the last issue cited the Daily News (London) was 
quoted, "That British diplomatic representatives should 
criticise the conduct of a friendly Government through the 
medium of a newspaper seemed too wild folly to be be­
lieved. "
3kBritish Embassy (Washington) to Grey, October 23, 
1913, P.O. 115/1742, PRO, reporting a conversation be­
tween one of the Embassy staff and Bryan, October 22.
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trust not the reality, of British obstruction to the policy
3 5we are pursuing in Mexico." Such a thought must certain­
ly have occurred to President Wilson, but even more basic 
was his sound dislike for those who disagreed with him, or
were in any way critical of his policies.
Shortly after Carden's statements hit the front 
page, Wilson advised Bryan to have Page check with the 
British government to determine if Carden had really made 
the comments attributed to him. Attempts to brush the
matter off lightly did not appeal to the President who in­
sisted that the criticism be disavowed or explained. Wilson 
considered the incident much more serious than Henry Lane
Wilson's comments in August, when an immediate apology had
37been made to the Foreign Office. The denial which the 
President desired was even then enroute from London.
The British Embassy, on October 24, notified Bryan 
that His Majesty's government had publicly disclaimed the 
interview based on Carden's own disavowal. Carden's re­
ply to the Foreign Office inquiry denied the accusation 
that he had made any allusion to United States policy or
^^New York Times, October 23, 1913, 10:1.
Arthur S. Link has ably summarized these aspects 
of Wilson's character, Wilson The New Freedom, 65-70.
37Woodrow Wilson to Bryan, October 24, 1913, Woodrow 




interests in Mexico during the interview. Page, who had 
been following the matter very closely, reported that it
seemed the denial was forced and that private reports
39claimed Carden had not denied it. Even though the 
British statement was accepted, the Secretary of State 
was still not satisfied with Carden's presence in Mexico. 
He wired Page that at the first opportunity he should in­
form Sir Edward Grey that it was unfortunate the Foreign 
Office information came from someone "so out of sympathy
kowith this Government's point of view."
The debate created by the incident continued to 
rage in the press for several weeks. The Associated Press 
reporter who was responsible for the article maintained 
that Carden had made the remarks attributed to him, but 
Grey accepted Carden's disavowal and accused the papers
4lof manufacturing the attacks on the British Minister.
^^Carden to Grey, October 25, 1913, F,0. 371/1677,
PRO.
^^Page to Secretary of State, October 25, 1913, 
Wilson Papers,
^^Bryan to American Embassy (London), October 24, 
1913, SDP,
^^Grey to British Embassy (Washington), October 28, 
1913, F.O. 115/1742, PRO; The Times (London), October 25, 
8b; October 28, 1913, 8a ; New York Times, October 25, 1: 
2-3, 4:2, 3:2; October 27, 3:2-3, 8:5; October 28 , 5:3-4; 
November 9, 1913, 2:5-6; The Literarv Digest, XLVII 
(November 8, 1913), 8 6 3 , called Carden an unintentional 
harmonizer, stating that "the importance of the incident 
lies in the prompt action of the organs of British opinion 
in telling us that the British people are with us in our 
Mexican policy."
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The best judgment on the situation would seem to be 
that Carden did make the statements, and then found it 
expedient to deny them»
From the announcement of his appointment in July, 
Carden had been the center of several unpleasant incidents. 
Page had been advised to delay the assignment, but had con­
cluded that representations without new evidence would be 
a waste of time. The delay was accomplished, but from 
Mexican rather than American appeals. Lind had become 
suspicious of him during their brief meeting in Veracruz, 
and had so advised Washington. Carden's arrival in Mexico 
City the day Congress was dissolved, followed by the pre­
sentation of his credentials could not have been more 
poorly timed from the American viewpoint. Moreover, his 
intimate association with Huerta during the first few days 
he was there led to some unpleasant conclusions by both 
Lind and 0'Shaughnessy. Finally, the interview in which 
he criticized Wilson's policies in Mexico merely confirmed 
in many observers minds what they had thought anyway.
Carden had accomplished his immediate objectives. 
Huerta had, or at least thought he had, an ally against 
the "Colossus of the North." The British had sent him an 
official adviser, or so it must have seemed, and one who 
had no more love for his chief antagonist than he. Carden 
and Huerta agreed on the need for strong government. They 
both looked on the Constitutionalists in the North as
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nothing more than a few bands of marauders and highway­
men. They both, at least publicly, opposed intervention 
from the United States, but for different reasons. Carden 
feared it would mean the destruction of British interests. 
Huerta thought it might mean his downfall and that of 
Mexico too. At least Huerta was rejuvenated in mind and 
spirit, if not in a more material way. The next obstacle 
in Huerta's path was the election of October 26. How could 




In late August, Lord Cowdray made an able summary 
of the diplomatic impasse between the United States and 
Mexico. Washington would not recognize Huerta, but inter­
vention appeared doubtful unless some untoward event oc­
curred. Huerta would be permitted to remain in office 
until the election of October 26, at which time the United 
States would recognize the president elected on that day. 
Cowdray believed that the United States had made a mistake 
in not recognizing Huerta, but concluded that, if things 
worked out as he had predicted, it was about as satis­
factory an arrangement as could be hoped for,^ If this 
pattern had held true to form many problems would have 
been averted.
The most important of the approaching events was 
the election of October 26 when a new president would be 
chosen. But as election time neared a series of incidents 
marred the prospects of an end to the Mexican problem. It
^Cowdray to Dr. C. W. Hayes, Vice-president of the 
Mexican Eagle Oil Company, and in charge of all oil drill­
ing operations, August 30, 1913, Cowdray Papers.
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would prove to be a trying time for everyone»
On May 31, 1913, the Mexican government passed an
electoral law which provided that the election for the
new executive officers would be held on October 26, 1913*
In order for the election to be valid, it required a vote
from fifty-one per cent of the electoral districts. This
would permit a president to be legally elected without
those states participating which were outside of govern- 
2
ment control.
The leading aspirant in September appeared to be 
General Félix Diaz, candidate of the National Democratic 
party, who had announced his intention of running for 
president in the Pacto de la Ciudadela on February l8.
2
0'Shaughnessy to Secretary of State, September 9, 
1913, SDP. A copy of the new electoral law was sent as 
an inclosure to 0•Shaughnessy's letter. In September the 
five states of Sonora, Coahuila, Durango, Guerrero, and 
Morelos and parts of some other states were considered 
outside of government control due to the revolutionary 
activity of the Constitutionalists and the Zapatistas, 
Nevertheless, the electoral districts still under the con­
trol of the central authority constituted more than fifty- 
one per cent. In Guerrero conditions were so bad that the 
lives of the members of the electoral board were threaten­
ed by the rebels if the elections were held. Clarence 
Miller, United States Consul at Tampico, to Secretary of 
State, October I8 , 1913, Wilson Papers. On October 12, 
Lind reported that a letter from certain senators and 
representatives claimed that "eleven States are wholly 
and seven partially in control of Constiutionalists" and 
cited this among other reasons why elections should not be 
held, Lind to Bryan, October 12, 1913, Wilson Papers,
3
See the fourth point in the Pacto, U, S., Depart­
ment of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of 
the United States 1913] (Washington; Government Printing
Office, 1920) , 7 2 2 (hereafter cited as Foreign Relations
1913)
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Diaz worked hard to secure the support of the Constitutional­
ists of the North. One of the objects of the Lind mission 
was to get Huerta to accept the participation of the Con­
stitutionalists in the presidential elections.^ If Diaz 
was able to get support of this group and, at the same 
time, win the general election, there was every possibility 
that President Wilson would extend recognition to his 
government. But warning signals were in evidence long be­
fore the election that plans were afoot to insure that 
Huerta would remain in office.
In early October, 0 *Shaughnessy guardedly expressed 
the opinion that the elections would be held, but that none 
of the candidates would receive enough votes to meet the 
constitutional requirements. The following day, Lind re­
ported hearing rumors that the Congress would either post­
pone the elections or declare the results void. Lind was 
not sure but he had a feeling that Huerta might be trying 
to hold on. If things were as he suspected, Lind feared 
that no argument would induce Huerta to step down, unless
4
William 0. Manson to President Woodrow Wilson, 
September 6, 1913, Wilson Papers. Manson accused the 
Guggenheim interests of backing Diaz in his drive to get 
support in the northern states. If elected Diaz was ex­
pected to see that the lucrative contracts secured by the 
Guggenheims from old General Porfirio Diaz were confirmed.
If Diaz was elected Manson felt, the Mexican people would 
be just as badly off as before. Lind to Bryan, October 7, 
1913, SDP. This message from Lind describes his efforts 
to get the central government and the Constitutionalists 
to cease fighting in order that both sides could par­
ticipate in the presidential election.
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accompanied by threats of direct action from the United 
States,^ On October 5» after having received what he 
termed "trustworthy information," Lind advised Bryan that 
he now knew Huerta's plan. The elections would be held 
with Federico Gamboa of the National Catholic party re­
ceiving a plurality of the vote. The Liberal party, how­
ever, which controlled the Chamber of Deputies, would not 
permit a Catholic to take office. Therefore, sufficient 
excuse would be found for voiding the election, and Huerta 
would be forced to continue as president,^
Before the Congress was dissolved by Huerta on 
October 10, there were several attempts to secure passage 
of a bill to postpone the elections. Most of the available 
information regarding Huerta's role in this is contra­
dictory, On October 3» Huerta confidentally informed 
0'Shaughnessy that if the Chamber passed the bill post­
poning the elections he would veto it. At the same time 
Lind was reporting on "absolutely reliable evidence" that 
Huerta was behind the efforts to push the bill through, and
^0'Shaughnessy to Secretary of State, October 1, 
1913, SDP; Lind to Bryan, October 2, 1913, SDP, The Con­
stitution required that one-third of the three million 
voters must go to the polls. New York Times, October 27, 
1913, 1:1.
^Lind to Secretary of State, October 3, 1913, SDP,
O 'Shaughnessy in his report of October 1, stated, "I have 
talked with several members of the Liberal party today 
and they tell me that they prefer the continuance in power 
of Huerta rather than the election of any candidate whom 
the Catholic party may propose," 0'Shaughnessy to Secre­
tary of State, October 1, 1913, SDP,
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that the bloc sponsoring it was completely under his con­
trol» On the day Congress prematurely met its end, and 
before Lind was aware of its demise, he wired that it was 
evident the postponement bill could not pass. Lind also 
told Bryan that one of Huerta's men had been to see him 
and had presented several propositions for his consider-
7
ation.
Two of the proposals made to Lind concerned the 
forthcoming election. If the elections were held as 
scheduled would the United States recognize the person 
elected; and, second, if the elections were held and the 
country pacified would the United States recognize Huerta 
for the remainder of his ad interim term? Lind had re­
plied that if the person under the first proposition was 
elected according to the conditions specified by President 
Wilson's instructions then he would undoubtedly be recog­
nized. As for the second point, Lind advised the agent
that it would be impossible under any conditions to re-
g
open the question of recognition for Huerta. The dis­
solution of. October 10 cast an entirely new light on the 
elections of October 26; now, in addition to a president
7
0'Shaughnessy to Secretary of State, October 1, 3, 
1913, SDP; Lind to Bryan, October 2, 3, 1913, SDP.
g
Lind to Bryan, October 10, 1913, Wilson Papers. 
President Wilson's conditions were set forth in his in­
structions to Lind and were restated in his address to 
Congress on August 27, 1913, Foreign Relations 1913, 820-
23.
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and vice-president, elections must also be held for the 
new Congress.
On October 11, 0'Shaughnessy attempted to see 
General Huerta, but had to settle for a talk with Huerta's 
private secretary. During the conversation which was pri­
marily concerned with the arrest and imprisonment of the 
deputies from the late Congress, the secretary made a re­
vealing comment about the elections. He told 0'Shaughnessy 
that even if the country could not elect a new president, 
it could at least elect a new Congress. Thus, a remark 
made in what may have been a purely casual manner by a 
person close to the Mexican President indicated that there
Q
would be no new president on October 26. This comment 
also becomes more significant when added to a report which 
claimed that the Governors of San Luis Potosi, Aguascal- 
ientes, and Zacatecas had been ordered to insure that an 
insufficient number of votes be returned in order to nullify 
the elections in those states.
While reports of this nature were being received by 
the State Department, President Wilson made clear his at­
titude toward the approaching elections. In view of the 
dissolution of Congress and the arrest of the deputies,
9
0'Shaughnessy to Secretary of State, October 11, 
1913, SDP.
^^There was insufficient identifying data on this 
message to tell who it was from, but its file number was 
812.00/9175, October 10, 1913, SDP.
7k
Huerta was advised that the United States could not 
accept the results of elections held under such con­
ditions In order to acquaint all the governments with
representatives in Mexico about his communication from the 
President to General Huerta, copies were sent to United 
States embassies throughout the world, including London.
Page was instructed to present it to the Foreign Office
12and to report Grey's comments.
Sir Edward told Page in discussing the President's 
message that the British government would wait until 
October 26 before making any decision, and at that time 
would let Page know what it planned to do. Grey said he 
hoped that rumors that the United States might soon raise 
the embargo on arms to the rebels were not true. Page was 
able to dispel this fear and advised Grey that President 
Wilson would not sanction intervention merely for the 
sake of United States financial interests. He was able 
to gather from this conversation that the British Foreign 
Secretary appreciated the difficulties surrounding President
^^Bryan to O 'Shaughnessy, October 13, 1913» Foreign 
Relations 1913, 838. It was anticipated by at least one 
newspaper that if the elections were not held as scheduled 
even those governments which had already recognized Huerta 
would withdraw that recognition. Mexican Herald, October
12, 1913, 1:7.
12Secretary of State to certain diplomatic officers 
of the United States, October l4, 1913, Foreign Relations 
1913, 841.
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13Wilson's policy. Grey's instructions to the British 
Embassy in Washington on the meeting amplified Page's 
comments.
Grey pointed out to the American Ambassador that 
the only end which Britain had in mind for Mexico was 
the reestablishment of order and security. Recognition 
of Huerta while awaiting the election of a permanent 
president had seemed to him the best way of achieving 
that goal. He asserted that the British were unaware of 
the coup d 'etat of October 10 and that it had created a 
bad impression in London. Even so, he refused to commit 
himself in advance on the election, but would await 
Carden's report before deciding what action to take. As 
for the Constitutionalists, Grey said that his information 
about them was that they were nothing more than bandits.
The British had already stopped traffic in arms with the 
Constitutionalists, and he concluded that extending recog­
nition to them would only make things worse. Grey's state-
14ments were relayed to Bryan by Ernest S. Scott.
^^Page to Secretary of State, October 21, 1913, 
ibid., 846.
^^Grey to Spring-Rice, October 21, 1913, P.O. 115/ 
1742, PRO. Ernest S. Scott was the First Secretary of the 
British Embassy in Washington. Recognition of a belliger­
ent status for the Constitutionalists would have given 
them a tremendous advantage over the Central Government.
At this time the United States had not recognized either 
faction. Without such recognition both sides were finding 
it difficult to get credit. In addition, the arms embargo 
was being applied against Huerta as well as against Carranza,
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During their conversation Bryan informed Scott that 
the United States would probably not recognize the results 
of the October 26 electionso He also told Scott that it 
seemed Huerta was trying in one way or another to secure 
his own election» Small wonder that Bryan should express 
such an opinion in view of the reports from Mexico. Bryan 
also showed surprise at the British attitude toward Huerta, 
and felt that it had encouraged him in his "lawless con­
duct." This aside was obviously a reference to Carden's 
arrival and the sequence of events which followed. Unable 
to offer any alternative that would insure a return to 
stable conditions in Mexico, the Secretary of State told 
Scott that almost anything was better than the current 
conditions. Grey was somewhat upset by Bryan's accu­
sations, and fired a reply to the British Embassy in 
Washington saying:
I do not understand Secretary of State's state­
ment that our attitude is likely to encourage Huerta 
in his lawless conduct. Statement I made to U. S. 
Ambassador here was that I would not decide whether 
to recognize result of elections in Mexico or not
although it was known that an active illicit trade in 
munitions was going on across the Rio Grande with the Con­
stitutionalists. The fact that they controlled most of 
the northern border gave them a decided advantage in 
smuggling arms from the United States. Grey may well have 
remembered more history than President Wilson. British 
recognition of the belligerent status of the Confederacy, 
it will be recalled, was later regarded by them as having 
been an error. The possibility of the United States ex­
tending such recognition to the Constitutionalists must 
have seemed to Grey a far more serious mistake.
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till after they had taken place. To reserve 
decision can hardly be described as encouraging 
Huerta and I gather U. S , Go [Government] them­
selves have not quite definitely decided what 
their attitude after the elections will be »
Grey wanted this explained to Bryan, but cautioned that 
he did not wish to do anything that would upset the amiable 
relations that existed between him and Pageo^^ As events 
began to move more swiftly, President Wilson, in order to 
gain a temporary respite, asked the British as well as 
other nations to withhold any action until the United 
States had a chance to consider its next move. After re­
ceiving these instructions Page requested permission to 
elaborate on them.
Page believed that the British were in something of 
a quandary. British recognition of Huerta, which he thought 
they now considered a mistake, tied their hands until after 
the elections. Page suggested to Bryan that he be per­
mitted to talk with Grey to see if the Foreign Office would 
refrain, as a friendly act, from extending recognition to 
whomever was elected President of Mexico on October 26, 
at least until the United States had a chance to evaluate 
the situation and could announce its decision. The 
American Ambassador felt that Grey would accept this pro­
posal in order to avoid any further differences with the 
United States, or, if he would not, perhaps Page could
^^Spring-Rice to Grey, October 23, 1913, P.O. 115/ 
1742, PRO; Grey to Spring-Rice, October 27, 1913, P.O. 115/ 
1742, PRO.
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discover the real reason behind the British refusal,
Page wrote President Wilson the same day:
I have been trying to find a way to help this 
Government to wake up to the effect of its pro- 
Huerta position and to give them a chance to re­
frain from repeating that mistake--and to save 
their faces; and I have telegraphed one plan to 
Mr, Bryan today. I think they ought now to be 
forced to show their hand without the possibility 
of evasion. They will not risk losing our good- 
will--if it seem wise to you to put them to a 
square test.17
This request by Page had been prompted by a published re­
port that Huerta would rely on British, French, and German
18help in case of United States intervention.
The statement which spurred Page’s recommendation 
had been made by General Huerta at a meeting of the diplo­
matic corps in Mexico City on October 23o Carden’s and 
0 ’Shaughnessy's accounts of the meeting were quite similar. 
Huerta had called a conference of the representatives of 
the foreign powers to discuss the situation in Mexico in 
view of the approaching elections. First, he told them 
that he had assumed office in February in order to pacify 
the country pending the election of a new president, He
^^Secretary of State to certain diplomatic officers, 
October 24, 1913» Foreign Relations 1913, 849; Page to 
Secretary of State, October 24, 1913, Wilson Papers.
^^Page to Wilson, October 24, 1913, quoted in Burton 
K. Hendrick, The Life and Letters of Walter H.Page (3 vols.; 
New York: Doubleday, Page & Company, 1924-1926), I , l84-
85»
X 8Page to Secretary of State, October 24, 1913, Wilson
Papers„
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had, he said, been forced to dissolve the Congress be­
cause fifty of its members had joined various revolution­
ary groups throughout the country. The fact that incrim­
inating documents had been found in the desks of a large 
number of the deputies had led to the wholesale arrests 
that followed. Huerta also realized that some of his 
friends had put him forward as a candidate, which he was 
unable to prevent, but he assured the diplomats that he 
would not accept election even if he received a majority 
of the votes. The Mexican President gave as his reasons 
for this decision the fact that the constitution would 
not permit it, and that he had given his word that he 
would not be a candidate. Further, he wanted to make it 
known that there would be complete freedom at the polls 
and that force would be used only to keep the peace. In 
his report Carden added that "This step, which was taken 
by the President under my advice, may prove, it is to be
hoped, to the U. S. Gov't, that he is actuated by a real
19desire to comply with his engagements." While these 
same sentiments were reported in the news release 
mentioned by Page, several additional statements were
^^Carden to Grey, October 23, 1913, P.O. 204/419, 
PRO; 0 ’Shaughnessy to Secretary of State, October 23, 1913, 
Foreign Relations 1913, 848-49; New York Times, October 23, 
1913, 1:1, rendered a somewhat more thorough account, 
adding that Huerta's statement had come only after a long 
conference with Carden, who was charged by other diplomats 
as having taken a large share in the political situation 
there.
8o
also attributed to Huerta which were not contained in 
either Carden's or 0'Shaughnessy's accounts.
The Pall Mall Gazette reported that Huerta had 
stated that because of the unsettled conditions in the 
country it was possible that some voters would not go to 
the polls. If so, the required number of electoral dis­
tricts might not render returns, therefore, invalidating 
the election. Under such circumstances it would force 
the present de facto government to remain in office until 
new elections could be held. If this last was found to 
be necessary, it was hoped, Huerta reportedly said, that 
the United States would extend recognition to his govern­
ment and give him the support needed to pacify the country. 
The failure of the United States to do so, Huerta claimed, 
could produce a crisis in Mexico "which might bring Wash­
ington face to face with the Governments of London, Paris, 
and Berlin, and lead either to the upsetting of the Monroe
Doctrine or to an appalling injustice of American inter-
«20 vention."
20Clipping of the article from the Pall Mall Gazette 
(London, England) was included in the Foreign Office minute 
number 484]1, October 24, 1913, P.O. 371/1677, PRO. Other 
comments attributed to Huerta included a statement that 
intervention by the United States would "cost them in ad­
dition to at least a quarter of a million lives more money 
than the entire amount of foreign investments in Mexico." 
New York Times, October 24, 1913, 1:1, mentioned the pos­
sibility that the elections might be voided and that Huerta 
would have to continue in office, but made no reference to 
the prospect of trouble from Europe if recognition was not 
extended. The Times (London), October 25, 1913, 8a, re-
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The Foreign Office reaction to the two different
accounts of Huerta's speech is quite interesting. The
first comments were based solely on Carden's report of
the meeting, and before the newspaper story had been seen.
Accordingly, it was believed that Huerta's statement should
appease the United States, and it was felt that "It would
be well to inform them [the United States] that Huerta's
action was taken on Sir L. Carden's advice." Later that
same day after the newspapers appeared, it was noted that
the references to "Europe and the Monroe Doctrine" and the
"Cost of Intervention," had not been mentioned by Carden.
The Foreign Office adopted a cautious attitude, "if
President Huerta did make them it would perhaps be as well
to say nothing about Sir L. Carden having given advice."
To which the British Foreign Secretary added, "Certainly
we must say nothing or Sir L. Carden will be held respon-
21sible for some very undesirable things." Grey shortly 
advised Carden that he should be "careful not to incur 
responsibility for Huerta's statements or policy, it will 
apparently be his object, if need be, to create tension
ported an account quite similar to that in the Pall Mall 
Gazette « but a day after the story appeared in the Gazette. 
New York Times, October 25, 1913, 4:1, called Huerta's 
statement a "grand stand play," and predicted he would 
remain in office.
21Foreign Office minute number 48431, October 24,
1913, F.O. 371/1677, PRO.
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between European countries and the United States Govern- 
22ment." Carden was able to deny in what appeared to be
complete truthfulness that the statements attributed to
23Huerta had not been made in the meeting of October 23»
No evidence has been uncovered to indicate whether 
the newspaper account was the work of an imaginative re­
porter, or whether the Mexican government planted it.
The latter theory has some validity because Huerta was 
certainly at odds with the United States, and it is 
possible that he expected such an outburst to split Great 
Britain and the United States. From Carden's reports it
PRO.
^^Grey to Carden, October 27» 1913» F.O. 371/1677,
Carden to Grey, October 27, 1913, F.O. 204/419, 
PRO. Several days later Grey showed Page the telegram to 
Carden recommending that he not be held responsible for 
Huerta's action, and Carden's denial that Huerta had made 
the statements charged to him. Grey asked Page what would 
happen if Britain did withdraw its recognition of the 
Mexican president? Page thought he would collapse and then 
the people would have a chance to establish a successful 
government. In case that should fail, Page told Grey that 
the United States would probably take the same steps in 
Mexico that they had been forced to take in Cuba. Grey 
wanted time to think it over and told Page that he would 
await President Wilson's message. Page to Secretary of 
State, October 20, 1913, Foreign Relations 1913, 052. The 
British Foreign Office was not at all pleased by Huerta's 
alleged comments. In minute number 48^03, October 2$,
1913, F.O. 372/440, PRO, the following two statements 
appear, "If the Mexican Government make too much of British 
goodwill & sympathy they will do neither themselves nor us 
any good vis-à-vis the United States," and, "The less 
'gush' we get from Huerta just at present the better. I 
see that he appeared to have been making mischief in the 
Mexican Press by saying that he had the support of Great 
Britain against the United States. But very possibly the 
report was only another newspaper lie."
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was obvious that he intended to give Huerta all the support 
possible, including advice, and this may have been enough 
to have triggered the newspaper story. But this is mere 
speculation. In any event, Washington was not pleased by 
Huerta's speech.
It is evident that President Wilson's reply to 
0'Shaughnessy's report of the meeting was based on the 
newspaper version as well as on 0'Shaughnessy's message.
The President considered the statements as an indication 
that Huerta intended to disregard constitutional govern­
ment completely and planned to establish a "despotism."
Wilson went on to point but that the United States would 
recognize no one in Mexico unless freely and legally 
elected. This was a clear warning that Wilson would not
2kcondone Huerta's continuation in office after the election. 
The President's concern was also expressed quite forcefully 
in his address at Swarthmore College the following day:
And yet the mere extent of the American conquest 
is not what gives America distinction in the annals 
of the world, but the professed purpose of the con­
quest which was to see to it that every foot of this 
land should be the home of free, self-governed people, 
who should have no government whatever which did not 
rest upon the consent of the governed. I would like 
to believe that all this hemisphere is devoted to 
the same sacred purpose and that nowhere can any 
government endure which is stained by blood or
2kBryan to American Embassv (Mexico City), October 
2k, 19131 Ray Stannard Baker Papers, Library of Congress,
Manuscripts Division;
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supported by anything but the consent of the
governed.25
Although the President made the trip to Swarthmore, the 
importance attached to the Mexican situation was such 
that Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels cancelled a 
scheduled trip to Philadelphia, and it was feared that 
the President might have to postpone his visit to Mobile 
where he was to speak before the Southern Commercial 
Congress on October 27.^^ Meanwhile, however, Carden was 
making suggestions to the Foreign Office which were to 
prove all too true an indication of events to come in 
Mexico o
In all fairness to Carden, he was not reporting 
anything that had not already been prophesied. The 
military situation between the Mexican government and 
the Constitutionalists had been turning sharply in favor 
of the rebels from the North. In early October, the Con­
stitutionalists had captured the city of Torreôn, an im­
portant link between central Mexico and the northern states, 
Its loss was considered so important that Carden reported 
as late as October 25, the day before the presidential 
election, that the diplomatic corps believed it would be
2 5Uo S., Congress, Senate, "Address of President 
Wilson at Swarthmore College, Swarthmore, Pennsylvania, 
October 25, 1913," 63d Cong., 1st Sess., Document No.
234, 3-5.
^^New York Times, October 25, 1913, 1:1.
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unwise to change presidents at that time. There was no 
indication whether 0'Shaughnessy was at the meeting in 
which this decision was reached» Carden also reported that, 
since the United States had announced it would not recog­
nize the results of the election, it would be "less re­
grettable if no candidate be found to be legally elected." 
Such a contingency would mean that new elections would 
have to be called at a later date. He suggested that the
United States might somehow be persuaded to "maintain the
27status quo" until this could be accomplished. It would,
of course, mean that Huerta would continue as president 
ad interim. This report from the British Minister closely 
paralleled his conversation with Lind in Veracruz. On the 
same day, October 25, Huerta held a meeting with all of 
the presidential candidates except Félix Diaz.
The four candidates, Manuel Calero of the Liberal 
party, Federico Gamboa of the National Catholic party,
David de la Fuente of the Liberal Republican or "Agrarian" 
party, and José Luis Requena the running mate of Félix 
Diaz of the National Democratic party, issued a proclama­
tion regarding the election. The candidates announced 
that they would support the government of whomever was 
elected. In case no one was elected, they also agreed 
loyally and patriotically to sustain the present govern-
^^Carden to Grey, October 25, 1913, F.O. 204/4l9,
PRO.
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ment until new elections could be held* The candidates 
acknowledged that such a contingency might mean the 
temporary suppression of the ideals for which they were 
struggling, but that it would contribute to the con-
28
solidation of the government and peace for the country.
When the proclamation reached Washington, Bryan
forwarded a copy of it to President Wilson noting, "It
is fair to assume, however, that they had little choice.
If they had refused to sign they would have invited 
29attack." Bryan was only guessing, but it is reason­
able to assume that the candidates believed Huerta had no
280 ’Shaughnessy to Secretary of State, October 26, 
1913, Wilson Papers; Carden to Grey, October 27, 1913,
F.Oo 204/4l9, PRO. Requena was probably acting for Félix 
Diaz who was at Veracruz. Under normal conditions Diaz 
was given a good chance to win the election, but there is 
more than enough evidence to. indicate that Huerta wanted 
Diaz to withdraw his candidacy. In fact, after his return 
from Cuba in October he was virtually under house arrest 
or close surveillance in Veracruz. He made no attempt to 
make the trip to Mexico City, although it was rumored on 
several occasions that he would put in an appearance there « 
Diaz finally fearing for his life on October 27, asked for 
asylum from the American consulate in Veracruz and was 
transferred to the USS Wheeling where adequate protection 
could be afforded on October 2o. He was subsequently put 
aboard the Ward Line Steamer Esperanza at sea and taken to 
Cuba. Mexican Herald, October 29, 1913, 1:6-7. Gonzales, 
American Legation at Habana, Cuba, to Secretary of State, 
October 19, 1913, Wilson Papers; 0'Shaughnessy to Secre­
tary of State, October 25, 1913, Foreign Relations 1913, 
850," Admiral Fletcher to Secretary of Navy, October 23»
1913,November 13, 30, 1913, SDP; Mexican Herald, October 
25, 1913, 1:5, has a brief rundown on the four political 
parties and their candidates.
^^Bryan to the President [c. October 28, 1913] 
Wilson Papers.
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intention of stepping down»
Reports from O 'Shaughnessy, Lind, and others all 
indicated that orders had been issued to the state govern­
ors to insure that an insufficient number of votes would 
be cast on election day. But to make certain there was 
no slip in the procedure, enough votes were to be cast
for Huerta and General Aurelio Blanquet to give them a
30majority of the ballots counted.
The elections were held as scheduled on Sunday, 
October 26» The returns indicated that the election 
would not meet constitutional requirements, but Congress 
would have to convene before the official canvas could be 
determined. It was not expected that this would be accom­
plished until late in November, but the reports favored 
Huerta and Blanquet. Since Huerta had announced publicly 
that he would not accept the election even if he got the 
necessary votes, the government-controlled press speculated 
that Blanquet might step up to the presidency. Carden 
thought such newspaper speculation was an effort by Huerta
30Blanquet was the Secretary of War and the vice 
presidential candidate on the ticket with Huerta, O'Shaugh­
nessy to Secretary of State (copy undated), SDP, contains 
a copy of the instructions sent to General Joaquin Maas, 
Governor of the State of Puebla by Huerta. Similar in­
structions were transmitted to the other state governors.
See Memorandum H., Division of Latin American Affairs, to 
Mr » Long, November 11, 1913, SDP; Lind to Bryan, October 
26, 1913, SDP; Lespinasse, American Consul at Frontera.
State of Tabasco, to Secretary of State, October 20, 1913, 
SDP; 0'Shaughnessy to Secretary of State, October I8 , 25, 
1913, SDP,
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31to sound out public opinion on this possibility. The 
consensus was that the election of the president and vice- 
president would be voided by the new Congress. The election 
of senators and representatives was generally considered
valid, and it was assumed that Huerta would continue in
32power until Congress rendered its decision. Nonetheless, 
Huerta was being criticized, even by many Mexicans, for 
his highhanded methods during the election, and particular­
ly because he controlled the election of the Congress, thus
33assuring a majority amenable to his wishes.
In spite of the approaching Mexican elections and 
the furor which preceded them, President Wilson decided to 
make the trip to Mobile, His speech to the Southern Com­
mercial Congress on October 27 was delivered before any 
definite results on the elections could have reached him.
The keynote of the address was Latin America with some 
rather obvious implications directed at Mexico. It will 
be recalled that this was the pattern of his first policy 
statement on Latin America on March 12, He began by
^^Carden to Grey, October 27, 31, 1913, F.O. 204/
419, PRO.
O 'Shaughnessy to Secretary of State, October 26; 
two dispatches dated October 27, 1913, Wilson Papers; New 
York Times, October 27, 1913, 1:1, 3:4; The Times (London), 
October 28, 1913, 8a ; Mexican Herald, October 29, 1913, 1:5»
3 30'Shaughnessy to Secretary of State, November 3, 
1913, SDP; Carden to Grey, November 5, 1913, F,0, 4l4/235, 
PRO.
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saluting those Latin American delegates attending the 
Congress and stressed the desire for a common under­
standing. Referring to the Panama Canal, he expressed 
the hope that this new commercial route would do much to 
cement the two continents together. In a pointed reference 
to foreign capital in Latin America, he emphasized that 
where concessions to foreign corporations were granted 
there was a tendency for those interests to dominate do­
mestic affairs. This was interpreted as a rebuke to British 
commercial penetration in Mexico. The President was still 
convinced that British concessionaires in Mexico were be­
hind Huerta, and that they were instrumental in shaping 
British foreign policy there. Latin America, he stressed, 
was going to seek emancipation from the domination of such 
vested interests. He stressed that a common goal should 
be the establishment of true constitutional liberty for 
the American nations. In an attempt to allay any suspicions 
that intervention in Mexico would be followed by territorial 
demands, the President asserted that the United States would 
never again seek one additional foot of territory by con- 
quest. This address coupled with the one which he gave
34
New York Times, October 28, 1913, 1:1; The Times 
(London), October 28, 1913, 8a, commented that the Mexican 
elections were proof of the Utopian character of the Presi­
dent's idealism. For an analysis of the effect which this 
policy was to have on European financiers see R. J. Mac- 
Hugh, "The Monroe Doctrine and the Latin-American Re­
publics," The Fortnightly Review, XCV (January to June,
1914), 671^3T1
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at Swarthmore were regarded as kernels in the formulation 
of the long-awaited Wilson Mexican policy.
Bryan, in an exceptionally able analysis of the 
relationship of this new policy to the evolving interpre­
tations of the Monroe Doctrine, offered his conclusions 
to the President on his return from Mobile. Bryan wrote;
The first announcement of the Monroe doctrine 
was intended to protect the republics of America 
from the political power of European nations--to 
protect them in their right to work out their own 
destiny along the lines of self-government. The 
next application of that doctrine was made by 
Cleveland when this Government insisted that 
European governments should submit their contro­
versies with American republics to arbitration, 
even in the matter of boundary lines.
A new necessity for the application of the 
principle has arisen, and the application is en­
tirely in keeping with the spirit of the doctrine 
and carries out the real purpose of that doctrine.
The right of American republics to work out their 
own destiny along lines consistent with popular 
government, is just as much menaced today by 
foreign financial interests as it was a century 
ago by the political aspirations of foreign 
governments. If the people of an American re­
public are left free to attend to their own af­
fairs, no despot can long keep them in subjection; 
but when a local despot is held in authority by 
powerful financial interests, and is furnished 
money for the employment of soldiers, the people 
are as helpless as if a foreign army had landed 
on their shores. This, we have reason to believe, 
is the situation in Mexico, and I cannot see that 
our obligation is any less now than it was then.
We must protect the people of those republics in 
their right to attend to their own business, free 
from external coercion, no matter what form that 
external coercion may take.
Bryan commended the President on his statement that 
the United States planned no more territorial acquisitions 
by conquest, and offered a plan which he believed would
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permit Latin America to throw off the shackles of foreign 
financial domination. This could be accomplished by pro­
viding these countries with credit through the United States 
government, thereby eliminating the "excuse for their putting 
themselves under obligations to financiers in other lands." 
Bryan suggested that the loan proposition might be a valuable 
addition to the policy which the President was expected to 
announce. He explained the practical aspect of the plan 
as it effected Mexico. If the United States could succeed 
in getting foreign support withdrawn from Huerta, the Con­
stitutionalists with what help the United States could pro­
vide them, might be able to force a real election in
3 5Mexico. While Bryan's plan may have had some long range 
implications for American policy, the more immediate prob­
lem facing the United States was the action European 
countries were going to take in regard to the election 
just held in Mexico.
Most countries had offered to withhold any action 
regarding recognition until after the elections. The 
elections had now been held, but nothing definite would 
be known for some time at least until Congress convened.
Under the circumstances Great Britain was asked to further 
delay any policy decision until the President's long- 
promised statement was available, and this was expected
^^Bryan to Wilson, October 28, 1913, William 
Jennings Bryan Papers, Library of Congress, Manuscripts 
Division.
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within the week. Grey readily agreed. After returning 
from Mobile the President finally penned his long-awaited 
policy communication.
The draft of the presidential note briefly encom­
passed these propositions: the interests of governments
other than the United States in Mexico were primarily 
commercial; the United States on the other hand had inter­
ests and responsibilities which put it in a class by itself; 
Huerta's government had been sustained by the recognition 
it received from the other nations; the United States re­
fused to recognize the Huerta regime and disapproved its 
continuation; the United States had refused to intervene 
physically, but had sought to apply moral persuasion to 
better conditions there; other governments had not knowing­
ly attempted to thwart the United States policies in Mexico, 
but they had encouraged Huerta to the point that he refused 
to relinquish his hold on the government; the nations con­
cerned were requested to adopt policies in harmony with 
those of the United States; and finally, assurances were 
given that, while the United States did not plan armed 
intervention in Mexico, it was willing to accept full 
responsibility for whatever action it might be necessary
^^Spring-Rice to Grey, October 28, 1913, F.O. 4l4/ 
235, PRO; Grey to Spring-Rice, October 27, 1913, F.O. 115/ 
1742, PRO. Page had already received Grey's assurances 
that Britain would await the President's pleasure. Page 
to Secretary of State, October 27, 1913, Wilson Papers.
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37to undertake to accomplish its objectives.
Bryan gave John Bassett Moore a copy of the draft 
to look over before it was sent out. In handing him the 
paper Bryan asked Moore if there was not someway in which 
the Monroe Doctrine could be invoked against the European 
powers, "especially if it should be assumed that they 
acted under the influence of financial interests." Moore 
replied that the Monroe Doctrine did not apply in such 
cases» Recognition of independent nations in this hemis­
phere was not a privilege which the United States could 
give or withhold, and any attempt to exercise such a right 
would be deeply resented by the American governments 
affected,
Moore then turned his attention to the note. As 
for the President's comments on the commercial penetration 
of foreign nations in Mexico, Moore wrote, the United 
States owed a great deal to foreign capital in its own 
industrial development. Any efforts on the part of the 
United States to prevent Latin American countries from 
obtaining European funds for industrial or governmental 
expenditures would be reason enough for them to take offense 
at such interference. Moore admitted that in some cases 
foreign concessions had involved political questions, but 
on the whole they had assisted in the industrial and
37Inclosure 1 to letter John Bassett Moore to the 
President, October 28, 1913, Wilson Papers.
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economic development of Latin America and had, therefore, 
contributed to its political stability and independence.
On the recognition of the Mexican government, Moore 
asserted that the nations which had done so had only followed 
diplomatic practice. Most of those governments had waited 
some time for a policy announcement by the United States, 
which was not publicly available until after the President’s 
message to Congress on August 27. Severing diplomatic re­
lations once extended, he stated, was an unfriendly act, 
and should be carefully reviewed before asking other nations 
to reconsider their recognition of Huerta.
Moore then turned to the question of British recog­
nition of Mexico, and the imputation that Great Britain had 
been motivated by "improper or sordid motives" in its 
Mexican policy. He brushed aside the argument that British 
oil interests had been supporting Huerta, by pointing out 
that United States oilmen had been openly antagonistic to­
ward him. There were other examples why the United States 
could hardly point an accusing finger at the British. The 
Panama Canal Act of 1912 granted free tolls to American 
coastwise shipping. The British as well as many reputable 
American statesmen argued that the act was a violation of 
the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty of 1901, which provided for the 
equal treatment of all nations in the use of the Canal.
In addition, the Senate refused to act on various arbi­
tration treaties because it feared that a similar treaty
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with Great Britain embraced "an obligation to arbitrate 
the tolls question." Among several other things, he 
mentioned the passage bÿ the Senate of the Seaman's Bill, 
which directly affected both Germany and Great Britain, 
and included matters on which the United States had agreed 
to negotiate. Moore's note is said to have accomplished 
one objective, "President Wilson never again spoke publicly 
or diplomatically about the commercial exploitation of
o Û
Latin America by Great Britain." Moore's note was such
an excellent rejoinder that the President decided to drop
39the matter for the moment.
Wilson now decided that the only solution to the 
problem was to force Huerta's resignation, since it was 
apparent the election had not dislodged him. The result 
was a note to 0'Shaughnessy on November 1 suggesting that 
Huerta voluntarily separate himself in all respects from 
the government of Mexico, Failure to accept this counsel 
from the President of the United States, it was warned, 
would lead to an ultimatum which, if rejected, would 
force President Wilson to propose some "very serious 
measures" to the Congress. 0'Shaughnessy was directed to
^^Philip Holt Lowry, "The Mexican Policy of Woodrow 
Wilson" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. Dept, of Inter­
national Relations, Yale University, 19^9), 68; Moore to 
the President, October 28, 1913, Bryan Papers.
^^Moore to the President, October 28, 1913, Wilson
Papers,
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suggest that the United States was entertaining the idea 
of open assistance to the Constitutionalists, and, if 
Huerta persisted, the United States would cut off all 
outside aid to his government. President Wilson even went 
so far as to recommend the composition of a provisional 
government which would be acceptable to the United States. 
No one connected with Huerta would be considered a suit-
40able replacement.
Negotiations on the basis of the penultimatum 
were disrupted on November 4, when the press published a 
report that Huerta's resignation had been demanded by 
President Wilson. The publicity which followed merely 
helped to stregthen Huerta's hand, and efforts to deny 
the story failed. Wilson was back where he had been be­
fore the elections, and he decided to turn again to
_ 4lEurope.
Meanwhile, the British Embassy staff especially 
Scott, the First Secretary, had been carrying on almost 
daily conferences with Bryan. Some of his conversations 
with the Secretary of State have already been noted, but 
on October 29, he composed a very thorough report for the 
Ambassador Sir Cecil Spring-Rice, who was seriously ill.
40Lowry, "The Mexican Policy of Woodrow Wilsin,"
68, f.n. 34, is a copy of the penultimatum Bryan to 
0'Shaughnessy, November 1, 1913o
^^Ibid., 69-70.
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The major part of this message was devoted to a summary 
of Bryan's well-known antipathies toward British recog­
nition of Huerta, Essentially, Bryan blamed everything 
which Huerta had done on England, Carden, and Lord Cow- 
dray in about that order, and rejected out of hand any 
suggestion of joint intervention in Mexico. The words
attributed to Bryan were: "If anything is to be done,
42it will be done by the United States alone," Scott 
then turned to a discussion which had recently occurred 
between Colonel House and one of the embassy personnel.
Scott characterized House as "President Wilson's 
most intimate friend and trusted adviser, who though 
very unobtrusive in his methods, is in fact 'the power 
behind the throne,' and is, perhaps, the only man who 
really influences the President's policy." According to 
Scott, House said, that it was a mistake to believe the 
President's hesitation to recognize Huerta was based only 
on his "devotion to democratic constitutional principles 
and theory." Rather it was founded on the facts. Revo­
lutions in Latin America had been commonplace largely be­
cause of the spoils of victory. This placed a premium on 
revolution, and. House continued, the United States had
42 ,
Spring-Rice to Grey, October 29, 1913, F.C. 371/
1678, PRO; Bryan believed British policy was dictated by
their interest in Mexican oil. See Tyrrell to Grey,
November 8, 1913, P.O. 115/1742, PRO; Paxton Hibben, The
Peerless Leader, William Jennings Bryan (New York: Farrar
and Rinehart, Inc., 1929), 330.
98
finally decided that it was high time to put an end to 
this practice» What House probably had in mind was that 
the refusal of the United States to recognize such 
revolutionary governments and the threat of United States 
intervention to restore popular rule would no doubt impair 
their credit on the world money markets, complicate their 
dealings with other nations commercially, and tend to dis­
credit them diplomatically. Thus, because they would be 
unable to enjoy many of the advantages normally available 
to legitimate governments, such revolutionary movements 
would be discouraged. The Huerta regime was a perfect 
example of what the President had in mind. President 
Wilson did not expect that representative democratic in­
stitutions would work in Mexico as they would in a more 
civilized country. But, House said, "in the absence of 
pure democracy, let there at least be some semblance of 
legality; if there must be an oligarchy, let it be a good 
and efficient one which commands respect,"
This Scott believed, was really what the President 
had in mind, although he observed that Wilson was inclined 
to give the impression to the public that he was more con­
cerned with democratic ideals than the more practical 
approach suggested by Colonel House, Scott thought Bryan 
"is far more ardent in his devotion to abstract theory and 
is averse from recognising any Government in Mexico, how­
ever successful in re-establishing order, which does not
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conform to the American democratic ideal «" Scott con­
cluded his remarks by referring to the fact that it seemed 
common knowledge that President Wilson was his own secre­
tary of state, and that this had been determined even be­
fore Bryan was rewarded with the post as a tribute to his
k3long struggle for the Democratic party»
Such information must surely have kept the British 
Foreign Secretary off balance» From one of the President's 
most intimate advisers on two occasions, the preceding July 
when House was in London and again during the heat of the 
Mexican elections, he had been led to believe that President 
Wilson was just as much interested in order as the British. 
Page, on the other hand, had been trying to convince Grey 
that the President was more concerned with a new approach 
which rested on a moral basis, divorced of any thought of 
protection for vested interests» Scott, however, had
41
Spring-Rice to Grey, October 29, 1913, F.O. 371/ 
1678, PRO; Bryan to American Embassy (London), October 29, 
1913, SDP.
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Page to the President, October 24, November 16, 
1913; Page to House, November 2, 1913, Hendrick, Page, I, 
184-91. These three letters show Page's efforts to con­
vert Grey to the moral aspect of the President's policy.
The following excerpt from Page to the President, November 
16, 1913, ibid», I, 188, clarified in Page's mind, anyway, 
Grey's narrow view of foreign affairs, "I can't get away 
from the feeling that the English simply do not and will 
not believe in any unselfish public action--further than 
the keeping of order. They have a mania for order, sheer 
order, order for the sake of order» They can't see how 
anything can come in any one's thought before order or 
how anything need come afterward. Even Sir Edward Grey 
jocularly ran me across our history with questions like
1 0 0
identified the dichotomy in what House was saying pri­
vately and what President Wilson was saying publicly.
Grey, if he ever recognized what was happening, never 
let on that the president seemed to be speaking with a 
"forked tongue," one position for official consumption, 
another for the public.
Failing in his bid of November 1 to secure Huerta's 
voluntary retirement, the President once more sought the 
good offices of the European governments. In a circular 
note of November 7, Wilson outlined a three-point program 
which he announced as a temporary substitute for his de­
tailed policy statement which, it will be recalled, Wilson 
had decided not to send after Moore had written his critical 
rebuttal. He was, the President stated, committed to 
Huerta's ouster, and the United States would employ the 
necessary means to accomplish that end. The note re­
iterated the President's earlier determination that the 
Mexican people should not be bound by any acts of Huerta 
or the fraudulent legislature which was soon to convene.
this; 'Suppose you have to intervene, what then?' 'Make 
'em vote and live by their decision,' 'But suppose they 
will not so live?' 'We'll go in again and make 'em vote 
again.' 'And keep this up 200 years?' asked he. 'Yes,' 
said I. 'The United States will be here two hundred years 
and it can continue to shoot men for that little space 
till they learn to vote and to rule themselves.' I have 
never seen him laugh so heartily. Shooting men into self- 
government! Shooting them into orderliness--he compre­
hends that; and that's all right. But that's as far as 
his habit of mind goes."
1 0 1
The governments, principally the major powers, to which the 
note was addressed were asked to use their good offices to 
encourage Huerta to accede to President Wilson's demands
45
"in the interest of peace and constitutional government," 
Page replied the following day advising that Grey 
wanted time to consult with France and Germany before 
answering the President's message. Grey was troubled not 
so much by the fact that Huerta might be eliminated but 
because he could see no one capable of taking his place.
Page had informed the Foreign Secretary that this request 
was the prelude to intervention if Huerta did not resign.
The only question was whether Huerta was to be "eliminated 
with or without the moral support of the British Govern­
ment? Sir Edward's last words were 'It is a very grim 
46situation.'"
During the summer and early fall things had gone 
badly for Huerta. The failure of the United States to 
recognize his regime had made it difficult for him to 
borrow money abroad. The Constitutionalists had proved 
more militarily capable than was expected, and the fall
^^Secretary of State to certain diplomatic officers 
of the United States, November 7» 1913, Foreign Relations 
1913, 8560 The note was sent to Argentina, Belgium, Brazil, 
Chile, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Norway as well as 
Great Britain. Bryan to Page, November 9, 1913, SDP; Page 
to Grey, November 10, 1913, SDP.
^^Page to Secretary of State, November 8 , 1913,
Wilson Papers.
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of Torreôn was especially serious. The military reverses 
were accompanied by political opposition from Congress 
which finally culminated in its dissolution by the Mexican 
President on October 10. Just when it seemed Huerta had 
no place left to turn, Carden arrived. This seemingly 
led Huerta to believe that he could count on Great Britain 
and perhaps other European countries in case of trouble 
with the United States. Rumors and reports soon began to 
emanate from Mexico that the elections were rigged, and 
President Wilson announced that the United States would 
not accept the results of elections conducted under such 
circumstances. All this, coupled with Carden's and Huerta's 
criticisms, did nothing to conciliate Wilson, but rather 
convinced him more than ever that Huerta must go.
In his Mobile speech and in the draft of his policy 
statement the President was highly critical of the role 
played by foreign capital in Latin America. The Secretary 
of State echoed these sentiments in his desire to add a 
novel interpretation to the Monroe Doctrine. The State 
Department Counselor effectively countered both pro­
positions. Wilson failed to secure Huerta's voluntary 
retirement through the threat of an ultimatum which 
seemed only to strengthen the Mexican President's de­
termination to hold on. This was the situation the first 
week of November.
The evidence is too inconclusive to assign the re­
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sponsibility for Huerta's determination not to resign 
solely to the British Minister, Sir Lionel Carden. It is 
true that in his letter to the British Foreign Secretary 
before he departed from England in September, Carden had 
outlined a program which called for whole-hearted co­
operation with the Mexican government. In his conver­
sation with Lind on October 7 he advanced two plans de­
signed to keep Huerta in power. One of these worked. 
Excluding the presentation of his credentials, he was known 
to have acted as an adviser and confidant to the Mexican 
President. Carden, as late as October 25» suggested to 
the Foreign Office that it would be well to get the United 
States to observe the status quo if for some reason the 
election for president was not successful and Huerta re­
mained as president ad interim. Huerta was not only 
Carden's selection but, from Grey's conversations with 
Page, that of the Foreign Office too. Of course, the 
General had been the choice of Henry Lane Wilson and 
Stronge while they were in Mexico. It does not matter 
whether Carden specifically told Huerta what to do, gave 
his assent to the General's own plans, or merely knew 
what was going to happen, Huerta was stronger in early 
November than he had been a month earlier when Carden 
had arrived.
Events showed that President Wilson was policy 
poor. Mediation by Hale, Lind, and others had failed.
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Foreign governments had been condemned for following 
traditional diplomatic practices, although Wilson had 
charged that "sordid motives" controlled their policies. 
Moore cited several examples when United States policies 
had been determined by motives of self interest too.
There had been threats of intervention in one form or 
another from February to November. After so long, the 
cry of "wolf, wolf" had lost its effectiveness. The role 
played by the United States had been a negative one, and 
the results demonstrated it. But what of Huerta?
The Mexican President had remained in office in 
spite of efforts to force him to resign. He had undoubted­
ly schemed and connived to control the elections, and had 
intimidated the major candidate, Félix Diaz, to the point 
that Diaz fled the country. No matter which way the 
election went, Huerta would win. If the elections for 
president were declared void, he was to remain in office 
until new elections could be scheduled. He even had the 
"support" of the presidential candidates on that score. 
Since the Huerta-Blanquet ticket polled the most votes, 
it was possible that he might even be counted into the 
executive mansion. This would be for the Congress to de­
cide, and after all Huerta had seen to it that the right 
men had been elected to that branch of the government. He 
had openly defied the President of the United States, and 
had refused to resign in the face of any ultimatum. He
10 5
was a scoundrel, but he had nerve, and, on November 7> he 
was still President of the Republic of Mexico. On that 
day President Wilson, while still unwilling to announce a 
definitive policy, did insist that Huerta relinquish his 
position and called on the major powers to use their in­
fluence to get Huerta to resign. Grey hesitated to commit 




While Grey was awaiting word from France and Germany 
in regard to the November 7 note, he wired both Spring-Rice 
and Carden about his discussion with Page concerning the 
request for British assistance. The Foreign Secretary told 
Spring-Rice of his reluctance to give Huerta advice because 
even that could be considered intervention. Sir Edward re­
called that he had been hesitant in August to help smooth 
the way for Lind when asked by the United States, fearing 
Huerta would blame the British if the negotiations failed. 
Grey said that he had assured Page that there was abso­
lutely no question about the British intervening in Mexico 
in opposition to the United States. He had also told the 
American Ambassador that at most England might send one 
or two ships to Mexico to protect British lives and 
property and to take off any refugees who made their way 
to the coast from the interior. In the event of United 
States intervention. Grey expressed the hope that every­
thing possible would be done to protect British subjects. 
Page assured him that the United States would do what it
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could,^ Essentially the same information was sent Carden, 
but Grey told him that before he made any plans he would 
like to get Carden's view of the "situation in Mexico in 
the light of this decision by the United States Govern­
ment o
Carden replied at once that considerable opposition 
to Huerta had developed as a result of Huerta's interference 
in the elections, the political arrests, the financial dif­
ficulties, and the peculation going on in some of the govern­
ment departments, particularly the War Department. But 
there was also renewed hope for a Federal victory over the 
Constitutionalists because of the recent successes in repel­
ling the rebel raids at Chihuahua and Monterrey. Huerta 
also had a new tax plan, Carden reported, by which he ex­
pected to raise enough money to meet current expenses. 
Therefore, Carden concluded, Huerta would not submit to 
United States demands to resign, but rather such inter-
^Grey to Spring-Rice, November 8, 1913» F.O. 371/
1678, PRO.
^Grey to Carden, November 8, 1913» F.O. 37I/I678,
PRO. Just a few days previously Carden had notified the 
Foreign Office, "The question at issue with the United 
States Government, which seems to hinge directly and ex­
clusively on the retirement of General Huerta from the 
Presidency, remains in statu [sic] quo. Nor does there 
appear to be any ground whatever for thinking that he 
contemplates acceding to the demands of President Wilson 
in this respect." Carden to Grey, November 5» 1913» F.O. 
4i4/235» p r o . Grey did not receive this message until 
November 22. Huerta's obstinance on November 5» was a 
direct result of the publicity given Wilson's penultimatum 
of November 1.
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ference would be resented by the country at large and 
would strengthen the Mexican President's determination to 
stay on. The British Minister was convinced that if the 
United States intervened, the Mexicans would revert to
3
guerrilla warfare which would last for years.
Almost immediately on the heels of this report,
Carden sent a second message. He stated that he had seen 
Huerta the previous evening, November 9i and that the 
Mexican President was aware that the United States planned 
some action against him. Huerta was prepared, Carden re­
ported, to do anything which did not reflect on the dignity 
or independence of his country to avoid a rupture with the 
United States, The General indicated to Carden that British 
mediation was desired. In view of President Wilson's re­
quest that Great Britain aid in securing Huerta's retire­
ment, Carden asked for authorization to see if he could
4
not find a solution to the problem that would avert war, 
Carden was unquestionably one of a very few people in 
Mexico who exercised any influence over the Mexican 
President,
Carden's friendliness with Huerta was a source of 
great irritation to Lind, who repeatedly condemned the 
British Minister in his reports to Bryan. On November 7,
^Carden to Grey, November 9, 1913, F.O. 204/4l9 




for example, Lind wrote that O'Shaughnessy had informed 
him that Carden was the only Minister in Mexico City who 
believed that Huerta would remain in office. The following 
day, Lind advised Bryan that Huerta was under Carden's ab­
solute control, and that the British Minister was violently 
opposed to United States intervention or to the recognition 
of the belligerency of the Constitutionalists. Lind also 
stated that Carden had characterized as "bluff," the latest 
communication from the United States. Finally, on November 
9, Lind wired that Carden had told him that no action on 
the United States request would be taken before the Mexican 
Congress convened.^ The Congress was expected to meet on 
November 15•
In view of Lind's messages, Bryan instructed Page 
to tell Grey that "Carden not only opposes the policy of 
this government but is even reported to have characterized 
our recent communication to Huerta as 'bluff.' Carden 
seems to be Huerta's chief reliance in opposing this 
government's demands. We cannot believe he is correctly 
representing his government's attitude."^ It was several 
days before Page answered this communication from the 
Secretary of State. The American Ambassador was reluctant
^Lind to Bryan, November 7, 1913, Wilson Papers; 
ibido, November 9» 1913, SDP. Lind was equally hostile to 
Lord Cowdray in his reports.
^Bryan to American Embassy (London), November 9,
1913, SDP.
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to bring these latest complaints against Carden to the 
attention of the Foreign Office, stating that unsubstant­
iated charges by the late Ambassador Reid had been dis­
missed and Carden upheld. Page asked for some reliable 
information which the Foreign Office would be obliged to 
investigate, and which would help bring matters to a head. 
Bryan was asked by Page for authority to request Carden's 
removal on the grounds that he was exerting an unfriendly 
influence in Mexico. In this way. Page believed, the 
matter could best be handled, because he did not think 
Grey would take any action against Carden on hearsay 
evidence. The American Ambassador believed that "If we 
can silence or remove Carden I am sure the last cause of 
any possible misunderstanding will be removed." Page 
hesitated to reopen the Carden controversy because of the 
ground gained in securing British support for the Presi-
7
dent's request of November 7» However, he did inform Grey 
that public opinion in the United States distrusted Carden.
Although he had not received replies from Germany 
or France, Sir Edward met with Page on November 11 to give 
him an answer to the November 7 note. As he had advised 
both Spring-Rice and Carden, Grey declared that the 
British would not support Huerta in his dispute with the 
United States, but Grey was unwilling to take the initiative
7
Page to Secretary of State, November 13, 1913,
SDP.
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in advising the General to retire as the United States 
had requested. Sir Edward would, however, inform the 
Mexican President that he could expect no aid from England 
if he showed by word or deed that he expected assistance. 
If during such a conference, "it should appear that a 
possible service may be rendered in enabling Huerta to 
retire with dignity he [Grey] asked if the United States 
would receive such a suggestion," Page was unable to give 
a definite answer, but told Grey that any help would un­
doubtedly be acceptable. In his report. Page asked the 
State Department to advise him on that point. Grey, in 
a very evasive fashion, had offered to mediate if the 
situation presented itself.
Shifting to the subject of concessions in Mexico, 
Grey said that Lord Cowdray had written him that he had 
not secured any economic favors from Huerta. But Page 
claimed that many observers believed that Cowdray was 
aiding Huerta financially. The British Foreign Secre­
tary denied any knowledge of this, however, and added 
"with a smile that he should think such aid a bad in-
g
vestment," Grey's account of the meeting, as tele­
graphed to Spring-Rice, amplified considerably the re­
marks about Lord Cowdray, concessions in Mexico, and 
mediation.
o
Ibid,, November 11, 1913, Wilson Papers
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Grey had, for instance, informed Page that reports 
reaching him accused American financial interests, par­
ticularly the Standard Oil Company, of influencing United 
States policy in Mexico in anticipation of getting a 
monopoly of Mexican oil. Grey said he had dismissed such 
reports because he believed President Wilson above such a 
thing. The Foreign Secretary added that he was very sorry 
to hear that Bryan believed British policy was dictated by 
the desire for oil concessions in connection with the 
supply of oil for the British Navy and that Lord Cowdray, 
in order to secure such concessions, was helping Huerta 
financially. Grey favored a plan whereby concessions ob­
tained during the turbulent state of affairs in Mexico
9
would not be recognized as valid. He also put a different 
connotation on his mediation suggestion.
The negotiation offer was made as a result of 
Carden's statement of November 10, in which he suggested 
that he might be of service in working out a plan whereby 
war could be averted. Grey, however, had a somewhat 
different approach in mind. He wired both Spring-Rice 
and Carden that if Huerta should wish to discuss retire­
ment arrangements "other Powers might possibly be of use
9
Grey to Spring-Rice, November 11, 1913; Gbrey to 
Carden, November 11, 1913, F.O. 4l4/235, PRO. Grey's 
remarks about Bryan were in reference to Sir William 
Tyrrell's meeting with the American Secretary of State 
on November 8, Tyrrell was Grey's private secretary.
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as intermediaries, and that was a point on which I would 
consult them»" He also advised that his mediation offer 
to Page was made to insure that the United States would 
be ready to discuss terms. Sir Edward was convinced that 
the British should not volunteer to mediate unless asked 
to do so by both sides.
Carden did not agree with Grey's proposal on joint 
mediation by the European powers. He notified the Foreign 
Secretary that Huerta would be more inclined to listen to 
proposals for his retirement from the British than he would 
be to suggestions from several nations acting on behalf of 
the United States. The British Minister again asked that 
he be authorized to discuss the question with Huerta un­
officially. Grey was not convinced, and restated his be­
liefs that there were grave risks in British mediation 
without the cooperation of other countries. But he 
authorized Carden to report any proposals from Huerta. 
Carden called on 0'Shaughnessy on November 13j and in­
formed him that he was ready to lend his assistance in 
bringing about a settlement of the problem. O 'Shaughnessy 
told Carden that the United States would be glad to have 
his help, knowing that he exerted a great influence with
^^Ibide; Grey to Spring-Rice, November 11, 1913, 
P.O. 371/1^76 ; Grey to Carden, November 11, 1913, F.O. 
209/421, PRO.
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H u e r t a F o r  some unknown reason Grey also reversed 
his decision and decided to take the initiative in ad­
vising Huerta that he could not expect British assistance.
In his instructions to Carden on November 11, the 
British Foreign Secretary stated, "I presume that Huerta
knows that we cannot support him in any way against the
12U. So, but if not, you should make it clear to him."
The following day. Grey informed the Mexican Minister to 
Great Britain, when he called at the Foreign Office, that 
"it was a settled part of our policy not to intervene in 
the affairs of Central and South American Republics, and
I could not intervene in support of General Huerta either
13inside or outside Mexico." Although Grey's statements 
did not find their way into the newspapers at this time.
Sir Arthur Shirley Benn, a member of the British Parliament 
who was in the United States on business, was quoted as 
saying that the English government would not back Huerta
14against the United States.
^^Carden to Grey, Number 139, November 12, 1913, 
on Foreign Office minute number 31579, November 13, 1913, 
no F.O. number, PRO; Grey to Carden, Number l60, November 
13, 1913, no F.O. number, PRO; O 'Shaughnessy to Secretary 
of State, November 13, 1913, SDP.
^^Grey to Carden, November 11, 1913, F.O. 209/421,
PRO.
^^Ibid., November 12, 1913, F.O. 4l4/235, PRO, re­
counting his conversation with the Mexican Minister.
^^New York Times, November 11, 1913, 2:4.
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On November l4, three days after Grey's in­
structions were sent to Carden, the British Minister 
called on General Huerta and informed him that he could 
no longer count upon British support, and that it would 
be best for him to accept the proposals presented by the 
United States. The newspaper reports of this conference 
indicated that Huerta would resign in favor of Francisco 
Carbajal y Rosas, chief magistrate of the Mexican Supreme 
Court. It was anticipated that one of the first acts of 
the new Mexican Congress would be to accept Huerta's résig­
nation. Huerta refused to commit himself.
Bryan was unaware of Grey's instructions to Carden, 
and expressed regret that Grey would not take the initia­
tive in notifying Huerta to retire. He advised Page that 
Grey's statements as reported by Page on November 11, seemed
^^Ibid., November 15» 1913» 1:8. Carden's report 
of this meeting, indeed if there ever was one, could not 
be found in the Foreign Office Archives. Some historians 
imply that Carden's visit to Huerta on November l4 was 
prompted by a meeting between Tyrrell and President Wilson 
held on November 13. However, Tyrrell's report of this 
meeting was not sent until November l4, and Carden's con­
ference with Huerta was held on the afternoon of the l4th.
It would have been almost impossible for Tyrrell's report 
to the Foreign Office in London to have been received, 
studied, a decision made, and a message dispatched to 
Carden in Mexico City in time for him to have made the 
visit that same day. In addition, no record of instructions 
could be found in the Foreign Office Archives to Carden on 
November l4, advising him of the Tyrrell-Wilson meeting, 
or giving any other reason for Carden to make the pilgrim­
age to see President Huerta. There appears to be no valid 
argument for assuming that Carden's visit was due to any 
reason except Grey's instructions to him on November 11.
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guarded. Page replied immediately, "The abbreviated 
dialogue of my telegram . . .  I fear was misleading. Sir 
Edward Grey was definitely, positive, exceedingly friendly, 
even cordial, and he seemed to me to give all we asked." 
This satisfied B r y a n . G r e y  was still negotiating with 
France and Germany for a common course of action in Mexico.
The British Foreign Secretary informed Germany that 
he had refused to ask Huerta to resign on the grounds that 
this would be intervening in Mexico's internal affairs.
He suggested a common course of action for Great Britain, 
France, and Germany, but made no concrete proposals. The 
Germans agreed to Grey's recommendations in principle, and 
expressed a willingness to discuss specific steps to be 
undertaken with France and England. Sir William Tyrrell 
advised Cou)t Johann Heinrich von Bernstorff, the German 
Ambassador to the United States, of Grey's action emd told 
him in confidence that the English wished to avoid American 
intervention, which he feared would rob Mexico of its in­
dependence. Sir William also told the Count that (àreat 
Britain would under no circumstances undertake a separate 
course in Mexico because it was felt that only a unified
17approach by the European countries would have any effect.
^^Page to Secretary of State, November 13> 1913,
SDP; Bryan to American Embassy (London), November 12, 1913» 
SDP.
17Foreign Office to Bernstorff, November l4, 1913, 
A22683; Bernstorff to Foreign Office, two dispatches.
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Tyrrell’s comments were forwarded to Berlin and, together 
with Grey's statements, appeared to have influenced the 
German decision on Wilson's November 7 request» The 
German reply to this note was quite similar to the British 
answer »
Germany was inclined to give the United States moral 
support, but showed a decided interest in responsible govern­
ment in Mexico» The German Foreign Office was especially 
interested in knowing who was being substituted for Huerta. 
Once this was determined, then the European powers could 
discuss the proposed candidate. Germany's main concern 
was to insure that someone capable of maintaining law and 
order would step into the presidency without delay. If 
this was accomplished, the Germans were completely in­
different as to who was elected President. Germany added 
that Huerta was the man most qualified to deal with the 
disturbed state of affairs, an idea agreed upon by other 
European nations and by the previous United States Ambas­
sador to Mexico as well. The British thought the German
18answer a good one.
A22683 and A22765> November l4, 1913» Aktenband [Collected 
Documents], Mexico 1, XXXIX, German Foreign Office, Politi­
cal Archives, Bonn, Germany (hereafter cited as German 
Archives).
l3James W« Gerard, United States Ambassador to 
Germany, to the Secretary of State, November 8, 1913» SDP;
Sir E, Goschen, British Ambassador to Germany, to Grey, 
November 12, 1913» and Foreign Office minute number 31493, 
F.O. 371/1678, PRO. Goschen*s report of Gerard's inter-
Il8
The French reaction to the British note and the 
request from the United States was little different from 
that of Germany, Stephen Jean Marie Pichon, the French 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, concurred with Sir Edward 
Grey's views as communicated to the French government on 
November 11, France would not interfere in the internal 
affairs of Mexico, although interested in seeing matters 
settled there. The French declined the role of inter­
mediary between the United States and Mexico unless asked
19to do so by both sides.
In discussions with Prince Hugo J.R.E.L. Radolin, 
the German Ambassador to France, Pichon indicated that 
France would welcome a common position with Germany to­
wards Mexico, He believed that such a course would have 
to be a neutral and watchful one in the beginning, but 
later, as circumstances warranted, more decisive measures 
would call for unified action by Germany, France, and 
Great Britain, Pichon also told Radolin that France would 
not comply with the United States request to apply diplo-
view with the German Foreign Office is far more elaborate 
than the American Ambassador's report. The German's con­
cern about Huerta's successor came up repeatedly during 
November. See J . B. Moore, Memorandum to the Secretary of 
State, November 19, 1913, SDP, relating the visit of Baron 
Kurt von Lersner, Secretary of the German Embassy, to the 
State Department on this question; Gerard to Secretary of 
State, November 27, 1913, SDP,
19Sir Francis Bertie, British Ambassador to France, 
to Grey, November 12, 1913, F.O. 3?l/l678, PRO, relates 
the French attitude and replies.
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matic pressure on Huerta. France was sympathetic, he
stated, toward all efforts designed to restore peace in
Mexico, but the French Foreign Minister was doubtful if
the action by the United States would accomplish this
objective. Pichon considered rumors that the United
States would give support to the Constitutionalists as
20very dangerous. France, Germany, and Great Britain had 
given almost uniform answers to President Wilson's request.
The three European nations while sympathizing with 
Wilson's policy, would not become involved in Mexico's in­
ternal affairs. To comply with the President's appeal to 
apply pressure against the Mexican President to force his 
resignation was more than they were willing to do. Medi­
ation was also out unless requested by both Huerta and 
Wilson. These countries were interested in peace and 
order in Mexico, and to the European powers Huerta seemed 
like the man most able to provide such stability. Before 
they could sanction his removal, they wanted to know who 
was going to replace him. Great Britain was just as much 
dedicated to this position as France and Germany.
Sir Edward Grey had refused to take the initiative 
in advising Huerta that he could not expect British aid 
against the United States. Within a few days of this
20German Ambassador to France, to Bethmann Hollweg 
[Sir Theobald Theodore Friedrich Alfred von Bethmann Holl­
weg], Imperial Chancellor, November l4, 1913, ACP 3?8, 75- 
122, No. 89-90, National Archives, Diplomatic, Legal and 
Fiscal Branch.
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decision Grey had advised the Mexican Minister that 
Huerta could no longer count on British support, and 
Carden had been instructed to deliver a similar message 
to the Mexican President. Without formally accepting 
the role of mediator, Grey had also authorized Carden to 
report any proposals which Huerta should make regarding 
his retirement and compliance with President Wilson's 
demands. Great Britain had thus complied with all of 
the requests from the United States except to demand 
Huerta's resignation. Grey's action could best be 
classified as a reluctant willingness to cooperate with 
the United States, a situation encouraged by the very 
agreeable relations between Grey and Page. However, 
this condition was also brought about by Grey's private 
secretary. Sir William Tyrrell, who had been in the United 
States for several weeks.
CHAPTER VI 
WILLIAM TYRRELL
Sir William George Tyrrell (1866-194?), entered 
the British Foreign Office in 1889* He was appointed 
private secretary to the permanent under secretary of 
state, Sir T. H, Sanderson, in I896, and in 1903 was 
made secretary to the Committee of Imperial Defence*
His only foreign assignment before his appointment to 
Paris, was a short stint as acting second secretary at 
Rome. Returning from Italy in 1905, he was selected as 
precis-writer for Sir Edward Grey, the British Foreign 
Secretary. In 1907, he became Grey's principal private 
secretary, a position he held for the next eight years.^
Tyrrell was an old friend of Sir Cecil Arthur
Spring-Rice, the British Ambassador to the United States,
2
who had replaced Sir James Bryce in April 1913* Sir
^L. G. Wickham Legg and E. T. Williams (eds.). The 
Dictionary of National Biography (2k vols.; London:
Oxford University Press, 1959),Supplement 1941-1950, 893- 
96 (hereafter cited as DNB); The Times (London), January 
1, 1913, 8c, contains a sketch of Tyrrell at the time he 
was appointed to the Most Distinguished Order of Saint 
Michael and Saint George. Tyrrell became Ambassador to 
France in I928.
^New York Times, April 20, 1:2; April 28, 1913, 5:5<
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William had planned to visit Spring-Rice in the summer of 
1913? but was forced to advise him on July 30 that the 
fighting in the Balkans had ruined any prospect of his 
leaving England that summer. He hoped to make the trip
3
in October. In the fall, Spring-Rice was stricken with
Graves* disease, exophthalmic goiter, and left Washington
to convalesce at a home he had leased in Dublin, New 
4
Hampshire.
Even before his illness Sir Cecil noted the at­
tention that the Mexican situation was getting in the 
press. In late summer he wrote Bryan about the alarming 
reports appearing in the newspapers, and expressed concern 
that any violent action by the United States would be harm­
ful to British subjects in Mexico. He complained rather 
humorously to Henry Cabot Lodge on August 2 that the 
Mexicans "can no more distinguish between a Britisher and 
an American than between a crocodile and an alligator."^ 
Sir Cecil was out of the capital in October when 
the crisis between Washington and Mexico City was reached.
^Tyrrell to Spring-Rice, July 30, 1913, P.O. 1/24?,
PRO.
4
Stephen Gwynn, The Letters and Friendships of Sir 
Cecil Spring Rice; A Record (2 vols.; Boston; Houghton 
Mifflin Company, 1929), II, 194; New York Times, May 23, 
1913, 1:7.
^Spring-Rice to Lodge, August 2, 1913, quoted in 
Gwynn, Spring Rice, II, 191. See also, Spring-Rice to 
Lodge, August 11, 13, 22, 1913, quoted in ibid., II, 192- 
95.
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The Ambassador’s absence from Washington vras noticeable 
by mid-October, when Thomas Spring-Rice, third secretary 
of the embassy staff called on Colonel House for infor­
mation on the Mexican and the Panama Canal tolls questions.^ 
Tyrrell’s visit would prove to be of value to Spring-Rice 
and the Foreign Office as well.
Sir William left England on the SS Imperator,
October 23, and docked at New York City on October 29® 
Shortly after Tyrrell's departure, Page wrote House and 
others about the impending visit. He advised them that 
while Sir William would go directly to Dublin to see Spring- 
Rice, he would be in the United States for some time and 
should be indoctrinated with the moral aspect of the 
Mexican problem at every opportunity. The British diplo­
mat was characterized as a man of influence in the Foreign
7
Office, and whatever he learned would go directly to Grey.
^House Diary, October l6, 1913, Edward M. House 
Papers, Yale University Library (hereafter cited as House 
Diary). House recorded in his diary that young Spring- 
Rice, a relative of the Ambassador, was Charge d'affaires, 
but the New York World, The World Almanac and Encyclopedia 
1914 (New York: The Press Publishing Company, 1914), 497,
lists Thomas Spring-Rice as third secretary.
^New York Times, October 26, 3:2; 29, 15:3; 30, 8:8, 
1913; The Times (London), October 24, 13e; 30, 1913, 20b; 
Page to House, October 26, 1913, quoted in Burton K. Hend­
rick, The Life and Letters of Walter H. Page (3 vols.;
New York : Doubleday, Page & Company, 1924-1926), I, 200-
202; Page to Dudley Field Malone, Assistant Secretary of 
State, October 27, 1913, SDP. Page had written similar 
notes to the Secretary of Agriculture, David Franklin 
Houston and to President Wilson's private secretary, J. P. 
Tumulty.
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Colonel House was ready to board the train for 
Washington when he received Page's cablegram about 
Tyrrell's arrival and missed meeting him. House called 
the British Embassy in Washington after reaching the 
capital and learned that Tyrrell was going directly to 
Dublin. During the Colonel's conversation with President 
Wilson the same day, he promised that he would get in 
touch with Sir William to feel him out on the Mexican 
situation. A few days later House received word that 
Tyrrell would like to see him, and would also like to
g
meet the President.
There has been a great deal of speculation as to 
whether Tyrrell was in the United States on a vacation 
or had been sent to handle matters during Spring-Rice's 
illness. House was under the impression that he was in 
the country personally to handle some of the complicated 
questions for the Foreign Office. On November 3 an article 
in the London Times, applauding Sir William's arrival to 
take charge of the delicate situation, was highly critical 
of the Foreign Office for Spring-Rice's long absence from 
Washington. During the critical negotiations between the 
United States and Great Britain the Embassy had been in­
trusted to a councillor and a first secretary who had 
themselves only been in the United States a short time.
g
House Diary, October 30; November 3, 1913; House 
to Page, November 4, 1913, Hendrick, Page, I, 205-206.
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The German Embassy in London, which kept well abreast of 
events noted the article in the Times on the third, and 
advised Berlin;
The trip of Sir William Tyrrell to the United 
States has nothing to do directly with the sick­
ness of the ambassador and with the political 
situation since, as I know, it had been planned 
long before the worsening of the Mexican question.
In any case, it will be valuable to Sir Edward 
Grey to be informed directly by his trusted 
political coworkers about the mood in America at 
the present moment of political differences of 
opinion.9
Tyrrell also denied that he was on any kind of a diplomatic 
mission, claiming that it was only a personal visit, not 
connected in any way with current events. Sir William ex­
pressed surprise at the reports which indicated a rift be­
tween the United States and Great Britain over the Mexican 
a f f a i r . E v e n  so, Tyrrell showed his concern privately
9Herr Dr. Richard von Kühlmann, councillor of the 
Embassy (London), to Sir von Bethmann Hollweg, November 3» 
1913, A2206o, Collected Documents, England 86, XIV, German 
Archives. Tyrrell resented the accusations made in the 
Times article and subsequent investigation revealed that 
it had been written by a person who wanted to discredit 
Spring-Rice for personal reasons. Tyrrell to Hubert (not 
further identified), November I8 , 1913, P.O. 800/82, PRO.
See also House Diary, November 3, 1913; The Times (London), 
November 3, 1913, 8b.
^^New York Times. November 4, 1913, 1:6. W. F . Bul­
lock, the American correspondent for the London Daily Mail, 
after seeing Tyrrell's comments wired Secretary of State 
Bryan that, while British officials had denied any feelings 
of antagonism, no such denial had been made by the Americans. 
Bullock asked Bryan for a statement which he could put in 
the British press expressing an opinion on the British at­
titude toward the policy of the United States in Mexico. 
Bryan declined to comment. W. F. Bullock to W. J. Bz-yan, 
November 4, 1913, SDP.
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at least about the American attitude toward England over 
Mexico o
One of the passengers who sailed with Tyrrell on 
the SS Imperator was his old friend Count Johann Heinrich 
von Bernstorff, the German Ambassador to the United States. 
During the voyage Sir William told the German Ambassador 
that he was concerned because it was being asserted in 
official circles that Huerta would have already resigned 
except for the support given him by the European countries, 
especially Great Britain. Tyrrell feared that if United 
States intervention became necessary, Great Britain would 
be blamed. He also told the Count that the British did 
not want to do anything which could be interpreted as op­
position to American policy. In reporting this conver­
sation, Bernstorff added that American intervention ap­
peared nearer every day.^^
^^Bernstorff to the Foreign Office, November 10,
1913, A224o6, Collected Documents, Mexico 1, XXXIX, German 
Archives, A penciled notation on this message apparently 
by someone in the German Foreign Office, if not Bethmann 
Hollweg himself, commented on Tyrrell’s fears that Britain 
would be blamed if United States intervention in Mexico be­
came necessary, "das wSre ja herrlich" [that would be 
splendid]. The Germans were obviously not interested in 
seeing a rapprochement between Great Britain and the United 
States. The outbreak of the World War was only nine months 
away. Bernstorff and Tyrrell, however, had been friends 
from the time Bernstorff was councillor and first secretary 
of the German Embassy in London, 1903-1905. Bernstorff to 
Bethmann Hollweg, November 30, 1913, A24453, Collected 
Documents, United States 17, IX, German Archives. Bern­
storff reported his conversations with Tyrrell on the diplo­
matic developments to Berlin regularly. Interestingly 
enough, Tyrrell and Prince Hugo J.R.E.L. Radolin, the
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After spending a short time at Dublin with Spring- 
Rice, Tyrrell journeyed to Boston where he remained for a 
few dayso While there he received and accepted an in­
vitation from Colonel House to dine with him in New York 
on November 6. During the dinner engagement Tyrrell met 
Mrs. Woodrow Wilson but had little opportunity for more 
than a few words with House, whose time was occupied pri­
marily with the first lady. House was unable to place an 
estimate upon Sir William during this meeting, later re­
cording, "Before I came in close touch with the heads of 
governments I imagined them made of superior clay. But
they are very like the rest of us, neither better nor 
12worse." Before leaving for Washington the following day,
Sir William wrote House to be sure and call him on his
next trip to the capital city. The Colonel agreed to
13meet him there within the week.
On November 8, the day after Tyrrell reached Wash­
ington, Bryan requested that Sir William be present at a
German Ambassador to France at this time, had married 
sisters. DNB, Supplement 1941-1950, 893-94; Herman A. L. 
Degener (edTT, Wer ist's? (Leipzig: H. A. Ludwig Degener,
1908), 1084.
12Tyrrell to House, November 3» 5,1913, House Papeyg; 
House Diary, November 6, 1913* Of course, Tyrrell, as con­
fidential secretary to the British Foreign Secretary, could 
hardly have been classified as a head of government. This 
kind of overstatement, however, apparently to feed his own 
ego, was characteristic of the Colonel.
13Tyrrell to House, November 7, 1913, House Papers; 
House to Page, November 7, 1913, Walter Hines Page Papers, 
Houghton Library, Harvard University.
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meeting which the Secretary of State had scheduled with
Ernest Scott, First Secretary of the British Embassy.
During this conference Tyrrell became convinced that Bryan
suspected Carden of being responsible for the impasse
with Mexico. In addition, Bryan accused the British of
being influenced by the possibility of new oil concessions
in Mexico which would provide an additional supply of fuel
l4oil for the Royal Navy.
Besides Bryan's diatribe against the British policy 
in Mexico, he told Tyrrell and Scott that the United States 
was dedicated to Huerta's elimination. Intervention, how­
ever, would be resorted to only if other means failed.
The Secretary of State desired the cooperation of the 
European nations in withdrawing all support from the Mexican 
President. The British diplomats were asked to urge London
^^Tyrrell to Grey, November 8, 1913, P.O. 115/1742, 
PRO. The colorful account given in Hendrick, Page, I, 202- 
203, does not appear in Tyrrell's report, and may have 
been obtained from Tyrrell by Page after Sir William's re­
turn to England. Fuel oil for the British Navy had been 
basic to Admiralty policy ever since 1904, when Admiral 
John Arbuthnot Fisher became First Sea Lord. This included 
oil concessions in different parts of the world, the es­
tablishment of oil storage reserves, the construction of 
oil tankers, and the conversion of naval vessels from coal- 
burners to oil-burners. Lord Cowdray had a contract to 
furnish fuel oil for the Navy, and his Mexican Eagle Oil 
Company had large oil concessions in Mexico. Since Mexico, 
in 1913, was the third largest producer of crude oil in 
the world, Mexican oil was of great importance to the Brit­
ish. Bryan had been thoroughly primed by Lind, Henry Clay 
Pierce, and others. E. H. Davenport and Sidney Russell 
Cooks, The Oil Trusts and Anglo-American Relations (New 
York: The Macmillan Company, 1924).
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to inform Huerta that he could no longer rely on Gireat 
Britain. Tyrrell made no recommendations in his report 
of this meeting, but a day or two later he advised Grey 
that since the British did not want intervention the best 
course would be to remain absolutely neutral. Thus, Huerta 
would not be excited by any false hopes of British sup­
p o r t . S p r i n g - R i c e ,  who had returned to Washington with 
Tyrrell, did not agree with this approach.
The British Ambassador felt that the time had 
arrived when the British must throw off their attitude of 
reserve and give the United States the cooperation it re­
quested, and he advised Grey accordingly. Sir Cecil was 
afraid that unless Great Britain did so, and if United 
States intervention became a reality, the British would be 
blamed. Tyrrell had voiced a similar apprehension to 
Bernstorff. Spring-Rice's recommendations, like Bryan's 
admonitions, reinforced President Wilson's request for 
assistance in his circular note of November 7»^^
Colonel House reached Washington on November 11. 
Bryan was waiting for him when he arrived and they dis­
cussed Page's telegram relating to Britain's reply to
^^Tyrrell to Grey, November 8 , 1913i P.O. 115/
1742, PRO; ibid.. November 9. 1913, P.O. 800/82, PRO.
^^Spring-Rice to Grey, November 8 , 1913, P.O. 371/ 
1678, PRO. See supra, pp. 99-100, for Wilson's note of 
November 7•
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to the President's request. House thought it a satis­
factory answer although he felt there were some points 
that were still not clear. After leaving the Secretary 
of State, House called on President Wilson. During their 
conversation the Colonel expressed his concern over the 
Mexican question, and gave the President a rather detailed 
report on Tyrrell. He explained that, "In talking to Sir 
William we were practically talking to Sir Edward Grey, 
and I thought it would be foolish not to exercise the 
opportunity in order to bring about a better understanding 
with England regarding Mexico." House mentioned his 
luncheon appointment with Tyrrell the next day, and sug­
gested that if he had a free hand he might be able to 
accomplish something worthwhile. The President authorized 
House to speak as freely with Tyrrell as he believed ad­
visable. Colonel House saw President Wilson again the 
next morning and told him that he would urge Tyrrell to 
encourage the British to use their influence with the 
other powers to pressure Huerta into stepping down. House 
promised to report his conversation with Sir William as 
soon as possible, provided there was anything of value
, 17to discuss.
Colonel House lunched at the British Embassy at 
one o'clock that afternoon. Spring-Rice was still not
17House Diary, November 11, 12, 1913,
131
well enough to attend, and sent his regretso After the 
meal, House and Tyrrell retired to discuss the two pressing 
problems: the Mexican question and the Panama Canal tolls
controversy. Tyrrell showed the Colonel various dis­
patches from London and his replies. He told House that 
Lord Cowdray had not received any concessions from Huerta, 
and, even if he had, the British government would not 
recognize them as valid. Tyrrell believed that an effort 
was being made to involve Cowdray in the Mexican situation 
with the idea of encouraging United States intervention.
Sir William also defended Carden, acknowledging his 
zealousness, but indicated the British Minister would 
follow his government's instructions. House replied that 
he was glad to hear a favorable report on Carden and Cow­
dray, because both President Wilson and Bryan held dif­
ferent views. After a brief discussion on the world arma-
18ment race, they turned to the Panama Canal Act.
The United States in August 1912 passed the Panama 
Canal Act which provided tolls exemption for American 
coastwise shipping through the canal. The British ob­
jected even before the bill became law, arguing that it 
violated the "equal treatment for all nations" clause of 
the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty of I90I. After the passage of 
the measure, mild but formal protests were made by Great
*l8
Ibid.. November 12, 1913»
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Britain, The British Ambassador to the United States,
Sir James Bryce, remained in Washington beyond his
scheduled departure date, hoping to work out a solution
to the problem. Although a few noted Republicans agreed
with the British, the Republican administration, through
some rather ingenious interpretations of the wording of
the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty, refused to agree to a revision
of the Panama Canal Act, Since the Democrats had promised
not to consider any legislation except the tariff and
money bills during the special session of Congress,
President Wilson would not jeopardize passage of those
19measures by any attempt to amend the foils act. There 
matters stood when Tyrrell and House met.
Sir William said that the British were very much 
concerned about the tolls problem, and that "Sir Edward 
Grey's idea was that no possible good came to nations if 
either the letter or the spirit of a treaty was broken." 
House indicated that President Wilson was equally de­
voted to the inviolability of treaties, which he was 
sure the President would make clear to Sir William when 
they met. The Colonel suggested that Tyrrell and the 
President should get together as soon as possible, and
^^Arthur S. Link, Wilson The New Freedom (Princeton; 
Princeton University Press, 1956), 306-307® The Panama 
Canal was not officially opened to traffic until August 
15, 1914, therefore, the tolls exemption provision did 
not have any practical consequence during 1913»
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Sir William thought it an excellent idea.
Upon reaching the White House, the Colonel found
the President was out and he was unable to see him until
that evening. After dinner House gave the President a
detailed description of his afternoon meeting with Tyrrell.
The President was most interested in meeting Sir William,
but since it was late he decided that it would be best to
do so the following day. House telephoned the British
Embassy and made an appointment for Tyrrell to see the
20President the next morning at 9:30.
The President met Tyrrell in the Blue Room of the 
White House. Their conversation began with the President's 
views on Central America. The imminent opening of the 
Panama Canal, he stated, had placed a great emphasis on 
the general need for good government in Central America.
Bad government tended to create friction and might bring 
about another Venezuelan affair like that which had 
occurred under Cipriano Castro. In order to prevent a 
recurrence of such an incident it was necessary, the 
President believed, to bar men such as Castro and Huerta 
from office, and to insist that these countries select 
good rulers. He planned to make an example of Huerta by 
demanding his resignation. The President explained the 
plan by which he hoped to accomplish this.
20House Diary, November 12, 1913.
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Huerta would be requested to convene the twenty- 
sixth Congress which he had dissolved on October 10.
Wilson did not consider the Congress elected on October 
26 as a legal legislative body» Huerta would be required 
to proclaim a general amnesty for all of Mexico in order 
that the Constitutionalists could participate in a general 
election for a new president. The failure of the Consti­
tutionalists to take part in such a plan would brand them 
as rebels, and the United States would treat them accord­
ingly* If Huerta would accept these proposals, the Presi­
dent said, he would do whatever he could to permit him to 
save face. Wilson recognized the Mexican capacity for mal­
administration, and after Huerta resigned, he told Tyrrell, 
he did not plan to look too closely at what happened in 
Mexico. Huerta, however, had transcended permissible 
limits in undemocratic government and must be eliminated.
The President was certain that the Mexican Congress could
21select a successor who would maintain law and order.
Turning to the Panama Canal tolls problem. President 
Wilson informed Tyrrell that he agreed with Grey's in­
terpretation. He was determined to overcome Senate op­
position to a repeal of the tolls exemption clause due 
partly to the Hibernianism of some senators and the vanity 
of others. If necessary, the President said, he was pre-
^^Ibid., November 13, 1913; Tyrrell to Grey, Novem­
ber i4, 1913, P.O. 371/1678, PRO.
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pared to turn to the Republicans for support in pushing
22through the repeal legislation.
Tyrrell explained to Wilson that he was in the 
United States in a private capacity, but was at the same 
time helping Spring-Rice who desired him to stay in close, 
but unofficial, communication with the President. Wilson 
replied that this was a perfectly acceptable medium of 
exchanging information and suggested that Grey use it 
whenever he wished to convey his personal views. The 
President intimated that he did not want to use Bryan for 
that purpose. Sir William left the interview impressed 
with Wilson's "great sincerity and force of character:
every one is agreed that he is a man of his word, and the
2 3only man who counts in the Administration."
22The reference to Hibernian opposition referred 
primarily to Senator James Aloysius O'Gorman (D-NY). As 
early as January 1913» O'Gorman had been proposed by the 
Gaelic American, for a portfolio in the Wilson Cabinet, 
which was considered at the time a reaction against repeal 
of the Panama Canal Tolls Act. His subsequent appointment 
as chairman of the Senate Interoceanic Canal Committee gave 
notice that a fight over repeal was assured. The Times 
(London), January 21, $e; March 1?» 1913, 39d; House con­
firmed the anticipated fight with O'Gorman in December, 
1913» in a conversation with Spring-Rice. Spring-Rice to 
Tyrrell, December l4, 1913, Gwynn, Spring Rice, II, 194-95° 
During the spring of 1914, when the repeal issue was before 
the Congress, hundreds of memorials were received from 
Irish-American societies protesting the surrender of the 
President to British demands. One outspoken member of the 
Clan-Na-Gael even declared, "If I was in Congress I would 
take steps to impeach him." New York Times, March 9» 11:1; 
March 23, 1914, 3:3.
^^Tyrrell to Grey, November l4, 1913, P.O. 371/
1678, PRO.
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In his reports of the conversation with the Presi­
dent, Sir William stated that he believed Wilson’s pro­
posals on Mexico would create a de facto United States 
protectorate over Central America which the President 
did not seem to realize; others in Washington apparently 
did and were happy to see it come about, Tyrrell was 
forced to admit that in his opinion Great Britain had 
neither the purpose nor the power to obstruct the Presi­
dent’s plan. He did feel that if intervention were de­
layed, it would take longer for Wilson's plans to mature. 
He told Grey that the President was anxious to receive 
any help that the British could provide.
The President approved Carden’s proposal to see 
Huerta unofficially to work out some arrangment whereby 
the Mexican President could retire with dignity. Sir 
William also reported that the administration and the 
public had been favorably impressed by several recent 
events. These included the Prime Minister’s Guildhall 
speech; Lord Cowdray’s statement to the Foreign Office 
that he had received no concessions from Huerta; Cowdray’s 
public denial of financial assistance to the Mexican 
President; and Grey’s attitude about new concessions in 
Mexico, All of these, according to Tyrrell, had helped to 
overcome the suspicions aroused by the recent reports on
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2kCarden and Lord Cowdray.
In his speech delivered at the Lord Mayor's ban­
quet on November 10, Herbert Henry Asquith, the British 
Prime Minister, denied that English policy was designed 
to thwart United States plans in Mexico. He stated that 
the British decision to recognize Huerta was made before 
the United States' attitude was announced. The change 
of ministers in Mexico, the Prime Minister asserted, in­
volved no change in the British position. He hoped the 
United States, whatever it decided to do in Mexico, would 
show a regard for legitimate foreign commercial interests 
there. Nothing was anticipated, he said, which would in 
anyway upset the friendly and sympathetic understanding
25
that existed between the United States and Great Britain.
2^Ibid.
^^New York Times, November 11, 1913, 1:6; The Times 
(London), November 11, 1913, lOc-d, Page had already ex­
pressed his appreciation of the Prime Minister's speech to 
Grey. Page to Secretary of State, November 11, 1913,
Wilson Papers; the British Embassy in Washington reported, 
"There can be no doubt that the Prime Minister's statement 
has been received with great satisfaction." Ernest Scott 
to Grey, November 13, 1913, F,0. 4l4/235, PRO. While the 
speech received plaudits in the United States, the Japanese 
saw in it a basic difference in policy between the two 
western nations. Asquith's speech was regarded there as 
a slap at the United States for interfering in Mexico's 
internal affairs, something which the Prime Minister in­
dicated England would not do. Looked at in that light 
such an interpretation has some validity, but the Prime 
Minister certainly did not intend his remarks as a criti­
cism of United States policy. The Japanese had their own 
reasons for hoping for a split between the United States 
and Great Britain. "England's Policy on Mexico," Gaiko 
.jihS (Revue diplomatique), XVIII (December 1913), 1289- 
92, copy in Library of Congress, Orientalia Division.
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Tyrrell had arrived at an opportune time. He was 
a personable diplomat who was well acquainted with his 
chief's policies. While there is no evidence to sub­
stantiate the argument that he was sent over to help, he 
was able to fill in for Spring-Rice at a rather crucial 
period in the United States-British negotiations. House 
was obviously impressed with him, and his reports to 
Wilson paved the way for an amicable meeting between the 
President and Tyrrell. The President seemed to enjoy this 
type of personal diplomacy. No doubt a better understand­
ing on Mexico was reached, but the only concrete result 
of the meeting was Tyrrell's request that Grey permit 
Carden to go ahead with his efforts to work out something 
unofficially with Huerta.
As a result of the discussion of the Mexican problem 
and the Panama Canal tolls controversy at the November 13 
meeting, accusations have been made that a "deal" was ar­
ranged between the President and Tyrrell. In return for 
British support of his Mexican policy, Wilson would push 
through repeal of the tolls exemption clause. Only an 
investigation of the President's attitude on the tolls 
problem can resolve this charge.
CHAPTER VII
WILSON AND THE PANAMA CANAL TOLLS EXEMPTION
In a speech at Gloucester, New Jersey, on August 
155 1912, Woodrow Wilson endorsed tolls exemption for 
American coastwise shipping and favored the Panama Canal 
bill which had just passed Congress. In so doing Wilson 
was supporting the Panama Canal tolls plank in the 1912 
Democratic platform. The Panama Canal Act was approved 
by President Taft and became law on August 24, 1912.^
The British protests had been to no avail, and 
Tyrrell advised Spring-Rice in December 1912 that he 
could not give him a definite date on which he could 
take up his new post in Washington because of the canal 
tolls problem. Even though the bill had been passed by 
a Republican Senate and signed by a Republican President, 
the British were supported by some Republicans who would
John Wells Davidson (ed.), A Crossroads of Free­
dom: The 1912 Campaign Speeches of Woodrow Wilson (New
H a v e n : Y a l e  University Press, 1956), 43; Urey Woodson 
(comp.), Official Report of the Proceedings of the Demo­
cratic National Convention 1912 [Baltimore: n. p., 1912],




not agree with their party on the question.
One of the leading Republicans to take a dissenting 
position on the issue was Senator Elihu Root of New York. 
Root, who had opposed the bill during its debate in the 
Senate in the summer of 1912, ran afoul of President Taft. 
Taft thought Root's opposition to the bill a "'defect' in 
his career." On January l4, 1913» the New York Senator 
introduced a bill in the Senate to repeal the exemption 
clause, but it was referred to the Committee on Inter­
oceanic Canals and there the bill died. Root took the 
floor on January 21, and delivered a blistering attack on 
the law, asserting that it was not only a violation of the 
Hay-Pauncefote Treaty, but also of American's word and
3
trust as well. Root was shortly to have an opportunity 
to enlighten Wilson on the matter.
2
U. S., Department of State, Papers Relating to the 
Foreign Relations of the United States [l912j (Washington; 
Government Printing Office, 1919), 457-89; ibid., Papers 
Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States 
[1913] (Washington; Government Printing Office. I920), 540- 
49 ; Tyrrell to Spring-Rice, December 7» 1912, F.O. 1/247, 
PRO; H. A, L. Fisher, James Bryce Viscount Bryce of Dech- 
mont, 0. Mo (2 vols.; New York; The Macmillan Company,
1927), II, 72-74. J. M. Kennedy, "A Broken Treaty: The
Panama Canal Tolls," The Fortnightly Review, XCV (May 1, 
1914), 905-13, contains an objective discussion of the 
British side of the argument.
3
Philip C. Jessup, Elihu Root (2 vols.; New York: 
Dodd, Mead & Company, 1938T1 II, 262-70; U. S., Con­
gressional Record, 62d Cong., 3d Sess., 1482 (hereafter 
cited as CR)~I The Times (London), January 22, 1913, 6c.
l4l
During the fall and winter of 1912-1913» Wilson
became convinced that the British interpretation was
correct. On January 24, 1913, Colonal House and the
President-elect discussed the question; "I [House] asked
him concerning his views in regard to the Panama Canal
tolls controversy with Great Britain* I was glad to
find that he took the same view that I have, and that is
4
that the clause should be repealed." A week later Wilson 
dined with Root and others in New York.
At a meeting of the Round Table Dining Club on 
January 31, Wilson listened to a discussion of tolls ex­
emption by Root and Joseph H. Choate. Root had been Secre­
tary of War in the Roosevelt cabinet and Choate was the 
United States Ambassador to Great Britain at the time the 
Hay-Pauncefote Treaty was negotiated. After hearing these 
two gentlemen expound their views, Wilson stated, "This 
has been an illuminating discussion. I knew very little 
about this subject, I think I now understand it and the 
principles that are involved. When the time comes for 
me to act, you may count upon my taking the right stand." 
None of the members doubted what Wilson intended to do.
A month later an Associated Press report from Trenton 
claimed that Wilson favored passage of the Root bill,
4
Charles Seymour, The Intimate Papers of Colonel 
House (4 vols.; Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1926-
1928), I, 193.
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which was still pending before Congress.^
There were two ways in which the tolls question 
could be resolved: the passage of a bill repealing the
exemption or by submitting the question to arbitration 
under the general Arbitration Treaty of I908. Ex- 
President Theodore Roosevelt favored the latter course.
The Arbitration Treaty had been passed during the last 
year of Roosevelt's second term, and he felt tJiat the 
tolls controversy was a perfect problem for arbitration. 
Senator Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachussets preferred a 
repeal bill by Congress. Lodge wrote Spring-Rice on 
March 10, 1913» and told him that Wilson opposed tolls 
exemption. He said that the President had wanted Congress 
to repeal it during the last session, but Lodge admitted 
they had been unable to muster the required votes. Look­
ing forward to the special session of Congress due to con­
vene in a few weeks, Lodge stated, "We can repeal it now 
if he will simply say the word and I have strong hopes 
that he will say what is necessary."^ Immediate action
^Henry White, The Roster of the Round Table Dining 
Club (New York: Privately printed, I926), 3^ 23-25• The
Times (London), March 1, 1913» 6e , quoting an Associated 
Press dispatch from Trenton, New Jersey.
^Theodore Roosevelt to Spring-Rice, undated. Lodge 
to Spring-Rice, March 10, 1913» Stephen Gwynn, The Letters 
and Friendships of Sir Cecil Spring Rice: A Record (2
vols.; Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1929), IT, I85,
188-89. Root reintroduced a bill to amend the tolls act 
on April 7» 1913. ÇR., 63d Cong., 1st Sess., 53. The bill 
went to the Committee on Interoceanic Canals. The other
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was not feasible for several reasons.
Before the Republicans left office they refused to
submit the controversy to arbitration as requested by the
British, but instead recommended a commission of inquiry
which the British rejected. Unfortunately, the Arbitration
n
Treaty of I908, was coming up for renewal in June 1913.
The matter was discussed at a cabinet meeting on April 15• 
After debating several alternatives, it was the general 
consensus that England would not agree to an extension un­
til the tolls matter was settled. After hearing the various 
facets of the problem argued, Wilson, according to Secretary 
of the Navy Josephus Daniels, stated that he "was inclined 
to think that under the treaty [Hay-Pauncefote] we had no 
right to charge tolls on English or other vessels more 
than our own coast-wise trade, and that it was a better
g
economic idea also to take that position." The importance 
of the economic aspect was later made clear by Repre­
sentative W. Co Adamson, Chairman of the House Committee 
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.
New York Senator, Democratic James A. O*Gorman, an ardent 
opponent of repeal, became chairman of that committee in 
March after the Democrats organized the Senate. A similar 
bill was introduced in the House on April 30, 1913. CR., 
63d Congo, 1st Sess., 866. Neither bill was ever reported 
out of committee during the special session.
^The Times (London), March 1, 1913, 6e»
o
Diary of Josephus Daniels, April 15, 1913, Box 1 
(I913-I921), Josephus Daniels Papers, Library of Congress, 
Manuscripts Division (hereafter cited as Daniels Diary).
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Adamson wrote Bryan that there were a number of 
congressmen who had originally favored exemption, who 
would dislike reversing themselves. On the other hand, 
it was believed that these same men would give their con­
sent to a plan that would enable the canal to be self- 
sustaining. Adamson contended that if the United States 
went ahead under the current tolls act to exempt coast­
wise shipping the revenues would be inadequate to maintain 
and operate the canal «
If gentlemen favoring the exemption can be made 
to realize that they could and would, with good 
grace, vote for a suspension of that exemption. I 
do not deem it wise to give prominence to the diplo­
matic side of the case. When we mention the treaty 
rights of England the jingoes go into action and in­
flame the popular mind to such an extent that the 
real question of domestic economy is entirely obs­
cured and excluded from consideration.9
Under such reasoning the issue could be handled as an in­
ternal problem and not one involving any international dis­
pute with Great Britain. But the diplomatic side could not 
be excluded that easily.
In mid-April Bryce had a long conference with Bryan 
about the problem. He asked that the new administration 
announce that, unless Congress repealed the objectionable 
clause, the question would be submitted to arbitration. 
Bryan argued that the Democrats were involved in a struggle 
over tariff revision, and he did not believe that the
9
Wo C. Adamson to Bryan, September 22, 1913» SDP.
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President would risk taking up a question which might 
split his party. Bryan felt that the matter could be 
postponed because the canal would not be opened to traffic 
for at least another year, and the delay would give the 
President time to complete the tariff fight. Legislation 
or arbitration posed the same problems. Bryce countered 
by stating that under the circumstances England might re­
fuse to continue the Arbitration Treaty. Bryan expressed 
surprise at this statement, feeling he had made a satis­
factory explanation of the situation. The Ambassador said 
that while government leaders were able to understand the 
problem, the English people were not. Bryan related his 
conversation with Bryce at the cabinet meeting on April 
18n After listening to Bryan’s comments, the President 
said that he had talked the matter over with Bryce and 
that he [Wilson] would make no statement in regard to the 
problem which might in any way hinder passage of the 
tariff bill.lO
The British concern over the violation of the Hay- 
Pauncefote Treaty was based as much on principle as any­
thing else. Grey's main worry was the Balkans, where the 
First and Second Balkan Wars were fought in 1912 and 1913» 
Treaties were made and broken with almost complete abandon,
^^E. David Cronon (ed.). The Cabinet Diaries of 
Josephus Daniels, 1913-1921 (Lincoln: University of
Nebraska, 19&3), 42-43.
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and seemed to have no more effect than so many scraps of 
paper. Peace in Europe could not be maintained if treaties 
were disregarded whenever it was advantageous to do so. 
Under such conditions the major powers were expected to 
set a high example. The Panama Canal Act of 1912, which 
favored United States shipping, was almost universally 
hailed as a violation of the 1901 treaty with Great Britain. 
The honorable thing to do, if an agreement between the two 
nations could not be reached, was to submit it to arbi­
tration. The failure of the Republicans or Democrats to 
settle the problem was, in the British opinion, setting a 
bad example. Thus, it was important to Great Britain that 
the United States take action at an early date.^^
Throughout the spring and summer, as the question 
of repeal was periodically raised, the British were in­
formed that nothing could be done during the special
session of Congress which was devoted to the tariff and
12currency bills. Wilson's attitude, however, seemed 
perfectly clear. He did not approve of the tolls ex-
^^George Macaulay Trevelyan, Grey of Fallodon:
The Life and Letters of Sir Edward Grey, afterwards Vis­
count Grey of Fallodon (Boston; Houghton Mifflin Com­
pany, 1937), 206-207,223-25.
^^Page to Secretary of State, Juhp 13, 1913, SDP; 
Bryan to American Embassy (London), July 19, 1913, SDP; 
Seymour, House, I, 196-97; Arthur S. Link, Wilson The New 
Freedom (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956),
3O6-307.
1 4?
emption clause, and would support its repeal at the ap­
propriate time. In a letter to Oscar S. Straus, the 
former ambassador to Turkey, he wrote, "I have had a 
great many very serious thoughts about the tolls exemption, 
and you may be sure that when the right time comes (at the
regular session of Congress) I will try to find the wisest
13and most effective way of handling it."
The President's most outspoken statement in favor 
of repeal came in early October. A ceremony had been 
prepared in Washington whereby Wilson by pressing a 
button would release a charge that would blast clear the 
final remaining obstacle between the Atlantic and Pacific 
Oceans in the Panama Canal zone. Immediately after pushing 
the switch, the President stated, "it is with peculiar 
pleasure that I am able to announce that there is now 
every prospect of the victory of Great Britain's patient 
and logical diplomacy over the Panama tolls question."
The report continued, "The President, after conferring
13Woodrow Wilson to Oscar S. Straus, September 22, 
1913, Box 13, Oscar S. Straus Papers, Library of Congress, 
Manuscripts Division. Lodge wrote Theodore Roosevelt the 
same day explaining that the path to repeal would not be 
a smooth one. Senator O'Gorman with the assistance of some 
West Coast senators was sitting on ten arbitration treaties 
which they were afraid to approve for fear it would lead to 
arbitration of the tolls question. Lodge was critical of 
Wilson and Bryan, however, for submitting the treaties and 
then turning their backs. Lodge to Roosevelt, September 
22, 1913, quoted in Henry Cabot Lodge, Selections from the 
Correspondence of Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge, 
1884-1918 (2 vols.; New York: Charles Scribner's Sons ,
1925), II, 439-40.
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with Mr » Moore . . .  announces that he is convinced of the 
correctness of the British contention that free tolls for 
American shipping are a violation of treaty obligations." 
While it was not certain just how or when this matter would 
be presented to Congress, confidence was expressed that re­
peal could be accomplished in face of the opposition against 
l4it. The statement touched a responsive chord,
Andrew Carnegie, the steel magnate, wired Wilson 
from Liverpool: "Greater far than your tariff victory,
great as that is, greater than your banking bill if passed 
or both combined is your noble stand for equal tolls to 
all lands. This touches our country's honor, the people 
will support you, ensuring victory. Cordial congratu­
lations ,
The Times announcement on October 11 also touched 
off a mild controversy. It put the President on the spot, 
but he refused to deny the statement which had been pub­
lished exclusively in the London paper. Wilson merely 
commented that the correspondent was not authorized to 
speak for him. Officials in the administration as well 
as the press accepted the statement as a true expression 
of the President's v i e w s . P u b l i c a t i o n  of the President's
^^The Times (London), October 11, 1913» 8a.
^^Andrew Carnegie to the President, October 11,
1913, Book 218, Andrew Carnegie Papers, Library of Congress, 
Manuscripts Division.
^^The Times (London), October 13, 1913, 7b.
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feelings, however, did not resolve the diplomatic problem.
The British sentiment about arbitration had not
changed by the time Tyrrell arrived. In one of Sir William's
conversations with Count Bernstorff he told the German
diplomat that England had no intention of concluding a new
arbitration treaty with the United States after the way
it had treated the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty. Like Bryce,
Tyrrell said that if England accepted a new treaty under
such circumstances the English public would never under-
17stand. Spring-Rice later voiced the same argument. Un­
questionably the British were greatly concerned about the 
arbitration treaty. But nothing could be accomplished on 
it until the tolls act was amended. The President was 
sympathetic but would not be moved until the regular ses­
sion.
Even before Tyrrell met Wilson, he and House had
discussed the tolls problem on November 12. House had
informed Sir William that the President was opposed to
the violation of treaties. The Colonel stated that Wilson
would clear up any doubt on that when he and Tyrrell met,
l8and this he did. The President explained to Sir 
William that he agreed with Grey's interpretation of the
^^Bernstorff to Bethmann Hollweg, November 6, 1913» 
A2307I, December I6 , 1913, A25620, Collected Documents,
Europe General 37, XV, German Archives.
1 o
House Diary, November 12, 1913.
1 5 0
dispute, but that he anticipated trouble from certain 
Senators in getting a repeal bill through Congress. Never­
theless, Wilson was even willing to jump party lines and
turn to the Republicans for support in getting the clause 
19set aside» In the two reports of this meeting there was 
no indication of a trade or deal. The only charge that 
can be leveled is that the British for the first time had 
received directly from the President a clear understanding 
of where he stood on the matter. At least one close ob­
server believed Wilson was incapable of making any such 
deal.
Josephus Daniels, who was in the Wilson cabinet for 
eight years, asserted that it was the opponents of repeal 
who charged that a bargain had been made. Daniels later 
wrote, "Wilson was incapable of making the trade suggested 
and Lord Grey emphatically denied in Parliament that there 
had been any trade, understanding, or agreement." Daniels, 
while corresponding with Ray Stannard Baker, who was work­
ing on his study of Wilson, claimed that Burton K. Hendrick's 
animosity toward Wilson caused him to give Page the credit 
for the President's attitude on the tolls repeal contro­
versy. Daniels stated that long before Wilson ever thought 
of selecting Page for the London post, the President's at­
titude on canal tolls was well known and that it was only
^^Tyrrell to Grey, November l4, 1913» P.O. 371/
1678, pR0.
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Wilson’s concern for the Tariff bill that delayed repeal,
”I know,” Daniels wrote, "about this matter because I
talked to him freely before he was inaugurated and after-
20wards.” George Macaulay Trevelyan, Sir Edward Grey’s 
biographer, also made a tribute to Wilson’s force of 
character; ”0n that issue [tolls repeal] his uncompro­
mising rectitude fought its first and most successful 
battle with the Senate.
The tolls exemption problem cropped up occasionally 
during the rest of November after the Tyrrell-Wilson meet­
ing on the thirteenth, but nothing of consequence occurred.
20Josephus Daniels, The Wilson Era; Years of Peace, 
1910-1917 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina
Press, 1944), 209-19; Daniels to Ray Stannard Baker, June 
21, 1926, July l4, August 8, 1927, Series I, Box 20, Ray 
Stannard Baker Papers, Library of Congress, Manuscripts 
Division. The President was not as confidential with 
other members of the cabinet. Baker later recorded a con­
versation he had with Lindley Miller Garrison, Secretary 
of War, March 1913-February I916 (resigned), "At the out­
set Garrison bluntly confessed he never understood Woodrow 
Wilson, doesn’t now, and doubts if anyone else can compre­
hend the real man. He was too complex to understand. 
Garrison says he never knew what the President was going 
to do. The Panama Canal tolls case was one in point. As 
the Secretary having jurisdiction over the canal, he 
studied the laws of the controversy and assured Wilson that 
there was good legal ground on which to justify the repeal 
of the tolls act. But the President went ahead and put 
the case on other grounds.” Baker, Memorandum of Conver­
sation with Mr. Lindley M. Garrison, November 30, 1928, 
Series I, Box 34, Baker Papers. Even in this exchange 
there was no indication that Wilson had any idea other than 
repeal of the exemption clause.
21Trevelyan, Grey of Fallodon, 236-37* Trevelyan 
does add that Wilson would not have won the battle in the 
Senate had Grey not given in on Mexico.
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In early December, House met Spring-Rice and told him 
that the President hoped to end the controversy by having 
Congress repeal the objectionable clause. But Wilson pre­
ferred to handle the matter as an internal problem and 
wished to avoid any further diplomatic negotiations over 
it. Senator 0 ’Gorman of New York was classified as the 
main obstacle to repeal. His parents had been evicted from 
Ireland years before, and 0'Gorman had no love for the 
English. Spring-Rice characterized the Irish distrust of 
the English quite aptly: "You know that an Irishman would
refuse to go to Heaven if St. Peter were an Englishman."
As a result of House's visit, Spring-Rice wrote Tyrrell
22and asked that the President's wishes be respected. At 
the same time the British Ambassador looked on Bryan as an 
ally in the tolls jFight.
Spring-Rice implied that Bryan's vanity and ego­
tism might be turned to good use in getting the tolls 
question to arbitration if other means failed:
Though public opinion in this country is probably 
at the present moment not so enamoured of peace 
propaganda as in the past, the popularity to be got 
through advocacy of Hague Conventions is still 
sufficient to spur such public men as Mr. Bryan 
into action, especially when it coincides with his 
own sincere zeal for "peace among the nations"; 
and the desire, which he probably entertains, to 
emulate Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Root as a candidate 
for the Nobel prize, may, perhaps, be of some 
weight in the future in securing a settlement of
o o
Spring-Rice to Tyrrell, December l4, 1913, Gwynn, 
Spring Rice, II, 194-95.
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the Canal question, which at present so seriously 
interferes with his aspirations.23
Even though things looked brighter, by late December Spring-
Rice wrote Tyrrell that they should be prepared to see the
Panama Canal tolls bill receive an unfavorable reception
in Congress. Before the canal bill was permitted to
come up for consideration by Congress, the administration
tested its support in the Senate on another matter.
The first major foreign policy hurdle for Wilson 
came in February 1914, during the regular session of the 
sixth-third Congress. An extension of the 1908 Arbitration 
Agreement with Great Britain which was due to expire in 
June 1913, had been signed by Bryan and Spring-Rice on 
May 31» 1913. The treaty was then submitted to the Senate 
for ratification, where it remained without being acted up­
on until February 1914. In reality, eight arbitration 
treaties were involved, but the ones with Great Britain 
and Japan were causing the greatest problems. Some 
Senators opposed ratification of the treaties unless 
particular questions were excluded from arbitration, such 
as the Panama Canal tolls, Japanese immigration, and the 
Monroe Doctrine. But they all conceded that the treaties 
had to be identical; therefore, the questions to be ex-
^^Spring-Rice to Grey, December 12, 1913, F.O, 4l4/ 
235, PRO.
24Spring-Rice to Tyrrell, December 30, 1913, F.O. 
1/247, PRO.
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eluded had to be incorporated in all eight agreements.
Thus, O'Gorman who opposed arbitration of the tolls dispute 
with Great Britain received assistance from West Coast 
Senators who wanted to exclude certain Japanese problems 
from the treaty with Japan. On the other hand, Republicans 
Root and Lodge, along with many Democrats felt no treaties 
were better than amended treaties.
On February 19 the treaties were debated for five 
hours by the Senate in closed session. The two main op­
ponents were O'Gorman and Senator George Earle Chamberlain 
(D-Oregon). Chamberlain introduced an amendment which pro­
vided for the exclusion from arbitration of the acute 
questions. The Chamberlain Amendment was not brought to 
a vote until the next day, when it was defeated 40 to 13» 
This decisive administration victory was followed on 
February 21 by Senate approval of all eight agreements 
without amendment. Ratification was looked upon as a sure 
sign that the repeal of the tolls exemption clause would 
be accomplished without difficulty, and this measure was 
expected to be the next important foreign issue to be sub­
mitted to Congress.
The Senate action bolstered the President's con­
fidence and he let it be known that he was committed to 
"out and out repeal of the tolls provision; that there 
could be no compromise in the situation in order that it 
might be signaled to the world that the United States
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would stand firmly by its international obligations*"^^
On March 5, the President addressed a joint session 
of Congress and called for amendment of the Panama Canal 
Act on the grounds that it was a violation of the Hay- 
Pauncefote Treaty of 1901. He said: "We consented to the 
treaty; its language we accepted, if we did not originate; 
and we are too big, too powerful, too self-respecting a 
Nation to interpret with too strained or refined a reading 
the words of our own promises just because we have power 
enough to give us leave to read them as we please.
Page rep'orted that the British had been favorably 
impressed with the President's stand. Heartened by this 
show of respect by the United States for its international 
commitments. Great Britain ratified the Arbitration Agree­
ment on March 11, 1914.^^ A week later Page wrote Bryan 
that the ratification of the Arbitration Agreement by the 
Senate and the President's message to Congress on the 
canal act had paved the way for Bryan's General Peace
25
New York Times. February 20, 2:5; 21, 1:4; 22, 
1914, 1 :1 ; O'Gorman did not consider ratification an in­
dication of the Senate's feelings on the tolls matter, 
ibid., February 22, 1914, 1:1; U. S *, Statutes at Large, 
XXXVIII, 1767-68. ----------------
63d Cong., 2d Sess., 4312, 4346.
27
Page to Secretary of State, March 6 , 1914, U. S., 
Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Re­
lations of the United States fl914 I (Washington: Govern­
ment Printing Office,1922),318.
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28Treaty with Great Britain. The way had also been 
cleared to push through the bill ending the long stand­
ing Anglo-American dispute.
The debates in Congress over the repeal bill 
during March brought charges that a deal had been made 
with Sir William Tyrrell--a free hand for Wilson in Mexico 
in return for the elimination of free tolls for American 
coastwise shipping. President Wilson immediately author­
ized publication of an official denial, and, in a news­
paper conference, called the accusation "just the crowning 
insult of a number of insults which have been introduced 
into this debate." The President said that it reminded 
him of a story he used to enjoy telling
of a very effective debater . . .  who sent a challenge 
down into a county very hostile to him to debate.
The people down there did not like the job very 
much, but they put up the man they liked best 
and who was generally put up on such occasions, a 
great, big, husky fellow whom they all called 
Tom. The challenger was given the first hour of 
the two hours allotted to the debate, and he 
hadn't got more than half way through his speech 
when it became evident that he was convincing the 
audience, when one of Tom's partisans in the back 
of the room cried out, "Tom, Tom, call him a liar 
and make it a fight." That is the stage this has 
reached.29
Grey also issued a denial of the charges, calling
28Page to Bryan, March 17» 1914, Box 29, Bryan 
Papers. The General Peace Treaty between the United States 
and Great Britain was consummated later in the year.
^^New York Times, March 31, 1914, 1:8.
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the reports without any foundation whatsoever and saying 
that he was glad to have an early opportunity to clear up 
the misunderstanding. In Parliament, Leif Jones, M. P., 
asked the Foreign Office representative, Mr. Acland, if 
there was any foundation for the reports that were ap­
pearing in the press. Acland replied that absolutely no
basis existed for the charges that any agreement had been 
30made. Despite the furor occasioned by these accusations 
they did not in any way alter the inevitable course of the 
bill.
The repeal of the tolls exemption clause was ac­
complished on June 15, 1914, but not without a determined 
fight from the Irish-Americans :â;nd'. those Democratic 
leaders in Congress who refused to support the bill because 
it violated the 1912 Democratic p l a t f o r m . T h e  passage 
of the bill was a great victory for the Wilson adminis­
tration.
During the heat of the Democratic campaign in 1912, 
Wilson had endorsed tolls exemption, but there was not one 
occasion after his election on which he again took that 
position. Rather, every reference to the issue indicated
30
Great Britain, 5 Parliamentarv Debates (Commons), 
LX (1914), 822; New York Times. March 31. 1914, 2:3»
31U. S., Statutes at Large. XXXVIII, 385-86; Norman 
Jo Padelford, The Panama Canal in Peace and War (New York: 
The Macmillan Company, 1942), 40-43.
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that he favored the British interpretation. The President 
was not willing, however, to jeopardize the tariff or 
money bills by taking up the tolls problem during 1913.
The dispute could be handled in two ways: arbitration or
repeal. It was decided that amending the 1912 Panama 
Canal Act would create fewer difficulties than arbitration. 
Pressure in the Balkans made the long delay an uneasy period 
for the British. Ratification of the Arbitration treaties 
would probably end West Coast opposition, although this 
would not still the Irish-American element nor those Demo­
crats who believed repeal a violation of the 1912 platform. 
The treaties served as an excellent measure of administration 
support on foreign affairs, and repeal of the exemption 
clause was never in doubt after their approval.
President Wilson recognized as early as January 1913» 
before the Mexican problem ever presented itself, that Grey 
was correct. There was never any indication that Wilson 
would not do the right thing. He was as much dedicated to 
an honorable principle as the British Foreign Secretary.
To charge that the President had been party to any trade 
is to completely misjudge him. Wilson's high moral policy 
in securing repeal of the exemption clause was another 
manifestation of the moral purpose of his Mexican policy, 
however diplomatically inept that policy might have been.
Wilson's primary concern in mid-November 1913 was 
not canal tolls, but Mexico. Tyrrell had told Grey that
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the President would appreciate Carden's help in working 
out some solution with Huerta. The course of events for 
the next few weeks would be centered on definite plans to 
get rid of the Mexican President.
CHAPTER VIII 
BRITISH MEDIATION
The negotiations between the Mexican President and 
the United States became exceedingly complex. Wilson 
worked through Lind and G'Shaughnessy to force Huerta's 
resignation, while Carden tried to find a common ground 
upon which the United States and Mexico could come to an 
agreement. Carden realized that Huerta would not meekly 
consent to ultimatums from the United States but would in­
sist on a negotiated settlement which would permit him to 
retire in an honorable fashion. The General had pride, 
and Wilson's uncompromising attitude offended him.
Lind had been rebuffed by the Mexican government 
on several occasions. On November 7 he advised Bryan 
that a definite time should be set for Huerta to comply 
with the United States demands,^ and Lind returned to 
Mexico City to seek a solution to the problem. Whereas 
President Wilson's notes of November 1 and 7 had empha­
sized Huerta's resignation, Lind now bargained to prevent 
convening of the new Congress. Lind's arrival was
^Lind to Bryan, November 7» 1913» SDP.
l60
l6l
heralded with much fanfare and publicity, spelling defeat
for his mission no matter how generous or demanding his
terms might be. He wired Bryan that Carden informed him
that Huerta would not resign until after the new Mexican
2
Congress met on November 15 <.
Lind proceeded with his plans and outlined the 
details to Bryan on November 10. First, he suggested that 
the United States announce that the new Congress would 
not be recognized as a legal body, and any action by it 
would be held null and void. If, in spite of such warnings, 
the Congress should convene, then on that same day the 
United States would recognize the belligerency of the Con­
stitutionalists in the North. Finally, the United States 
would establish a peaceful blockade of Mexico to prevent 
munitions from reaching Huerta. Bryan agreed with Lind's
3
recommendations in regard to the Congress. Lind then 
issued a threat to the Mexican government. He declared 
that the meeting of the new Congress must be postponed 
within twelve hours, or he would leave Mexico City and
2
Philip Holt Lowry, "The Mexican Policy of Woodrow 
Wilson" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Dept, of Inter­
national Relations, Yale University, 1949), 71-72. Lowry 
points out that instructions to Lind from the President 
could not be found. Lind's actions can be pieced together 
from the various telegrams. Lind to Bryan, November 9,
1913, SDP.
3
Lind to Bryan, November 10, 1913, Wilson Papers; 
Bryan to Lind, November 10, 1913, SDP.
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return to Veracruz. The time passed and no announcement 
was forthcoming from the government, so Lind left as
 ^ 4 announced.
Lind's "get tough" policy had failed for several 
reasons. The publicity accorded Lind's every move was 
anathema to his success, and Huerta had an intense personal 
dislike for him. As. if that were not enough, the unreason­
able twelve-hour ultimatum that Congress not meet was sure 
to mean failure. Lind may have feared that Congress would 
confer additional rich oil concessions upon Lord Cowdray.
He had expressed such a concern on several occasions. But 
it was absolutely essential to Huerta that the new Congress 
hold its session.
Ever since the dissolution of the old Congress on 
October 10, Huerta had assumed powers that under the Mexi­
can constitution belonged exclusively to the legislature. 
Therefore, the new body must either approve the executive 
usurpation of authority or hold him liable for prosecution. 
If Congress did not meet and Huerta's acts were not legis­
latively sanctioned, then he could be held accountable by 
any future Mexican government. Thus, to most observers
4
Lind to Bryan, two dispatches dated November 12, 
1913; 0'Shaughnessy to Bryan, November 12, 1913; Bryan to 
Lind, November 12, 1913, SDP, authorized Lind to fix the 
time for his departure if Huerta did not consent to a 
dissolution of the Congress. Lowry, "The Mexican Policy 
of Woodrow Wilson," 72; The Times (London), November l4, 
1913, 8e.
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there was no question about whether Congress should con­
vene or not--it must meet.^
The preliminary session of the Congress was held 
on November 15i although the formal opening was not 
scheduled until November 20. After much confusion the 
Chamber of Deputies was finally able to select a tem­
porary president, a committee on credentials, and then 
adjourned. The Senate with only twenty-one members 
present, mostly army generals, did not have a quorum 
which required twenty-nine, and adjourned until the next 
day. None of the Catholic senators were present, and 
their failure to attend indicated the attitude of the 
Catholic party.^ Finally, on the seventeenth, organ­
ization of the Congress was completed when the upper
7
house had a quorum. Thus, in spite of warnings from 
Lind and President Wilson the proscribed Congress was 
a fact, and General Huerta was scheduled to address the 
formal opening on November 20.
The question arose about attendance by the diplo­
matic corps. Grey advised Carden that he did not think
^New York Times, November l6, 1:8; l8, 1:6; 20, 2: 
1; 25, 2:3, 1913.
^Mexican Herald, November l6, 1913» 1:2; New York 
Times, November 16, 1913» II » 1:8. One report claimed 
formal organization was not completed until November 22. 
Ibid., November 23» 1913» III, 3:4.
^New York Times, November l8, 1913, 1:6,
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Britain was obliged to recognize the new Congress official­
ly, and thought it was better if Sir Lionel did not attend, 
Carden was instructed, however, to do whatever the other 
European representatives agreed upon, but Grey suggested
that Sir Lionel try to get them all to follow a common 
8course,
As President Huerta entered the assembly hall oho 
the evening of the twentieth he was greeted by cries of 
"Long live the maintainer of our national integrity."
The General's message was short and devoted principally 
to reasons for the dissolution of the old Congress and the 
necessity for his assumption of legislative power. Quoting 
Napoleon, he said, "the law is not violated when you save 
the fatherland." He believed that the action which he 
took was essential to prevent the collapse of governmental 
machinery. Such measures had been restricted, he related, 
to those absolutely necessary and were confined to the 
Departments of Finance, Interior, and War. Although he 
asked the new body to sanction his acts, Huerta accepted 
full responsibility for what he had done and said that he 
would abide by the decision of Congress. The speech was 
enthusiastically applauded by the members. Eduardo 
Tamariz, speaker of the Chamber of Deputies, replied by 
promising the full support of the Congress "in maintaining
PRO,
o
Grey to Carden, November 19» 1913, F.O. 37T/I678,
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intact the national autonomy and integrity, which you
g
have sustained thus far,"
All of the diplomats except 0'Shaughnessy attended 
the opening, and reports indicated their action had 
strengthened Huerta's position. The tide was now swing­
ing back in favor of the Mexican President after having
reached its lowest ebb when the Congress had been dis-
, 10 solved.
On November 13, 0'Shaughnessy met with Huerta's 
private secretary and Manuel Garza Aldape, Minister of 
Gobernacion. After advising them of the seriousness of 
the situation, he said that he would be willing to trans­
mit to Washington any proposals Huerta would care to make, 
Garza Aldape drew from his pocket a memorandum prepared 
by him and signed by Huerta. It proposed that the Congress 
must convene to decide on the presidential election, but 
since the required number of polls were not in operation 
the only possible decision would be to annul the election. 
Congress would be expected to confirm the extraordinary 
powers vested in the President after the dissolution of 
the old Congress on October 10. In order to avoid the 
taint of unconstitutionality because the recent elections 
for Congress were called by the executive and not the
^Mexican Herald, November 21, 1913, 2:3-7; New York 
Times, November 20, 2:1; 22, 1913, 1:8; Carden to Grey, 
November 20, 1913, F.O. 37l/l6?8; ibid., November 26, 1913, 
F.O. 414/235, PRO.
^^New York Times, November 22, 1913, 1:8,
l66
legislature, a new date would be set for elections for both 
branches of the government, and Congress would then be 
dissolved. It was further advised that if an acceptable 
interim government was installed and granted recognition 
by the United States, it would need no help in negotiation 
with the rebels because it would then be able to suppress 
the revolution. Later that day 0'Shaughnessy suggested 
that as its first duty the new Congress declare itself un­
constitutional and recall the old body. Thus legal conti-. 
nuity would be preserved.
Lind also received a copy of Huerta's proposals and 
immediately wired Bryan that in his opinion this was just 
another excuse for delay. He recommended that if the 
Mexican Congress was not dissolved by midnight of November 
155 G'Shaughnessy should be instructed to ask for his pass­
ports. He believed whatever action was planned should be 
executed without delay. Lind undoubtedly expected inter­
vention because he advised that he enjoyed the confidence 
of the Americans who were managing the Federal railroads 
terminating in Veracruz, and he could arrange to have 
considerable amount of rolling stock assembled for any 
anticipated needs.
Huerta's proposals were almost entirely disre-
^^0'Shaughnessy to Secretary of State, two dis- . 
patches dated November 13, 1913; Lind to Bryan, November 
14, 1913, SDP,
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garded by the United States. On the fourteenth Bryan 
instructed G'Shaughnessy to inform Huerta immediately 
that Congress should not convene and that he should re­
sign as soon as an ad interim government acceptable to 
the United States was installed. Lind and G'Shaughnessy, 
in conjunction with Huerta or his representatives, were 
to agree on the new government. It would promptly be 
recognized by the United States, and an understanding with 
this government would be concluded foi free elections to 
be held at an early date under the Constitution of l857o 
G'Shaughnessy delivered Bryan's message to the Minister 
of Gobernacion who was visibly shaken by it. Garza Aldape 
asked him to return the next morning for an answer.
When G'Shaughnessy called at the appointed hour, 
the Minister of Gobernacion informed him that he had not 
yet delivered the message. G'Shaughnessy asked if he was 
afraid to do so, and Garza Aldape replied that he was but 
would do so later in the day. He asked that G'Shaugh­
nessy return at 3 P.M. for Huerta's reply. Garza Aldape 
suggested that they be permitted to send a secret agent 
to Washington to negotiate the final terms, stating that 
no president publicly selected by the United States would 
ever enjoy the support of the Mexican people. Since 
Carranza, Chief of the Constitutionalistsi had already 
refused mediation by the United States, Huerta could do 
no less. The Minister of Gobernacion added that he would
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give G'Shaughnessy a list of persons whom Huerta would 
accept as provisional president.
That afternoon, Garza Aldape delivered Huerta's
reply» He completely rejected the terms tendered by the
United States» For his courage in presenting the demands
to the Mexican President, the Minister of Gobernacion was
shortly forced to resign, but he was subsequently appointed
12Minister to France. The likelihood that Huerta would 
accept the conditions had been notably decreased several 
days earlier when the newspapers published President 
Wilson's six-point plan for Mexico.
This program called for Huerta's elimination. If 
necessary the United States would apply financial pressure 
to bankrupt the government, blockade the Mexican ports to 
cut off customs revenues and munitions shipments, or even
12Bryan to American Embassy (Mexico City), November 
l4, 1913; G'Shaughnessy to Secretary of State, three dis­
patches dated November 15» 1913; ibid., November l6, 1913; 
Lind to Bryan, November 1?» 1913» SUP. Arthur S. Link, 
Wilson The Nei^ Freedom (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1956), 385, claims that "Huerta virtually surrender­
ed during the morning of November 15» 1913» by promising 
G'Shaughnessy to submit a list of names for the provisional 
presidency. By the late afternoon of the same day, when 
the American Chargé returned to the Foreign Gffice to re­
ceive Huerta's final reply, however, the situation had 
changed completely." It should be pointed out that it was 
Garza Aldape and not Huerta who promised the list of 
candidates and that at this time Garza Aldape had not even 
shown Huerta the message because, as he told G'Shaughnessy, 
he was afraid to. Also, there was no indication that on 
the morning of the 15th, Huerta was in any more of a mood 
to accept Wilson's ultimatum than he was that afternoon.
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resort to invasion to accomplish its purpose. After 
Huerta had been forced from power, steps would be taken 
to select a new provisional president, and new elections 
would subsequently be held for both president and Congress 
Assurances were given that the United States would not
13acquire any new territory as a result of intervention.
Publication of the President's plans caused Grey 
some anxiety. The principal problem was point four which 
provided for selection of Huerta's successor after he was 
eliminated. Great Britain, Germany, and France all re­
fused to ask for the General's retirement until a replace­
ment had been selected. Grey explained to Page that the 
European governments, especially Great Britain, could not 
urge Huerta to resign until they knew that someone capable 
of maintaining law and order was ready to take over. The 
interregnum might be a period of massacre and murder of 
foreigners even though Page replied that such things could 
occur while Huerta ruled. Grey acknowledged that this was 
true, but if Great Britain had not in any way intervened, 
it would not be held responsible. If Great Britain in­
sisted on Huerta's elimination when no one was ready to
accept the office and disorders followed, then the British
l4could in a sense be held liable.
^^The Times (London), November 13, 1913, 8a ; New 
York Times, November 13, 1913, 2:3.
l4Grey to Spring-Rice, two dispatches dated Novem­
ber 13, 1913, Numbers 316 and 656, no. P.O. number, PRO, 
relating Grey's discussions with Page.
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The constant crisis produced by Wilson's published 
statements and his private ultimatums to Huerta created a 
potentially dangerous situation in Mexico. Carden re­
ported on November 15 that he had instructed the consular 
offices to warn British subjects to make preparations to 
take refuge in the large towns in the event of any action 
by the United States which might be cause for alarm. He 
would give them advance notice of such incidents if he had 
time. Carden recommended that Huerta remain in office 
until his successor had been chosen, or else he feared 
there would be a complete disintegration of the government. 
The legal heir, Querido Moheno, Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
was regarded as incompetent. Carden reported rumors that 
the United States would lift the arms embargo to the rebels, 
and he feared it would bring misery to large areas of 
Mexico. Lind, Carden remarked, had let it be known that 
unless Huerta accepted Wilson's proposals 0'Shaughnessy 
would leave the country. Carden declined to believe the 
report, but it had created an adverse effect on the public.
The next day Carden informed Grey that 0'Shaughnessy
^^Carden to Grey, November l6 , 1913» F.O. 4l4/235,
PRO. Similar reports were reaching London throu^ private 
channels. Thomas J. Ryder, General Manager of the Mexican 
Eagle Oil Company, Mexico City, to Lord Cowdray, two dis­
patches dated November l4, 1913; A. E. Chambers, in charge 
of oil refining operations of Mexican Eagle Oil Company, 
Puerto Mexico, to Lord Cowdray, November 15» 1913; Adams, 
Veracruz, to Lord Cowdray, November l6 , 1913» Cowdray 
Papers.
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had shown, him a copy of the President's demands of 
November l4 which the Mexican President had rejected.
Carden stated that he believed Huerta was willing to con­
cede the essential points of the United States demands,
"but he resents their general attitude and their disregard 
of the legal difficulties of conceding what they want as 
they want it. Personally, Mr. Lind also irritates him,"
The British Minister added that Huerta had sent word that 
he wanted to see him the following day, November 17, and 
intimated he desired to make a proposal through Grey,
The Mexican President did not want to refer the matter to 
the diplomatic corps because of its delicate nature. He 
preferred to handle the negotiations in a confidential 
manner.
Grey noted an apparent disparity between Wilson's 
published six-point program of November 13 and the ulti­
matum sent Huerta on the fourteenth. The essential differ­
ence was that the note of the fourteenth provided for the 
selection of Huerta's successor before he left office, 
while the published demands required him to relinquish 
his position before a replacement was selected. Grey 
thought the conditions of the fourteenth were more favor­
able, Sir Edward told Carden to report any proposals 
Huerta should make, adding that the United States was now 
irrevocably committed to force him from office by what­
ever means necessary. Girey believed Huerta ' s only hope
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lay in arranging terms with Washington.
On the same day the British Foreign Secretary re­
plied to Tyrrell's November l4 report of his meeting with 
President Wilson. Grey was gratified by the frank ex­
change of views between Wilson and Tyrrell. He furnished 
Sir William a copy of his instructions to Carden to re­
port Huerta's proposals as requested by Wilson, but added 
"Object of securing better Government which President has 
set before him is one with which everyone should sympa­
thise but I doubt whether there is any means by which 
President can carry it out except direct intervention." 
Grey asked Tyrrell to thank the President for his kind re­
marks, and to keep him informed on what the British were 
doing in Mexico.
Sir William immediately contacted House in New 
York and told him he had an important communication from 
London regarding Mexico and wanted to relay it to the 
President. House called Wilson and arrangements were made 
for Sir William to see the President without delay or pub­
licity. During their meeting on the eighteenth, Tyrrell
18read the messages from Grey and Carden to the President.
^^Carden to Grey, November I6 , 1913; Grey to Carden, 
November 17» 1913, F.O. 414/235» PRO.
^^Grey to Tyrrell, November 17» 1913» F.O. 1/247,
PRO.
1 Q
House Diary, November I8 , 1913; Message read to 
President Wilson by Sir W. Tyrrell, November I8 , 1913»
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President Wilson expressed his appreciation for 
communicating Grey's instructions to Carden. He in­
formed Tyrrell that he would be very grateful to receive 
the communication which Huerta proposed to send through 
the Foreign Secretary. Wilson said that he realized 
"that premature leakage has handicapped Huerta and he
19assured me again that he would act with great patience."
Carden was unable to see Huerta on November 17, 
and it was the twenty-first before he could get an 
audience. Huerta apologized for: not having prepared a 
written statement, but the pressure of business had not 
permitted it. Carden thought, however, that the General 
preferred to find out what was expected of him before he 
committed himself to any specific plan. Carden told him 
that President Wilson desired him to do three things: 
retire from office, convoke the old Congress, and proclaim
copy in Moore Papers. Tyrrell while waiting to get his 
appointment wrote Grey, "I am very grateful for your tele­
gram of yesterday about Mexico. I am trying to see the 
President to give him your message, but getting an aud­
ience without its getting known is a little difficult. In 
view of his relations with the Secretary of State I am 
very anxious to prevent its being known & so far I have 
succeeded which is rather a feat in this country of pub­
licity." Tyrrell to Grey, November I8 , 1913, F.O. 8OO/
82, PRO, With the restrictions on the Moore Papers and 
the Foreign Office materials this visit is now for the 
first time known in detail.
^^Tyrrell to Grey, November I8 , 1913, F.O. 1/247, 
PRO, relating Sir William's meeting with the President on 
November l8 .
a general amnesty so that all groups could participate 
in new elections. After discussing the matter quite 
thoroughly with Carden, Huerta authorized the British 
Minister to make the following statement:
1. Congress will at once proceed to revise re­
turns of Presidential election, which is certain to 
be nullified, whereupon new election will be con­
voked. Huerta will then retire from the Presidency 
and devote himself entirely to pacification of the 
country, appointing substitute, who will offer 
necessary guarantees.
2. He explained that it was quite impracticable 
to recall the late Congress, which was so hostile 
to the Administration, many of its members being 
actually engaged in conspiring with northern rebels, 
as to render government impossible. After all, his 
Government was the only one in the country, and he 
was bound to maintain it, failing which the result 
would be chaos. He had no wish to act unconsti­
tutionally, but was forced, for no other reason, to 
summon new Congress.
3. He could not offer general amnesty to rebels, 
for so many had been guilty of atrocious crimes, not 
only against Mexicans, but against foreign subjects 
as well, that he would incur serious responsibility 
with foreign Powers if he did so. Nor could he pro­
pose cessation of hostilities, which would be re­
garded as proof of weakness and would encourage 
rebels to further efforts. But if the States in 
revolution would take part in the election he would 
be willing to suspend operations in so far as neces­
sary to enable them to do so. He was prepared to 
discuss means whereby this might be brought to the 
knowledge of rebel leaders.
Carden went on to report that if the conditions were accept­
able as the basis for an agreement, he believed that de­
tails could be worked out to President Wilson's satisfaction. 
But Huerta insisted that he be permitted to draft the 
declaration and to submit it through the British Foreign 
Secretary. He would not accept "a direct agreement with 
United States Government.” Carden suggested that the with­
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drawal of the United States naval vessels at Veracruz would
20materially improve the chances of a settlement.
Grey forwarded the information obtained from Carden 
to Spring-Rice and directed that it be communicated to the 
United States. He advised the British Ambassador to state 
that the manner of handling the arrangements and the with­
drawal of the United States ships were apparently im­
pressions which Carden had received in his talks with 
Huerta and should be considered accordingly. Grey would 
not sanction the proposal for withdrawal of American ships 
explaining that "at a moment when we are told that danger 
to foreign lives and property might occur suddenly and 
force foreigners to take refuge at the ports, when we have 
asked United States ships to give protection if need be, 
and are ourselves sending two ships to Mexican ports, we
cannot endorse any suggestion that United States vessels
21should be withdrawn from Mexican waters." A copy of 
Carden's message to Grey had also been sent to the British 
Embassy in Washington, and President Wilson was already 
appraised of the contents.
Tyrrell, again apparently through the good offices 
of Colonel House, met with President Wilson on November 23, 
to deliver Huerta's proposals. The President did hot
20
Carden to Grey, November 21, 1913, F.O. 4l4/235,
PRO.
21
Grey to Spring-Rice, November 24, 1913, F.O. 4l4/ 
235, PRO. The British request for American assistance and 
the sending of the two warships will be discussed later.
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indicate to Sir William exactly what he would do about 
them, but he seemed to think that they were only a device 
by Huerta to gain time. Tyrrell avoided publicity on his 
second conference with the President but was unable to do 
so this time.
Some significance was attached to the meeting by 
the newspapers because Tyrrell had been received on a 
Sunday. It was Wilson's policy not to discuss business 
on Sundays except with the Cabinet and then only on very 
important issues. The press was unable to discover the 
subject of their talk as Sir William brushed questions 
aside by saying that the meeting had been personal and 
private and was not to be discussed. The New York Times 
on November 25 erroneously reported that Tyrrell's visit
was to get the President to send a naval force to protect
22British interests at Tampico and Tuxpam, Mexico. At 
this point Carden decided to put his part in the negot­
iations in its proper perspective.
After 0'Shaughnessy had shown Carden the United 
States' demands and Huerta's rejection of them on November 
l6, Carden believed the circumstances warranted immediate
22House Diary, November 26, 1913; New York Times. 
November 24, 2:4; 25, 1913» 2:1; Memorandum of Tyrrell's 
visit with J. B. Moore on November 28, 1913* Colville 
Barclay, Councillor of the Embassy to W. J. Bryan,
November 25, 1913» copy in Moore Papers, contains a formal 
statement embodying Grey's comments to the Secretary of 
State.
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action» Even though he had been warned not to encourage 
Huerta to seek British mediation, Carden decided to see 
if he could help avert the impending crisis. In fact, 
Carden interpreted O 'Shaughnessy's conversation as an 
indirect appeal for assistance. Therefore, the British 
Minister requested an interview with Huerta on November 
17. Carden's report of the sixteenth stated that Huerta 
had sent word he wanted to see him the following day.
During this conference, Carden reported, Huerta 
was visibly incensed with the interference of the United 
States in Mexico's internal affairs, and he would not sub­
mit to Wilson's demands, even if it meant war. Efforts 
to force him from office, and the menace implied by the 
American flotilla in Mexican waters, merely strengthened 
his determination to resist Wilson's demands. After the 
two had talked for some time, the General began to take 
a more moderate tone. He seemed willing. Sir Lionel 
stated, to comply with some of President Wilson's re­
quests. He stipulated, however, that it must be done in 
such a way that it would not imply "acquiescence in the 
right of the United States Government to dictate the 
policy which Mexico should follow." Carden was instructed
to return for Huerta's statement, but it was not available
2 3until the twenty-first. Carden had originally made it
23
PRO.
Carden to Grey, November 26, 1913, F.O. 4l4/235,
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appear that Huerta was requesting British assistance 
in arranging terms with the United States, when in 
reality Carden had been the instigator» There is 
nothing to indicate that this revelation effected sub­
sequent events, nor could any reason be found to indicate 
why Carden decided to make the facts known.
On November 28 both Tyrrell and Colville Barclay, 
the recently arrived councillor of the British Embassy, 
contacted John Bassett Moore to see what the President 
had decided to do about Huerta's statement. In view of 
what the President had told Tyrrell on the twenty-third, 
Moore said that there would probably be no reply.
Carden was somewhat distressed to learn that in 
all probability no notice would be taken on the proposals. 
The plan called for Huerta's retirement and, Carden stated, 
he thought that was President Wilson's main concern. Un­
less future negotiations were conducted in such a way that 
they would not reflect on Mexico's national pride nor
interfere in the right of self-government, the efforts 
24would fail. Huerta would resist and the country would 
support him.
Grey was involved now, and he thought it was only 
proper that some reply from the United States should be
24Memorandum of Tyrrell's visit with J. B, Moore 
on November 28, 1913j Moore Papers; Carden to Girey, Novem­
ber 30, 1913, F.O, 414/235, PRO.
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made» Spring-Rice was instructed to find out if the
25
President had any counterproposals to make » Barclay
was sent to see the Secretary of State and he told Bryan 
that Grey felt obliged to make some kind of an answer.
Without hesitating a moment, Bryan "requested Mr. 
Barclay to say that the President considered General 
Huerta's proposals so 'absurd,' and merely calculated to 
gain time, that he did not deem them worthy of any reply 
whatever. He added that General Huerta knew quite well 
what was wanted of him, and the only thing that was left 
to him was to choose between going out 'on his feet or on 
his head.'" The Secretary of State then said that the 
policy of the United States was clearly defined in the 
President's message to Congress on December 2. The United 
States would be patient, and it was hoped that it would not
26be necessary to alter its policy of watchful waiting.
There was nothing left for Grey to do, and he advised
Carden on December 3 to inform Huerta that the United States
considered his "proposals so unacceptable that they do not
intend to reply." He added, "His Majesty's Government
27can do no more . . . ."
^^Grey to Spring-Rice, December 1, 1913, F.O. 4l4/ 
235, PRO.
^^Spring-Rice to Grey, December 2, 10, 1913s F.O. 
414/235, PRO.
^^Grey to Carden, December 3, 1913, F.O. 4l4/235,
PRO,
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Lind had failed to frighten Huerta with his 
ultimatunio The Congress had met and there was every in­
dication it would validate the General's actions. Huerta 
had offered one plan, which was answered by a new ulti­
matum from Washington. Huerta rejected these demands and 
refused to acknowledge that the United States had any right 
to interfere in Mexico's internal affairs, even it it 
meant war. Carden was obviously upset by the sudden turn 
of events and injected himself into the controversy in 
spite of Grey's warnings to stay clear of it. The British 
Minister was able to get Huerta to make a formal state­
ment of his position and to indicate how far he would go 
in complying with Wilson's demands. The essential point, 
so Carden believed, was Huerta's elimination and this was 
provided for, as well as an offer to work out some solution 
so that the Constitutionalists could participate in a 
general election. Thus, of the three requirements laid 
down by Wilson on November l4, the General had conceded 
two of them. One stumbling block, however, was the fact 
that even though Huerta resigned he would stay on to 
command the army in its efforts to pacify the country. He 
would not concede the third point, by cancelling the meet­
ing of the new Congress, and explained the impracticability 
of recalling the old one. President Wilson insisted on all 
or nothing, and the United States continued the policy it 
had followed for months, "watchful waitings"
l8l
Grey had gone the extra mile with Wilson, and had 
reluctantly reversed himself on almost every issue. Carden 
had exceeded his authority in trying to work out a solution 
to the impass4 between the United States and Mexico. The 
only thing the British had not done was to demand Huerta's 
resignation. As Grey had said, they could do no more.
Wilson had been pointedly discourteous to the Mexican 
President by refusing to acknowledge Huerta's communications, 
The President had demonstrated his diplomatic ineptness.
The General had offered far more than he could expect to 
receive.
Grey recognized that it was a problem the United 
States would have to solve. The British had investments 
and citizens that must be protected so two warships were 
ordered to the Mexican coast, and Great Britain asked the 




One of the major problems to confront the United 
States and Great Britain during the Mexican crisis was 
the protection of oil field operations in the state of 
Veracruz. The petroleum companies there found themselves 
in a very percarious position in November when the Con­
stitutionalists began their campaign. One of the com­
panies was the Mexican Eagle Oil Company whose major 
stockholder, Lord Cowdray, had been closely associated 
with the development of Mexico's oil industry.
Weetman Dickinson Pearson, the first Viscount 
Cowdray (I856-I927)» joined the firm of contractors 
founded by his grandfather, Samuel Pearson in 1875*
Young Pearson extended the field of operations of the 
company during the next few years to the United States 
and to Spain. Finally, in I889 he went to Mexico, and 
there secured a number of very valuable contracts for the 
firm in such enterprises as drainage, waterworks, harbors, 
railways, and power.^ During work on the Tehuantepec
^J. R. Ho Weaver (ed.), The Dictionary of National 
Biography (24 vols.; London: Oxford University Press,
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Railway, shortly after the turn of the century, Pearson 
noted evidence of petroleum^ Borings were made and oil 
was struck. This led him to send exploring parties to 
other parts of Mexico until the vast fields in northern 
Veracruz were discovered* He had in the meantime secured 
extensive oil concessions from the Mexican government. 
Pearson's oil operations brought him into direct com­
petition with several American companies which by I9II 
had culminated in a cutthroat price war with Henry Clay 
Pierce and the Waters-Pierce Company. Waters-Pierce was 
a subsidiary of the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey 
until it was disaffiliated from the parent company in
1911.^
1937)9 Supplement 1922-1930, 66O-6I.
2
Valentin R. Garfias, Petroleum Resources of the 
World (New York; John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1923), 26-33; 
Frederick A. A* Talbot, The Oil Conquest of the World 
(Philadelphia: J * B. Lippincott Company, 1914), passim,
contains an excellent but brief description of the develop­
ment of the Mexican oil industry and the part played by 
Lord Cowdray; Ralph W* Hidy and Muriel E« Hidy, Pioneering 
in Big Business 1882-1911, Vol. I of History of Standard 
Oil Company (New Jersey)""(2 vols.; New York: Harper and
Brothers, 1955), I, 464, describes the Pierce-Pearson rival­
ry in Mexico; George Sweet Gibbs and Evelyn H* Knowlton,
The Resurgent Years 1911-1927, Vol. II of History of Stand­
ard Oil Company (New Jersey) (2 vols*; New York: Harper
and Brothers,1956), II, 8, 19-20, 46-47, 84-85; Alfred 
Tischendorf, Great Britain and Mexico in the Era of Por- 
firio Diaz (Durham: Duke University Press, 1961), 124-25 ; 
David Pletcher, Rails. Mines and Progress (Ithaca; Cornell 
University Press, 1958), 298; J. Fred Rippy, "English In­
vestments in Mexico: A Story of Bonanzas and Heartbreaks,"
The Journal of Business of the University of Chicago, XXV 
(October 1952), 247-48, describes why Pearson was so suc­
cessful in his dealings with General Diaz and Pearson's 
rivalry with Pierce*
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In 1909 Pearson and certain members of Mexico's 
ruling clique formed the Mexican Eagle Oil Company. This 
firm was chartered by the Mexican government and was 
actually a Mexican enterprise. The overthrow of Diaz in 
1910, it was reported, put the company in a precarious 
position. Claims were made that the Madero revolution 
was financed by some American oil companies who expected 
him to cancel Pearson's oil concessions, thus eliminating 
their British rival. During the Madero regime statements 
periodically appeared in the press that the validity of 
the English oil concessions was being questioned by the 
Mexican government. Rumors also abounded that the counter­
revolution in February 1913 by Felix Diaz and Huerta was 
an effort by the British oil interests to install a govern­
ment favorable to them. The Constitutionalist movement 
under Carranza in northern Mexico against Huerta was said
to be inspired by American oil companies. Thus, the plots
and counterplots between I9IO and 1913 were attributed by 
many persons to the war being waged by the rival oil 
companies.
The charges carried to their ultimate conclusion
held that Lord Cowdray and the Mexican Eagle Oil Company
stockholders were influencing British policy in Mexico.
More specifically, Lord Cowdray was said to have in­
fluenced the British decision to recognize Huerta, secured 
Carden's appointment as Minister to Mexico to thwart United
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States policies there, financed the Huerta government 
when it could not borrow funds on the world money markets 
in return for additional rich oil concessions, and in 
general to have been the sustaining influence which kept 
Huerta in power in defiance of President Wilson's efforts 
to force him out of office. Reports were circulated that 
the new Mexican Congress was expected to pass legislation 
beneficial to the Pearson interests. Such charges appeared 
in the press, magazine articles, and in letters to members 
of Congress, the President, and a host of other officials 
both public and private. However, no concrete evidence 
has been produced to substantiate these allegations.
On the contrary. Lord Cowdray repeatedly denied 
throughout 1913 that he or anyone connected with him had 
in any way been a party to such adventures. He did admit 
that in September he had subscribed to about three per cent 
of a loan being negotiated by the National Bank of Mexico. 
The oil concessions granted under the Diaz administration, 
he stated, had been validated by Madero, contrary to what 
might have appeared in the press. His company had not 
applied for any new oil leases nor extensions of their 
present ones. Although he had been offered a number of 
contracts for public works in Mexico, only one had been
3
accepted and that was from the Madero government.
^New York Times, November 13, 1913, 2:3-4; Tyrrell 
mentioned Cowdray's denials in his report of his meeting 
with Wilson on November 13; Lord Cowdray to the American
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Lord Cowdray was convinced that Henry Clay Pierce 
was behind the efforts to discredit him. J. N. Galbraith, 
one of Pierce's associates in Mexico, had been filling 
Lind with anti-Cowdray propaganda ever since Lind's arrival 
in Mexico. In addition, Sherburne G. Hopkins, an attorney 
from Washington, D . C., had been employed by the Waters- 
Pierce Oil Company on several different occasions and as
Hopkins later testified, "I tried to make it as hot as I
L
could for Lord Cowdray and the Eagle Oil Company." Hop­
kins was also attorney for the Constitutionalists from 
April 1, 1913, to September 15, 1914, at which time Pierce 
was attempting to secure secret concessions from Carranza.^ 
The press attacks during October and November 1913 
were especially irritating to Lord Cowdray. When informed 
that the reports were coming from Hopkins' office in Wash­
ington, Cowdray wrote, "Hopkins is at his old tricks.
Ambassador (Walter Hines Page), November 17, 1913, copy 
in Cowdray Papers; Page to Secretary of State, November 
18, 1913, SDP, telling of Cowdray's visit to him on Novem­
ber 17; ibid., November 19, 1913, SDP, forwarding a copy 
of Cowdray's written denial.
4
Hopkins openly admitted his part in the efforts 
to discredit Cowdray in testimony before the Fall Committee. 
U. S., Congress, Senate, Subcommittee of the Committee on 
Foreign Relations, Preliminarv Report and Hearings, In­
vestigation of Mexican Affairs, 66th Cong., 2d Sess., 1920, 
Senate Doc. 285, 2 vols, II, 2411-19, 2520-74 (hereafter 
cited as Senate Doc. 285); Fred Adams to Lord Cowdray, re­
ceived November 25, 1913, Cowdray Papers.
^Senate Doc. 285, II, 24ll; Arthur S. Link, Wilson 
The New Freedom (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1956), 372.
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There is no statement, however unlikely, that he does not 
make if he deems it will have the effect of prejudicing 
the Aguila Co. in the eyes of the Constitutionalists. I 
assume he is acting for Henry Clay Pierce»'^ Cowdray at­
tributed Pierce's bitterness to his failure to be reelected 
to the board of the Mexican National Railways. Cowdray 
asserted that an editorial in the New York Herald charged 
him along with certain other New Yorkers with having pre­
vented Pierce's reelection because he knew tJ[hat they would 
never sanction sale of Cowdray's interest in the Tehuantepec 
Railroad to the Mexican National Railways. Cowdray stated 
he knew nothing about the election, nor had he in any way 
interfered with it. He was, however, determined to end 
these attacks.
On November 22 Cowdray cabled the company general
manager in Mexico City, Thomas J. Ryder, and asked him to
advise Galbraith that Pierce's campaign against him must
stop. Ryder was to tell him that
we could not be fiends in Mexico and allow him-- 
Clay Pierce--to do his damndest [sic] to injure us 
throughout the States and with the Constitutional­
ists in particular. I also asked him to say that 
unless C. P. is prepared to be friends all round, 
we will break the arrangement now existing--which 
was made at his request--and go for as much of the 
Domestic Trade as it is possible for us to obtain, 
regardless of the price we may obtain, and Mr. C.
Pierce is not, I consider, in a position at the
^Lord Cowdray to Dr. Hayes and Mr. Ryder, Memo­
randum, November 25, 1913» copy in Cowdray Papers. The 
Aguila Company was the Mexican Eagle Oil Company.
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present time to stand a rate war. It strikes me 
therefore that proper representations . . .  to 
Mr. Galbraith may be very u s e f u l . 7
The adverse effect of the anti-Cowdray propaganda on the 
Mexican Eagle Oil Company was clearly evident in the Con­
stitutionalist campaign in the state of Veracruz during 
the fall and winter of 1913«
The loss of Torreon and the dissolution of the 
Mexican Congress led Cowdray in mid-October to express 
his anxiety "that the lives and properties of foreigners 
will be seriously jeopardised," He was confident, however, 
that such fears would not materialize unless the United 
States intervened, but he was also glad that the Mexican 
Eagle Oil Company's holdings were near the Gulf coast and
g
could be protected in the event of trouble.
The most important of the company properties were 
located in the northern part of the state of Veracruz in 
the vicinity of Tampico and Tuxpam. The northernmost area 
known as the Panuco District was about twenty-five miles 
southwest of the port city, Tampico, and was centered on 
the Panuco River. Oil reached the refinery, storage tanks, 
and loading facilities at Tampico by pipeline and barge.
The other major area, the Dos Bocas-Alamo District, was a
7
Ibid., in which Cowdray notes his cable to Ryder 
of November 22.
Q
Cowdray to Dr. C. ¥. Hayes, October l8, 1913, 
Cowdray Papers.
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narrow belt, about one mile wide, that formed a crescent 
stretching some forty miles from Dos Bocas on the Tamiahua 
Lagoon to Alamo on the Tuxpam River about twenty miles 
west of the city of Tuxpam» Since the shoreline was so 
shallow in this region, pipelines were constructed from : 
the fields to points a mile or more offshore where loading
o
operations were conducted. Fighting in this region had 
been sporadic during the summer and early fall.
The presence of large bands of rebels in the vicinity 
of Tuxpam, and reports of the movement of others south 
from Monterrey in late October prompted the Oil Fields of 
Mexico Company at Cobos, just across the river from Tuxpam, 
to request that a war vessel be sent to the area. Admiral 
Fletcher dispatched the USS Tacoma from Veracruz on October 
23 to render assistance and protection to the Americans
^Garfias, Petroleum Resources, 26-33» In December 
1913, the oil region was thus described; "Tampico-Tuxpam 
oil fields 2000 square miles, 120 million American and 
103 million foreign capital, 4l companies, 13 large and 
numerous small camps, 103 producing oil wells, 52,000 
barrels daily, 24l oil storage tanks in 20 localities and 
250 miles pipe line." Admiral F . F. Fletcher, Commander 
Detached Squadron, Tampico, Mexico, to Secretary of the 
Navy (Operations), December 5» 1913, National Archives 
Record Group 45 (hereafter cited as NA RG 45).
^^Juan Barragan Rodriquez, Historia del e.iercito v 
de la Revolucion Constitucionalista (2 vols»; Mexico; 
Talleres de la Editorial Stylo, 19^6), I, 329-30; N. C. 
Twining, commanding USS Tacoma, Off Tuxpam, Mexico, to 
Secretary of the Navy (Operations), October 26, 1913, SDP, 
reported that no American property had been destroyed or 
endangered at Tuxpam since July 3, 1913, but a force of 
700 rebels was reported about 25 miles jfrom Tuxpam on 
October 26»
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there, although it was shortly withdrawn when the immed­
iate threat to that town seemed to pass®^^ Nevertheless, 
the revolutionary activity was particularly disturbing 
because it was feared that the oil tanks and plants at 
Tampico and Tuxpam belonging to several American companies, 
as well as those of the Mexichn Eagle Oil Company, 
offered a great temptation to the rebels to set them afire. 
This would, of course, not only pose a threat to the oil 
fields but to the nearby cities as well.
Bryan decided that perhaps the best way to handle 
the problem would be to issue appropriate warnings to the 
Constitutionalist Chief. Therefore, he directed Frederick 
Simpich, the American consul at Nogales, to inform Carranza 
"that if the soldiers are acting under his direction we 
shall expect him to prevent such destruction of property. 
Willful damage of this kind would not only arouse indig­
nation but might compel this Government to put forth special 
efforts to protect life and property that might be en­
dangered." Carranza replied that he discredited reports
F. Fletcher to Secretary of the Navy (Oper­
ations), October 23» 1913, SDP; Percy N. Furber, President 
of Oil Fields of Mexico Company, had requested 0'Shaughnessy 
to apply for the vessel. Furber had also wired Lord Cowdray 
on October 20, asking that he request the United States to 
send a warship to Tuxpam on behalf of the Mexican Eagle Oil 
Company. He was advised that the matter should be taken 
up with Dr. Hayes, the company’s representative in Mexico. 
See J. B. Body to Percy N. Furber, November 6, 1913, Cow­
dray Papers; Furber to Josephus Daniels, Secretary of Navy, 
November 10, 1913» Box 64, Daniels Papers.
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that the Constitutionalists would set fire to the oil
tanks but promised that he would instruct his forces in
the area to afford adequate protection for Americans and
12their property. Carranza's guarantee said nothing about 
foreign oil holdings.
The climax to the rebel buildup in the Dos Bocas- 
Alamo District came on the night of November 10, when the 
forces under the command of Constitutionalist General 
Candido Aguilar attacked Tuxpam. Admiral Fletcher in re­
sponse to appeals from Arthur Payne, the American consular 
agent, sent the USS Wheeling and the USS Louisiana to Tux­
pam on the same day to provide protection for the Americans 
13there. Knowledge that the United States had sent ships 
to Tuxpam to assist Americans prompted the directors of 
the Mexican Eagle Oil Company to appeal to Ambassador Page 
for the protection of their property. Page informed them 
that the United States could not in any way be responsible
12Bryan to American Consul (Nogales), November 4, 
1913; Wilbur J. Carr, State Department to Miller (Tampico), 
November l4, 1913> SDP.
13Admiral Fletcher to the Secretary of the Navy 
(Operations), November 13, 1913, SDP, is a summary of the 
situation in Mexico from October 30 to November 13, 1913o 
Candido Aguilar was a native of Cordoba, Veracruz. He had 
been a Maderista and was General of Division in the Con­
stitutionalist army. After the triumph of the Consti­
tutionalists he held several posts including that of Secre­
tary of Foreign Relations and later governor of the state 
of Veracruz. See Francisco Naranjo, Diccionario Biografico 
Revolucionario (Mexico: Imprenta Editorial "Cosmos,"
1935), 17.
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for damage to British property in Mexico, but he said that 
he would forward the request to the State Department ^ Up­
on receipt of Page's wire, Bryan instructed Clarence A « 
Miller, the Consul at Tampico to do everything in his power
to provide protection for the property of the Mexican Eagle
l4Oil Company and for all other foreign property as well»
Such instructions were merely in keeping with the policy 
which the United States had followed in regard to similar 
appeals for some months.
The outbreak of the revolution in Mexico City the 
previous February, had posed serious threats to foreigners 
all over Mexico, On February 12 Ambassador Henry Lane 
Wilson notified the Secretary of State that upon appli­
cation he had instructed the consuls at ports where United 
States warships were located to afford protection for 
German citizens, Knox informed the Ambassador that assis­
tance should be extended to all foreigners without re­
striction, and Wilson was told to modify his instructions 
to the consuls accordingly. Navy regulations at the time, 
however, did not provide for such a contingency, and 
special orders had to be issued to the naval officers in
l4Page to Secretary of State, November 13, 1913; 
Bryan to American Consul (Tampico), November 15, 1913 ;
Bryan to American Embassy (London), November 15j 1913 ; 
Edward Bell, Second Secretary of Embassy (London), to 
Lieutenant Colonel A, B, Bathurst, M. P,, November 17j 
1913, SDP, advising that his request for protection of 
the Mexican Eagle Oil Company's property had been granted.
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Mexican waterso After this the United States, on numerous
occasions throughout 1913 and 1914, offered to provide aid
15for foreigners in Mexico where possibleo
Aguilar's initial attacks upon Tuxpam failed to 
take the town, and within a few days Federal reinforcements 
from Veracruz forced him to withdraw his army and establish 
his headquarters at the Tanguijo camp of the Mexican Eagle 
Oil Company. He planned to control the oil fields and to 
collect the revenues which the companies were paying to 
the Mexican government. These firms were expected to make 
large advance .payments, and were notified by the rebels 
that their properties would be destroyed if the demands 
were not met, of if they requested Federal troops. In 
addition, Aguilar hoped to stop delivery of oil to the 
railroads. Miller at Tampico was convinced that Aguilar 
could carry out his threats as he had several thousand 
men in the district and was soon expected to more than 
double his army, Bryan renewed his warning to Carranza 
about the destruction of the oil holdings, but in the 
meantime Aguilar attempted to blackmail the Mexican Eagle
or the United States instructions for the pro­
tection of British, Chinese, French, German, Japanese, and 
Spanish subjects and interests, see U. S ,, Department of
State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the 
United States 1913] (Vfashington: Government Printing
Office, 1920), Ü9&-923; ibid,, Papers Relating to the 
Foreign Relations of the United States 1914] (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1922), 7^4-900 (hereafter 
cited as Foreign Relations 1914).
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Oil Company.
The company was directed to make an advance war 
tax payment of two hundred thousand pesos and to agree 
not to deliver any more oil to the government railroads.
It was also to pay twenty-five thousand pesos monthly 
and agree not to appeal for aid from the Mexican govern­
ment. The company was given ten days in which to meet 
these demands, but until the negotiations were completed 
the company's pipelines would be shut down. Aguilar was 
represented as pretending to desire to protect American 
property, but he was said to be very bitter toward the 
British, and especially the Mexican Eagle Oil Company, 
because of his belief that the company had been instru­
mental in securing English recognition of the Huerta 
17government. Even before Aguilar's threats were known 
to Lord Cowdray he had become very much concerned about 
the company's property in Mexico.
On November 13 Lord Cowdray sent an urgent message 
to Ryder asking him to ascertain conditions at Tampico and 
Tuxpam and to advise London. Ryder reported the following 
day "everything all right at Tuxpam Bar up to Wednesday
^^William C. Canada, United States Consul (Vera­
cruz), to Secretary of State, November 17, 1913; Bryan to 
American Consul (Tampico), November l8, 1913; ibid 
(Nogales), November 20, 1913, SDP.
SDP.
17 Canada to Secretary of State, November 17, 1913,
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night [November 12], tankers being loaded and despatched 
by Customs now located at Bar. Tuxpam bankers and all 
money safe on ships at Bar. Federal reinforcements ex­
pected." He also forwarded a wire from Dr. Hayes, company 
vice-president, stating that two company employees had 
gone to the camp at Tanquijo to confer with Aguilar, who 
had demanded a meeting with company representatives.
Hayes said that the rebels had ordered all the company 
operations suspended, including pumping stations and pipe­
lines, and he urged that the Mexican government send at 
least one thousand troops immediately. Later in the day, 
Ryder advised that the lines connecting Mexico City with 
Tampico and Tuxpam had been cut and that communications 
with Tuxpam were available only through the United States 
battleships there. On November l6 another company employee, 
A. E. Chambers, cabled that the arrival of the United States 
warships had undoubtedly been a major factor in preventing 
rebel excesses against foreigners and their property.
Lind who had been watching the situation quite 
closely notified Bryan on November l4 that Lord Cowdray's 
representatives were appealing for assistance and that he 
had suggested that they call on Carden if they wanted 
quick and efficient help. This they did and Carden, who 
had delayed his request for British warships as long as 
he thought advisable, asked the Foreign Office to send
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l8two, one for Tampico and the other for Puerto Mexico.
It would, however, take several days before the Admiralty 
could get the ships to Mexico since they were being sent 
from the British West Indies. As before, the British 
again turned to the United States.
Grey wired Spring-Rice and asked that he inform 
the United States government that the ships were enroute, 
but until their arrival it was hoped that the American 
vessels would extend such protection as possible to British 
subjects. Spring-Rice was also to impress upon the United 
States the importance of timely notice in the event of 
American intervention so that persons living in outlying 
areas could reach safety. The British Embassy forwarded 
a memorandum to this effect to the "State Department on 
November 19» and John Bassett Moore advised that the 
communication would be sent to the President. He gave 
assurances that in the absence of the British ships the 
United States would continue its policy of safeguarding 
British citizens. Moore said that adequate notice to 
warn persons would be given if possible, but no one knew 
exactly what was going to happen at the present time.
The British request was forwarded to the President, who
18Thomas J. Ryder to Lord Cowdray, cable, November 
l4, 1913, and letter, November l4, 1913; A. E. Chambers 
to Lord Cowdray, November I6 , 1913, Cowdray Papers; Lind 
to Bryan, November l4, 1913» SDP; Carden to Grey, November 
17, 1913» P.O. 204/419» PRO.
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19endorsed Moore's course of actiono
Lind who was continually critical of Carden at­
tempted to further prejudice Bryan and the President about 
the British request for assistanceo He wired on November 
19 that if Carden had his way he would prefer at least 
three months advance notice of any action contemplated by 
the United States. Lind was of the opinion that Carden 
"has had ample notice if he chose to understand what I 
said in our last conversation." From all appearances Lind 
was convinced that United States intervention would take 
place momentarily. No doubt he had intimated as much be­
cause a few days later Carden told 0'Shaughnessy that the 
American ships at Tampico had orders to land marines.
Lind, on the other hand, did not approve of the idea that 
the British might land forces upon the arrival of their 
warships and he suggested to Bryan that the American 
naval commanders be given adequate orders to preclude such
Carden to Grey, November 1?, 1913, F.O. 204/
419; Grey to Spring-Rice, November I8 , 1913, F.O. 371/ 
1678; Spring-Rice to Grey, November 19, 1913, F.O. 371/ 
1678, PRO; British Embassy, Washington, Memorandum, 
November 19, 1913, SDP, interestingly enough this memo­
randum is dated November 19, but is date stamped in 
Moore's office, November I8 ; A condensed version of the 
British memorandum is included in Foreign Relations 1914, 
840-4l; John Bassett Moore to the President, November 19, 
1913, copy in Moore Papers; Woodrow Wilson to John Bassett 
Moore, November 21, 1913, copy in Letterbooks 8 and 9, 
Wilson Papers, Firestone Library, Princeton University. 
British Embassy to State Department, November 26, 1913, 
SDP, thanking the United States for the assurances given.
198
20a possibility® Later on the same day, Lind tried to 
build an even tighter case against Carden®
He forwarded a verbatim report made to the Asso­
ciated Press at Veracruz by a local citizen. When two of 
the brothers of the late President Madero recently had 
been arrested and thrown in the dungeon at Veracruz, a 
highly respected Englishman, whose sister had married one 
of the Madero brothers, called on Carden to get the British 
to intercede on their behalf. They were, the Englishman 
told Carden, guilty of no offense against the Huerta govern­
ment, but he feared for their lives. Carden informed him 
that because of the political situation and the relation­
ship between Great Britain and Mexico he would not inter­
vene on behalf of a Mexican citizen. But, the report con­
tinued, a new condition had arisen and it would be inter­
esting to see if Carden would continue this neutral policy. 
Now the property of Lord Cowdray's Mexican Eagle Oil Com­
pany was threatened by the rebels. "Will Carden continue 
to say that the relations between his Government and the 
present Government of Mexico are such that he cannot make 
any representations in behalf of a Mexican citizen when 
the relations of that citizen to Englishmen is one of
20Lind to Secretary of State, November 19, 1913, 
Wilson Papers; O 'Shaughnessy to Secretary of State, Novem­
ber 23, 1913; Bryan to American Embassy (Mexico City), 
November 24, 1913, SDP; Bryan denied in his message of 
November 24 that any order had been given to land marines.
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pounds and shillings and not one of . « . blood? . . .
Will he solve it?” Lind hardly needed to add the post-
21script to the story. On the very day that this report 
was received, Sir Edward Grey made a second request of 
President Wilson.
The British Foreign Secretary informed Spring-Rice 
that he had been besieged with urgent requests from both 
British and Canadian concessionaires with forty million 
pounds or more invested in various enterprises in Mexico. 
The investors, Grey said, wanted two things: that the
United States government make it clear that they would 
see things through in Mexico and not merely starve Huerta 
out without intending to insure that Mexico eventually 
receives better government, and that property will be 
protected. Grey had informed the investors that he under­
stood the entire purpose of the United States actions in 
Mexico was to bring about better government there. But, 
Grey believed, a public announcement by the United States 
that it intended to see things through "would undoubtedly 
help credit and enable some of these commercial interests, 
which are of most legitimate character and old standing, 
to survive through the bad times.” Grey's earlier re­
quest for protection of British property was also re-
21Lind to the Secretary of State, November 19»
1913» Wilson Papers.
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22peatedo Sir William Tyrrell forwarded this request to 
Wilson by letter on November 21.
The President replied on November 22, indicating 
a willingness to do what Grey desired, but he was hesitant 
because such announcements were invariably met with de­
finance or irritation by Huerta and Carranza. Thus, what­
ever negotiations were underway were usually handicapped. 
Wilson was adamant in regard to Huerta's retirement, which 
he thought would enable Mexico to secure better government. 
Business would be safer than ever as a result. He then 
reiterated the promises already made to safeguard all 
foreigners in Mexico when possible, and even quoted a 
statement from Aguilar guaranteeing the protection of all
domestic and foreign oil properties. Sir Edward was author-
23ized to inform those concerned about the President's views.
24Wilson's reply was cabled to Grey on November 23»
Grey's message, along with a request from Germany 
that it be informed of what he planned to do, prompted
o o
Grey to Spring-Rice, November 19» 1913, F.O. 4l4/
235, PRO.
2 3Woodrow Wilson to Sir William Tyrrell, November 
22, 1913, Wilson Papers. A copy of Tyrrell's letter to 
the President, November 21, 1913, has to this writer's 
knowledge never been uncovered. The references to Wilson's 
letter of November 22 to Tyrrell have invariably set this 
letter in entirely the wrong context.
24
Sbping-Rice to Grey, November 23, 1913, F.O. 4l4/ 
235, PRO; Tyrrell to President Wilson, November 26, 1913, 
Wilson Papers.
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President Wilson to make his most definitive policy 
statement in regard to Mexico. It will be recalled that 
the President had promised some such announcement even 
before the October 26 Mexican elections. Statements 
made between then and November 24 were usually quoted 
as interim pending publication of the formal policy an­
nouncement, The declaration was entitled "Our purposes 
in Mexico," and was sent to most of the major countries 
in the world.
The statement held that it was the purpose of the 
United States to secure orderly and peaceful self-govern­
ment in Central America, Usurpers fostered lawlessness 
which jeopardized lives, business, and credit. The United 
States was determined to stamp out such usurpations.
Wilson hoped to isolate Huerta by cutting off all foreign 
and domestic aid to him and thus force his resignation.
If this did not work, other means would be used. Should 
it become necessary, the United States would give advance 
notice of its intentions, although nothing on this order 
was presently contemplated. It was believed that if this 
plan was followed whenever such instances occurred, that 
it would tend to discourage future usurpations. The 
United States did not intend to secure any special pri­
vileges for its own citizens in Mexico or anywhere else, 
but would instead be a "consistent champion of the Open 
Door." It would within the limits of circumstances do
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whatever was possible to protect the lives and property
of all foreigners, as if they belonged to the United 
2 5States» There were not, of course, any significant 
new sentiments expressed. Huerta was still to be elim­
inated, and the United States did not pÆan to profit by 
intervention if that became necessary. Foreign reaction 
was somewhat indifferent, the tune had a familiar ring.
While the official negotiations between Grey and 
Wilson were underway. Lord Cowdray made a direct appeal 
to Ambassador Page on behalf of the threatened oil prop­
erties, Page wired Bryan on November 19* informing him 
about Aguilar's threats and the rumors that rebel des­
truction of British property would not be severely con­
demned by the United States. Cowdray, Page said, asked 
that United States ships be notified to warn the rebels
26that such acts would not be condoned. As a result,
25Bryan to all embassies, except Turkey and Mexico, 
and to European legations, Belgium, Netherland, Norway, 
Sweden, Denmark, and Portugal, November 24, 1913, SDP.
Page's copy came by way of Paris and was received in London 
on November 26; Page to Grey, November 26, 1913, SDP, for­
warded a copy to the British Foreign Secretary. This policy 
statement of November 24, parallels many of Wilson's re­
marks to Tyrrell on November 13. Tyrrell to Grey, November 
14, 1913, F.O. 371/1678, PRO.
^^Page to Secretary of State, November 19* 1913,
SDP; the message from the British consul at Tampico had 
been transmitted from the USS Rhode Island at Veracruz to 
Sir Lionel Carden in Mexico City on November l4, see Admiral 
Fletcher to Secretary of the Navy (Operations), December 5* 
1913* NA RG 45. This no doubt prompted Carden to ask for 
the two British ships, one for Tampico area and the other 
for Puerto Mexico. Carden to Grey, November 17, 1913, F.O, 
204/419, PRO.
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Admiral Fletcher was instructed to inform Aguilar that 
"destruction of these great foreign industrial prop­
erties wantonly or in revenge could not be regarded by
us with indifference, and cannot fail to be attended with
27the most unfortunate results."
Aguilar received the Department's instructions by 
telephone on November 20, and that evening replied that 
MI am governing on a constitutional basis my attitude 
being to guarantee the interests of all foreign and do­
mestic oil corporations existing in the region I occupy
fulfilling in this manner the demands of civilization and
28not being governed in my acts by caprice or vengence." 
However, the Mexican Eagle Oil Company was not taking any
^^Blue [Rear Admiral Victor Blue] to Flag Officer 
[Admiral Fletcher], USS Rhode Island, November 19» 1913,
NA RG 45; Bryan to American Embassy (London), November 19, 
1913, SDP, advising Page that appropriate instructions to 
the Navy had been sent; Walter H. Page to Lord Cowdray, 
November 20, 1913, Cowdray Papers, informing him of the 
action by the United States government ; that the Navy was 
a stickler for detail was noted when the request from the 
State Department arrived without signature. Although the 
action requested was taken, the following day the Navy 
Department sent a letter to the Secretary of State, "In 
order that the official records showing the reasons for 
these important instructions should be complete and 
authentic, it is requested that a signed confirmation of 
the note under acknowledgment be transmitted to this De­
partment," Franklin D. Roosevelt, Acting Secretary of the 
Navy, to the Secretary of State, November 20, 1913, SDP. 
The note was duly confirmed, J. B. Moore, State Department 
Counselor to the Secretary of Navy, November 26, 1913, SDP,
28Admiral Fletcher to Secretary of the Navy (Oper­
ations), December 5, 1913, NA RG 45, this report is a 




While the company was unwilling to make any pay­
ments not absolutely necessary, it did pay the rebels ten 
thousand pesos which was undoubtedly a condition upon 
which it was permitted to return to work. On November 20 
the company by agreement with General Aguilar resumed 
operations until the 24th, which was the deadline for 
conclusion of the negotiations. Miller, the consul at 
Tampico, advised the company to refuse further payments, 
and sent the rebel commander word that Admiral Fletcher 
had ten warships and complete authority to use them to 
protect foreign lives and property if necessary. He also 
told Aguilar that he had informed the company to remain 
absolutely neutral and not to pay any more war taxes.
When Dr. Hayes notified Lord Cowdray of the consul's ad­
vice, Cowdray replied that it was appreciated but it was
better to pay than risk destruction of the company prop-
 ^ 29erty.
On November 23, the Navy Department directed 
Admiral Fletcher to go to Tuxpam and Tampico and to evalu-
29Canada to Secretary of State, November 21, two 
dispatches dated November 22, I913, SDP. Admiral Fletcher 
reported the amount paid as 12,000 pesos. Fletcher to 
Secretary of the Navy (Operations), December 5» 1913» NA 
RG 45. Dro Hayes to Lord Cowdray, November 23, 1913; Lord 
Cowdray's reply is undated but attached to Hayes' wire;
A. Nicolaus, Pearson agent in Veracruz, to Lord Cowdray, 
November 25, 1913, forwarding Hayes' message of November 
24, Cowdray Papers.
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ate the situation personally. He was accompanied by 
Governor Lind. After a brief stop at Tuxpam, he reached 
Tampico early on the morning of November 26. That after­
noon he met with Miller and Hayes. Aguilar's insistance 
that no oil be furnished the Mexican railroads, the de­
mand of 200,000 pesos in war taxes, and his warning that 
the company was not to request Federal troops were dis­
cussed. After Aguilar had received Miller's and Fletcher's 
warnings he agreed to defer the payment of the war tax, but 
insisted that the two other requirements must be met. 
Fletcher considered these immaterial. In consequence of 
this meeting the Admiral cabled Washington that, while the 
presence of the rebels was a disturbing factor, all of the 
oil plants were back in operation. He was, Fletcher said, 
pretty well assured that Aguilar would not carry out his 
threats against the oil companies, although he might make 
an attempt to take Tampico. In such an event, the Admiral 
reported, he had worked out the steps he would take with
the local Federal Commander, General Ignacio Morelos Zara-
30goza to protect life and foreign property.
In the meantime, Carranza answered Bryan's repre-
30Fletcher to Secretary of the Navy (Operations), 
December 5, 1913, NA RG 45. The Admiral's reports refer 
to the Federal commander at Tampico as General Zaragoza;
It should be Morelos Zaragoza, see Robert E. Quirk, An 
Affair of Honor : Woodrow Wilson and the Occupation of
Veracruz (Lexington; University of Kentucky Press, 1962), 
7.
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sentations in regard to the foreign oil holdings. The 
Constitutionalists acknowledged receipt of the complaints 
made to the United States government by the English oil 
company. It stated that the Constitutionalist commanders 
had been instructed to make provision for the protection 
of the property and lives of all foreigners, but the rebel 
chief refused to permit the delivery of any oil to the 
railroads. It was imperative to the successful conduct 
of the war, the answer stated, to prevent such resources 
from reaching the Fédérais. The Constitutionalists 
agreed, however, to recognize any proven losses suffered 
by the oil companies. Therefore, they were instructed 
to prepare damage claims to beepresented at the appropriate 
time. But it was stipulated that only those claims aris­
ing from United States citizens should be submitted 
through the United States government. Suits from other
foreigners should be forwarded through their respective 
31governments. The only real problem then was for the 
companies to promise not to deliver oil to the rail­
roads .
Dr. Hayes wired Lord Cowdray on November 27 that 
31Frederick Simpich, American Consul (Nogales), to 
the Secretary of State, November 22, 1913, SDP. The Con­
stitutionalist replies were made by Francisco Escudero, 
the Secretary of Foreign Relations, two dispatches dated 
November 21, 1913, SDP, in answer to Bryan's messages of 
November 17, 18,^,1913, SDP. Escudero's replies in Spanish 
and the English translations are in the SDP.
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the rebels had agreed to permit the company to continue
operating if it would guarantee not to furnish fuel oil to
any Mexican railway as long as the rebels controlled the
oil fields= Cowdray replied that such a guarantee should
be made without hesitation, and the Mexican Railway office
was informed that because of the Constitutionalist's de-
32mands deliveries would be discontinued.
To relieve the tension in the oil fields Admiral 
Fletcher, Miller, and Hayes, agreed to send an intermediary 
to see General Aguilar and to request him to withdraw his 
soldiers from the immediate vicinity of the oil camps. 
During the subsequent conference the Constitutionalist 
General's demands were adjusted to the satisfaction of the 
company, and he again gave assurances that no oil proper­
ties would be injured. By December 3 practically all of 
the rebel troops had been withdrawn from the camps proper, 
although they remained nearby. Admiral Fletcher reported,
however, that Aguilar was still trying to get the com-
3 3panies to make payments.
A few days later Miller notified the State Depart­
ment that Aguilar had withdrawn his demands for payment 
of a war tax, but was insisting that he needed money to 
pay his troops. The requests for this purpose were being 
made verbally to the oil companies, particularly the
32T. J. Ryder to Lord Cowdray, November 28, 1913» 
Cowdray Papers.
3 3Fletcher to the Secretary of the Navy (Operations),
December 5» 1913» NA RG 4$.
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Mexican Eagle Oil Company with instructions that they 
should not notify the American consul, Admiral Fletcher, 
or Governor Lind. Miller believed that in spite of the 
companies' denials, they were actually making some pay­
ments, and would probably continue to do so as long as
34Aguilar was able to pressure them. But the major 
threat to the oil fields seemed over. Huerta was, how­
ever, still President of Mexico in spite of Wilson's an­
nounced determination to force him out.
On December 2, after his ultimatums to Huerta had
proved ineffective, Wilson went before Congress and in
his annual message said, in part, that Huerta;
has forfeited the respect and the moral support 
even of those who were at one time willing to 
see him succeed. Little by little he has been 
completely isolated. By a little every day his 
power and prestige are crumbling and the collapse 
is not far away. We shall not, I believe, be 
obliged to alter our policy of watchful waiting.
And then, when the end comes, we shall hope to 
see constitutional order restored in distressed 
Mexico by the concert and energy of such of her 
leaders as prefer the liberty of their people to 
their own ambitions.35
This announcement did not comport with his stated intention
to Grey of forcing the Mexican President from office. It
merely confirmed the fears of those businessmen who had
appealed to Grey in the first place. Wilson was going to
Canada to Secretary of State, December 6, 1913,
SDP.
S., Congressional Record, 63d Cong., 2d Sess.,
44.
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starve Huerta out. In an interview with Page, Cowdray 
showed his distress about the situation, explaining that
Q ^
"things could not be allowed to drift as they were."
The rebels remained in nominal control of the area 
throughout December and January, although they were un­
able to completely shut off the supply of fuel oil to 
the railroads. By early December the Federal garrisons 
at Tampico and Tuxpam had been strengthened and they were 
able to hold out against the Constitutionalist efforts to 
take them. When Tampico finally fell in April 1914, it 
was to United States forces and not to the rebels.
Lord Cowdray's success in the oil industry in 
Mexico had made him and the Mexican Eagle Oil Company the 
targets of a vicious propaganda campaign. One result of 
this effort was to discredit him in the eyes of the Con­
stitutionalists. For the rebels, however, revenge was 
perhaps the least important reason for their activities 
in northern Veracruz. Control of the oil fields, stoppage 
of fuel oil to the Federal railroads, and money were 
Aguilar's major objectives. The General's efforts were 
seriously handicapped by the presence of a sizeable fleet 
of United States warships charged with protecting the oil 
properties. Conditions appeared so bad that the British
Lord Cowdray, Memorandum of conversation with 
Ambassador Page, marked "strictly private and confidential," 
January 9, 1914, Cowdray Papers.
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finally decided to send their own ships to Mexican waters. 
Grey had attempted to get Wilson to commit himself pub­
licly to a firm policy that would end the Mexican imbroglio 
without a long period of anarchy. Seemingly the President 
was determined to follow through on his threat to force 
Huerta out, if not by peaceful means then by whatever 
measures were required. But by December 2 his resolve to 
take forcible action had melted, and he was content to 
play a waiting game. Lord Cowdray no doubt reflected the 
general attitude of the foreign businessmen in his frus­
tration at this policy of "watchful drifting."
Wilson proved to be his own worst enemy. He 
threatened and then did nothing. His policy of containing 
the rebel offensive in the oil fields was very helpful to 
Huerta's forces. It permitted the Fédérais to strengthen 
their garrisons in Tuxpam and Tampico and unquestionably 
saved those two key cities from rebel occupation. The 
loss of Tampico, an important oil center, with its port 
facilities and customs houses would have been a severe 
blow to Huerta. Thus, Wilson's concern for the protection 
of foreign properties had helped defeat his major objective, 
Huerta's elimination. He had rejected Huerta's offer 
through Carden of a negotiated retirement, and Huerta had 
done the same to Wilson's demands. All that was left was 
intervention. But the President could not bring himself 
to make this decision, at least not without greater provo-
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cation.
Before the year 1913 came to a close, another 
diplomatic encounter between the United States and Great 
Britain was to ensue. This one would involve the re­
cently arrived Rear Admiral, Sir Christopher George 




The dispatch of the two British cruisers under 
the command of Rear Admiral Sir Christopher Cradock 
presaged a new round of diplomatic controversy between 
the United States and Great Britain. The HMS Berwich was 
directed to Puerto Mexico, south of Veracruz, while the 
HMS Suffolk flying the flag of Rear Admiral Cradock ar­
rived at Tampico on November 26, just a few hours after 
Admiral Fletcher and Governor Lind reached there from 
Tuxpam.
Fletcher sent his Flag Lieutenant to the HMS 
Suffolk to arrange for official calls and salutes. Both 
Fletcher and Cradock were rear admirals, but Cradock 
having the earlier date of rank was the senior officer. 
According to British Admiralty regulations it was 
Fletcher's place to fire the first salute and make the 
first call. But according to United States naval regu­
lations since Fletcher was first in port and of the same 
rank, it was Cradock's responsibility to do the honors. 
Cradock conceded and during their conversations he brought 
up the point of his seniority. He informed Fletcher that
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compromise was out of the question, "he must be senior 
In all things or In none." It was customary that when 
a fleet composed of the naval vessels of different 
countries operated together they did so under the senior 
officer. The situation could have been embarrassing to 
the United States If Cradock assumed command, : but he 
agreed to waive his seniority. After that Fletcher ex­
pected no difficulty unless other foreign officers re­
fused to accept his leadership or If the British Admiralty 
disapproved of Cradock's action. Fletcher was of the 
opinion that the other naval commanders would follow his 
orders.^ Temporarily at least that problem was amicably 
resolved, although the situation had again aroused Lind's 
suspicions of British policy In Mexico.
The governor reminded Bryan that he had asked him 
some time earlier to give the American naval officers 
sufficient Instructions that would preclude the landing 
of marines by the British. He was convinced that England 
planned to take the Initiative In that respect. If It be­
came necessary to land troops. The sending of an officer 
senior to the American admiral was. In his opinion, no
^Fletcher to Secretary of the Navy (Operations), 
December 5» 1913» National Archives Record Group 4$ (here­
after cited as NA RG 45); Capehart, USS Michigan, to 
Secretary of the Navy, November 26, 1913» SDP, forwarding 
a copy of Fletcher's report of same date. Cradock was 
promoted to rear admiral September 5» 1910, Fletcher on 
October 1?, 1911.
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mistake especially after Cradock immediately raised the 
question of his seniority. It was, he believed, England's 
intention to control the naval operations there. Lind 
gave Fletcher credit for tactfully getting Cradock to 
yield, but he did not attend the conference "for obvious 
reasons." Having just received a copy of President 
Wilson's November 24 statement of purpose Lind concluded 
that the pronouncement gave Fletcher whatever right he
2
needed to demand that the British admiral yield anyway."
The seniority question, according to Colonel House, re­
sulted in the only unpleasant incident in Tyrrell's visit 
to the United States.
On November 30, just a few days before Tyrrell 
left to return to England, he met Harry Payne Whitney, a 
New York financier and businessman. Whitney was par­
ticularly offensive in his comments about Cradock's having 
waived his seniority to Admiral Fletcher. "It was," House 
recorded, "an act of courtesy upon the British Admiral's 
part, and was probably suggested by his Government, all
3
of which made Whitney's remarks the more discourteous."
2
Canada to Secretary of State, November 27» 1913»
SDP, relaying Lind's message to Bryan of November 26.
Lind to Bryan, December l4, 1913» Wilson Papers; George M. 
Stephenson, John Lind of Minnesota (Minneapolis: University
of Minnesota Press, 1935)» 248-50.
3
House Diary, December 2, 1913» House was not 
correct in his surmise that the British government had 
suggested that Cradock place himself second in command to 
Fletcher as will be noted subsequently.
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The experience in no way effected Tyrrell's apparent high 
regard for the United States.
During Cradock's short stay at Tampico, an incident 
occurred which showed how sensitive he was about minor 
matters. Dr. Hayes, of the Mexican Eagle Oil Company, 
paid a visit to Admiral Fletcher on November 26, but failed 
to call on Admiral Cradock. Later during a conversation 
with Fred Adams, an engineer with the company, Cradock 
brought up the slight by Hayes. He asked Adams if the 
company looked to him or to the United States for pro­
tection. Adams was advised by the home office that the 
company looked to both the British and American admirals 
for protection. Their personnel, he was reminded, were 
more American than British, but the property was more 
British than American. Therefore, it was expected that 
both navies would assume such responsibility. Privately, 
Adams was informed that the Foreign Office stated that
the British ships had definite instructions to protect
4
British lives and property to the fullest extent.
Cradock sailed for Veracruz and arrived there on 
November 28, where he reported that he had received a 
most cordial welcome from the Mexican authorities. In 
his report to the Admiralty he briefly referred to the 
United States, "American policy vague. America un-
4
Adams to Lord Cowdray, December 1, 1913; J . B.
Body to Fred Adams, December 2, 1913, Cowdray Papers.
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popular but am working in full accord with American 
Admiral. . . The lull in the fighting gave the ad­
miral an opportunity to make a trip to Mexico City to 
visit Carden, but he did not plan to remain more than 
a couple of days. He reached Mexico City on the last 
day of November.
The first two days were spent calling on the
ministers of the various countries, and on December 2 ,
accompanied by Carden, he was officially received by
President Huerta. The reception lasted for an hour and
a half and Cradock seemed pleased at its extremely cordial
nature. During the conversation the President
spoke much of England's past and present great­
ness, and dwelt on the great possibilities of 
his own country. Politics were not touched up­
on, with the exception that he frequently ex­
pressed a wish that the present trouble would 
come to an end and the country could be at rest.
. . .  Without my expressing any political views 
or opinions whatever, one could not get away from 
the quite apparent delight at the arrival of a 
British admiral in Mexican waters and at his 
presence in their capital.&
That afternoon Carden and Cradock visited the United States
Charge d'affaires. Nelson 0'Shaughnessy.
Their call was brief and formal, and if the Charge
^Cradock to Admiralty, November 29, 1913, F.O. 371/ 
1678, PRO; Canada to Secretary of State, November 28, 1913, 
SDP, reporting the arrival of the HMS Suffolk.
^Cradock to Admiralty, December 3, 1913, F.O, 371/ 
2025, PRO,
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was not impressed by the British Admiral and his aide 
in full uniform, Edith 0'Shaughnessy, his wife, certainly 
waso She later recorded:
Yesterday, at four o'clock. Sir Lionel and Sir 
Christopher Cradock were announced. When I went 
downstairs, a few minutes later, I found my drawing­
room a blaze of afternoon sun, setting off to per­
fection twice six feet or more of Royal British 
navy--Sir Christopher and his aide, Cavendish, re­
splendent in full uniform. They had just come from 
calling on Huerta in state, at the Palace. I was 
really dazzled for the first moment. Sir Christo­
pher is a singularly handsome man, regular of 
feature, and of distinguished bearing. His aide, 
equally tall and slender, a younger silhouette of 
himself, was standing by his side. Britannia re- 
splendens! Sir Christopher was evidently very 
interested in seeing, at first hand, the situation 
he is to 'observe' from the vantage of Vera Cruz.
After a lively half-hour he was borne off by Sir 
L. for visits at the legations, and comparative 
darkness fell upon the r o o m . 7
Nelson 0'Shaughnessy was not as influenced as his wife,
but was a little suspicious of the fact that the Admiral
and the British Minister had just called on General Huerta
g
in full uniform, making it a very formal occasion.
That evening Cradock and 0'Shaughnessy sat next to 
each other at a dinner given by the German Minister, Paul 
von Hintze. According to the Admiral, 0'Shaughnessy ex­
pressed himself quite freely on the Mexican situation.
^Edith 0'Shaughnessy, A Diplomat's Wife in Mexico 
(New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1916), 72. She
gives a rather complete rundown on Cradock's social activ­
ities during his visit to the capital, 72-75»
g
0'Shaughnessy to Secretary of State, December 2,
1913, SDP.
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He indicated a desire to pay Cradock an official visit at 
Veracruz, although he would have to make the trip down and 
back the same day. The Admiral was of the opinion that 
this somewhat unusual offer was intended to show the 
Mexican people that Great Britain was in full accord with 
and favored the American policy. The Chargé appeared not 
to be impressed by the Mexicans fighting ability, and told
Cradock: "Anyhow, Admiral, the Anglo-Saxon race will muddle
through somehow."
The next afternoon after having spent nearly four 
days in the capital, Cradock reported his views on what he 
had heard and seen there. The information which he for­
warded to London was gleaned from conversations with the 
diplomats in Mexico City, particularly the European and 
Japanese officials. Cradock stated:
To me the situation appears absolutely "without 
light," and beyond the generally-expressed hope 
that something may turn up, there appears to be no
definite point of aim. The undefined American
policy of "waiting" (apparently to serve their own 
aims with the view to possible occupation of the 
country some day), and their inexplicit, wordy, and,
I may almost say, blustering attitude, is doing 
manifest incalculable damage to Mexico, which is 
"standing still." I do not think there is any im­
mediate danger to life here or in the coast towns, 
unless through American action it becomes necessary 
for Huerta to withdraw his troops from the capital. 
Should this occur, it would probably go hard with 
Mexico city, inaccessibly situated as it is 250 
miles from the coast, with a destroyed railway.9
^Cradock to Admiralty, December 3, 1913, F.O. 371/ 
2025, PRO.
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Before returning to Veracruz, Cradock discussed 
the matter of local defense with the foreign colony. If 
necessity required a wireless radio link between Mexico 
City and Veracruz would be established, and arrangements 
were made so that on the slightest pretext a Maxim gun 
and ammunition could be sent to the British legation. 
Cradock reported that he had no intention of landing any 
men unless a real emergency threatened. He said that he 
overhead Huerta's private secretary talking to one of the 
European ministers, and it was intimated that the General 
would not object to the landing of men by any of the 
European countries, but such action by the United States 
might lead to serious consequences. The Admiral felt that 
now that he had become acquainted with Carden's views, he
hoped to be able to perform his mission with greater dis-
, , 10 patch.
0'Shaughnessy reported that Cradock's visit had 
given the Huerta government the feeling that the situation 
was not hopeless. He stated that he had proposed the trip 
to Veracruz to call on Cradock to offset the impression 
that the foreign nations were sending their warships to 
Mexico in protest to the presence of the United States 
fleet in Mexican territorial waters in spite of the de­
sire of the Huerta administration that it be recalled.
l°Ibid.
220
G ’Shaughnessy indicated that the press was constantly 
playing up the "courtesy" calls of the foreign warships, 
and the difference in the attitude toward such vessels 
and those of the United States was very marked. His 
official reception by the entire foreign fleet anchored 
at Veracruz, he believed, would help overcome the "il­
lusion which is being exploited to the detriment of our 
policy here,"^^ Cradock had divined 0'Shaughnessy’s 
purpose accurately.
A few days later, Carden in talking with O'Shaugh­
nessy verged on the insulting in discussing O'Shaugh­
nessy ’s official status in Mexico. Carden told him that 
he wanted to pose an official question, 0'Shaughnessy 
readily consented, and the British Minister asked, "Are 
you really Chargé d'Affaires of the United States?"
0'Shaughnessy was astonished by the question. He immed­
iately replied that he was, and that Carden had called 
upon him in that capacity. Even the Mexican government 
recognized him as such. Carden tried to pass the matter 
off by stating that Admiral Cradock was a stickler about 
protocol and it was necessary to be absolutely certain 
just exactly what 0'Shaughnessy's capacity was. The 
American Charge, however, would not permit the subject 
to be dropped so lightly and informed Carden that he would
^^0'Shaughnessy to Secretary of State, December 8,
1913, SDP,
221
have to report the matter to the United States government.
In addition, if he did go to Veracruz to see Cradock he
must be received in his role as a representative of the
United States with the required honors and courtesies
tendered by the visiting warships. After 0'Shaughnessy
had taken exception to Carden's question, the British
Minister said, "Oh! Well, of course, you are Charge
d'Affaires and it was stupid of me to have brought up the
question but, you know these Navy men are very exact in
12such matters. . « ."
Cradock's visit to Mexico City in full uniform 
had one immediate effect. When Lieutenant Colonel More- 
ton Foley Gage, the British Military attache from Washing­
ton reached the Mexican capital after being summoned there 
by Sir Lionel Carden, he attended a reception given by 
President Huerta on December l8. Gage wore a morning coat,
12 Ibid. The O 'Shaughnessys did not make their 
official call at Veracruz until after Lind returned from 
his conference with President Wilson at Pass Christian, 
Mississippi, in early January 1914. They left Mexico City 
on January 7, and did not return until January 11. During 
the visit 0'Shaughnessy was received with the full honors 
entitled him as Charge d'affaires by the vessels of the 
foreign powers anchored there. He and his wife were 
graciously received by Admiral Cradock on his flagship 
HMS Suffolk, and their departure was thus described by her. 
"We left about three o'clock. The English use black powder 
for their salutes and the thirteen guns made a very im­
posing effect. The ship was enveloped in smoke, a sort of 
Turneresque effect, making one think of 'Trafalgar,' while 
the shots reverberated through the harbor." 0'Shaughnessy, 
A Diplomat's Wife in Mexico, 130-41.
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having "purposely not brought his uniform, being wary at 
touching the official note, which might re-echo too loudly 
in Washington.
By December 9» Cradock had returned to Tampico 
where defense preparations were underway in expectation 
of the efforts by the Constitutionalists to take that port 
city. The British and the German naval commanders were 
able to charter vessels for the evacuation of their 
nationals from Tampico should the occasion arise, but no 
American ships were available for that purpose. As a re­
sult, Admiral Fletcher was forced to improvise plans for 
the protection of Americans in the event of an attack.
He and Miller, the American consul, decided that 
if it became necessary they would call the Americans into 
an area around the Customs House which was located near 
the dock. The USS Tacoma would then be moored alongside 
to provide what protection possible. Fletcher acknowl­
edged that there were no accommodations and hardly any 
shelter in the area and that the Americans resented the 
idea of leaving their houses and hotels. But there was 
little in the way of an alternative as the American 
battleships were prevented from entering the river be­
cause of the weather.
Both Admiral Cradock and the German Captain Seebohm
^^0'Shaughnessy, A Diplomat’s Wife in Mexico, 85,
101.
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seemed anxious to land consular guards, but Fletcher 
pointed out to them that this might be interpreted as a 
violation of Mexican territory and could lead to compli­
cations. The two foreign naval officers subsequently de­
cided against landing any troops, although Fletcher 
thought that they might have received such instructions 
from their governments.
On December 10 Admiral Fletcher sent a letter to 
both the Federal and Constitutionalist generals stating 
that the United States forces intended to remain abso­
lutely neutral. In the event of fighting in the city 
proper he expected ample notice to be given for the 
evacuation of foreigners. He further informed them of the 
area near the dock where the Americans would gather if 
necessary. He expected both sides to respect this area 
as a neutral zone. Only in the event that civil and 
military authority broke down would he land troops, and 
then only to protect the foreign colony from mob action. 
Fletcher stressed the concern which he felt in regard to 
the oil properties, and the opposing forces were warned 
not to direct their artillery fire in the direction of 
these facilities.
General J. 0. Arzamandi, the Federal commander, 
expressed his satisfaction with Fletcher's promise of 
neutrality, but stated that since he would easily defeat 
the rebel forces there was no need for the establishment
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of a neutral zone. The reply from J. C. Castro, the rebel 
general, posed several problems.
Castro confirmed his intention of protecting foreign 
property, even if the belligerency of the Constitutionalists 
had hot: been formally recognized by the United States. How­
ever, Castro raised the question of whether or not Fletcher's 
letter implied de facto recognition because it had in­
voked the provisions of the Hague Conference. It was, the 
rebel general contended, his understanding that the bel­
ligerency was recognized if they entered into an agreement 
to abide by the rules laid down by the Hague Conference.
As for the neutral zone, Castro wrote, one of the Federal 
officers was housed in that area and it could only be re­
respected if he was dislodged from his home. Fletcher 
apparently dodged the question of recognition by not 
answering Castro's inquiry, since no mention of it was
l4made in the Admiral's report of the incident.
When Cradock learned that Fletcher had been in 
touch with the rebel forces, he considered the action ill- 
advised. On December 13, after the Constitutionalist 
threat had subsided momentarily, Cradock reported that 
"In reply to one of my questions the American admiral ad-
Fletcher to Secretary of the Navy (Operations), 
December l6, 1913, NA RG 45. This twenty-one page report 
is a summary of the situation in Mexico from December 8 
to 15, 1913, the various letters and replies referred to 
are reproduced in this summary.
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mitted that he had illegally negotiated direct with rebel 
leaders. Such action seems illogical, and considering 
that Tampico is restored to order it is to be regretted. 
The American admiral seems to desire to land men."^^ 
Fletcher, however, seemed determined not to send a party 
ashore if it could be prevented.
Dr. Hayes who had called on Fletcher several times 
was not at all satisfied with the arrangements to protect 
the employees of the Mexican Eagle Oil Company in Tampico. 
The company occupied a large building in town and Hayes 
had made preparations to barricade and defend the property 
if circumstances required it. About two hundred people 
were housed there, some eighty men and a large supply of 
rifles and ammunition were available. In the event of 
trouble, Hayes did not like the idea of evacuating the 
building and moving to the neutral zone specified by 
Fletcher. He informed the Admiral that if the marines 
would not be landed to protect the Americans then they 
would defend themselves. Fletcher reported that as Hayes 
"showed some feeling I deferred the conversation." Later, 
the Admiral advised him of the seriousness of civilians 
engaging armed troops. He admitted that the arrangements 
were not all that could be desired, but that the American 
ships would take aboard everybody possible and the rest
^^Cradock to Admiralty, December 13, 1913, F.O,
414/235, PRO.
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would be under the protection of the vessels moored at
the dock. If worse came to worst he would send men
ashore to protect those in the neutral area.^^ Hayes'
disappointment with the situation was quite evident in
a wire sent to Mexico City, "Expect no protection foreigners
17or property from American or British Navy."
When Hayes' telegram was shown to Sir Ralph Paget 
in the Foreign Office, he called it preposterous. The 
British warships, Paget said, were there to protect lives 
and had already done so when the SS Logician was chartered 
and used as a refuge for foreigners. Property was another 
matter he admitted, but he thought it would receive ade­
quate protection too. The problem arose from the fact that
the British did not want to be the first to land marines,
idprecedence there would be given to the United States. 
Fortunately, that matter was not put to the test although 
Fletcher on one occasion virtually threatened Cradock that 
he would send his men ashore.
Cradock had moved the chartered ship, the SS Logi­
cian , into a position at the dock which commanded the 
bridge and all of the approaches to the neutral zone as-
^^Fletcher to Secretary of the Navy (Operations), 
December l6, 1913, NA RG 4$.
^^Hayes to Ryder, December 17, 1913. This message 
is repeated in part in a memorandum by J. B, Body, Decem­
ber 23, 1913, Cowdray Papers.
^®Ibid.
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signed by Fletcher for the protection of Americans.
Fletcher asked Cradock to move the ship so that he could
dock the USS Tacoma and thus, provide some protection for
those persons that could not be accommodated aboard the 
vessels, Cradock replied that he was holding that berth 
for the HMS Hermoine which would arrive shortly. Since 
all of the British were already aboard the steamship and 
it was not possible to bring all of the Americans on 
board, Fletcher stated that he needed that particular
berth to protect those that must remain on shore. If it
was not moved, the American Admiral said, it would neces­
sitate his landing marines. Cradock ordered the ship moved 
and the USS Tacoma took its place. Thus, the British
Admiral's accusation that Fletcher appeared to want to land
19troops probably stemmed from this encounter.
Interestingly enough, rumors soon began to circulate 
in Tampico that Admiral Fletcher had intended to land 
marines and had ordered the evacuation of all Americans 
from the city "for a purpose unfriendly to the Fédérais."
It was further asserted that Admiral Cradock had forbidden 
Fletcher to land the troops by exercising his authority as 
the senior officer. These allegations, it was reported, 
had been made by Admiral Cradock to certain Mexicans in
19Cradock to Admiralty, December 13, 1913, F.O. 
414/235, PRO; Fletcher to Secretary of the Navy (Operations), 
December l6, 1913, NA RG 45.
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high official positions in order to show them that he was 
their friend. Even Miller, the American consul confirmed 
the fact that these tales were being widely circulated. 
When informed of them, Fletcher forwarded the stories to 
Washington, and added that he had no comment about Crad­
dock's efforts "to make friends with the Fédérais other 
than to say that the temptation to do so may have appeared 
attractive to him and the opportunity favorable. It seems
incredible that he could have made the statements attri- 
20buted to himo" This, however, was only the beginning.
The differences between the two admirals would shortly 
touch both seats of government.
It was reported that both the Fédérais and the 
rebels were shooting prisoners. On the afternoon of 
February 12 it was noted that the bodies of several men 
were seen hanging from telegraph poles on a prominent 
ridge just west of the city. The German Captain and 
Admiral Fletcher decided to file a joint protest and they 
went to see Admiral Cradock. The following day, Cradock's 
aide brought Fletcher a document to be signed which stated 
that the German Captain had seen the bodies hanging in 
plain sight, and that the three naval commanders made a
20N. C. Twining, commanding the USS Tacoma, Memo­
randum, December 15, 1913, recording his conversation with
Manuel Leon, a resident of Tampico. Clarence A. Miller to
Admiral Fletcher, December 15, 1913; Fletcher to the Secre­
tary of the Navy, December l8, 1913, SDP.
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formal protest against such practices. Fletcher refused 
to sign it on the grounds that it did not mention that the 
spectahle had also been noted by several American ships, 
that a document of this nature should be prepared only 
after a conference among the signers, and that Cradock 
had signed the instrument as the senior member. This last 
part was not in accordance with the agreement arrived at 
on November 26 between the two officers.
At the conference which ensued Cradock stated that 
he could not waive his rank on matters touching inter­
national problems. Their previous accord had referred 
only to personal matters. When Fletcher reminded him that 
he had stated at the earlier meeting that he must be senior 
in all or nothing, Cradock denied having made such a com­
ment. As a result of this meeting, Cradock agreed that he 
would not act without informing Fletcher but that he would 
act independently. Joint action would be resorted to only 
after instructions from their respective governments.
They would, however, continue to hold regular conferences 
and keep each other informed. Fletcher registered his pro­
test against the hangings in a letter to the Federal 
general. His report to Washington over the seniority
21problem promptly brought a response from President Wilson.
21Fletcher to Secretary of the Navy (Operations),
December 12, 1913, Wilson Papers; ibid., December l6,
1913, NA RG 45.
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Bryan wired Page in London on the day Fletcher's 
report was received and instructed him to take up the 
matter of precedence with the two admirals with the Foreign 
Office. He was to say that because of the particular re­
lationship of the United States to the problem in Mexico, 
the President would appreciate instructions to Admiral 
Cradock for him to yield his seniority to the American
Admiral. Page asked for full details on the controversy
22which were forwarded immediately. In the meantime, Page 
had requested Commander Powers Symington, the American 
naval attache in London, to contact the Admiralty about 
the request.
Symington discussed the matter with the Second Sea 
Lord, Vice Admiral Sir John R. Jellicoe, who expressed 
some irritation that the United States did not take the 
obvious step of promoting the American admiral, or of 
sending a naval officer to Mexico who outranked Cradock.
It was, Jellicoe said, impossible to get a British admiral 
to waive his rank, all that could be done was to have Cra­
dock absent himself from the scene whenever joint action 
appeared imminent, thus making Fletcher the senior officer 
present. However, it was pointed out that the British
22Bryan to Tumulty, December 13* 1913, Wilson 
Papers, asking for the President's opinion on the rank 
problem. Bryan to American Embassy (London), December 13, 
15, 1913, SDP; Page to Secretary of State, December 15,
1913, Wilson Papers.
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had sont a naval force to Mexican waters to afford pro­
tection for their citizens and property, now the United 
States was asking that in the event that action was neces­
sary, the British officer withdraw and permit the American 
navy do the work that the British had been sent there to 
do in the first place. In his report of this meeting, 
Symington suggested that the request was improper and un­
reasonable, and that the United States was requesting 
something which it had no right to do. He recommended
that the government create new grades above that of rear
23admiral and avoid such complications in the future.
In spite of the reluctance on the part of the Ad­
miralty, the British government instructed Admiral Cradock
that in the event a landing became necessary he would pro-
24ceed to Veracruz leaving Fletcher as the senior officer.
2 3
Naval Attache [Commander Powers Symington] to 
the Ambassador [Page], Memorandum, December 17, 1913, SDP. 
At that time the highest rank that an American naval 
officer could hold on active duty was rear admiral. There 
were at least three higher naval ranks, vice admiral, 
admiral, and admiral of the fleet. As a result, the naval 
officers of foreign countries quite frequently outranked 
the American officers, and this situation held true for
nations whose navies were far inferior in size to that of
the United States.
24Admiralty to Foreign Office, December l6, 1913, 
F.O. 4i4/235, PRO; Page to Secretary of State, December 
l6, 17, 1913, Wilson Papers; ibid., December 19» 1913,
SDP. In this last report Page told Bryan that he had
seen Admiral Jellicoe and had thanked him for his kind
consideration.' The Admiral had answered that it was a 
shame that the United States did not give to its naval 
officers the rank that such circumstances warranted. Page 
wired that Vthe Admiralty were not really pleased at the
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As if the rank controversy was not enough, on 
December 13, the New York World published what was pur­
ported to be a copy of Cradock's report to the Admiralty 
in which he had made several statements highly critical 
of United States policy in Mexico, and complimentary to 
Huerta, 0'Shaughnessy was directed to contact the World
reporter to verify the story, and Lind was queried to see
2 5
if he had heard any news about it. 0'Shaughnessy re­
plied that the correspondent told him that the story was 
obtained from Cradock's stenographer, and the American 
Charge was of the opinion that the statement was indic­
ative of Cradock's views. He would, however, check 
further to see what else he could u n c o v e r . W i t h i n  a 
matter of hours, 0'Shaughnessy was able to secure a 
nearly verbatim copy of Cradock's report of December 3, 
in which he had stated how pleased President Huerta
request and that the Government in a sense forced their 
consent because they are just now eager to show us even 
unusual consideration touching our Mexican policy."
Bryan to American Embassy (Mexico City), Decem­
ber 13, 1913; Bryan to Lind, December 13, 1913, SDP. The 
report referred to was Cradock to Admiralty, December 3, 
1913, F,0, 371/2025, PRO. See supra, p. 2l8,
^^0'Shaughnessy to Secretary of State, December 13, 
1913, SDP; ibid., December l4, 1913, Wilson Papers,
0'Shaughnessy, A Diplomat's Wife in Mexico, 93, wrote,
"The confidential report of Admiral Cradock to his govern­
ment was filched by the press. The typewriter who made 
the copy was paid $200 for it. In it, it appears, he 
quotes Nelson as saying that the 'most sacred international 
relationship in the world is that between England and the 
United States,' Most annoying for Sir Christopher!"
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seemed to be to see a British Admiral in full dress, and 
his comments that the situation appeared "without light»" 
The copy was obtained from a lady stenographer, an Ameri­
can citizen, who 0*Shaughnessy said, had done so "as an 
act of patriotism, she stating that she holds her country 
above professional secrecy." He also said that the report 
which had appeared in the World was largely invented and
was not based on the report itself. However, he concluded
27that the original was serious enough.
Lind's reply to Bryan's wire kicked off another 
round of inquiries about Carden. The Governor advised 
Bryan that he had no reason to doubt the World's report, 
Cradock's visit to the capital had been made the occasion 
for a holiday. He was certain that if the Admiral needed 
any prompting Carden had no doubt supplied the inspiration. 
Lind reported, "Carden is more vicious than ever. He is 
becoming so offensive that both the English Consul at 
Torreon and Fred Adams have apologized for his expressions 
and conduct to me. Their statements to me were, however, 
personal and confidential in a measure." Again on Decem­
ber l4 he cabled:
270'Shaughnessy to Secretary of State, December 15, 
1913, Wilson Papers; ibid., December 15, 1913, SDP. These 
are two different dispatches. A comparison of O'Shaugh­
nessy 's copy and the original document from the Public 
Record Office confirms that he had received an accurate 
transcription of the report.
23k
England may talk fair in Washington but I tell you 
that in Mexico she is maneuvering every moment to 
get the advantage and to place us in an embarrassing 
light before the foreign interests and before the 
world so as to justify such steps as she is medi­
tating to maintain her political supremacy in the 
government of Mexico. The sending of a naval com­
mander outranking any American officer in Mexican 
waters was not an accident. She expected control 
of naval operations here but failed at least in 
part in that respect. The constant ridicule by 
Carden of the«American Government and American 
policies and American military power has its bane­
ful influence.2°
Lind's attack shifted the odium from Cradock to Carden.
Bryan was immediately interested in getting some
concrete evidence against the British Minister, but his
memory was apparently still fresh from his early bouts
with the Foreign Office over Carden, and he advised that
they could not do anything about him "unless we have direct
and positive evidence as to his words and deeds." Both
O'Shaughnessy and Lind had to admit that they had no such
29examples which would hold up in a court of law. Nor 
during the remainder of Carden's stay in Mexico could such 
evidence be uncovered.
Perhaps Sir William Tyrrell's characterization of 
Cradock and Carden came the closest of all to hitting the 
mark. Writing to his good friend Sir Cecil Spring-Rice
28Lind to Bryan, December 13, 1913» Wilson Papers; 
ibid., December l4, 1913, SDP; Stephenson, Lind, 250.
29
Bryan to American Embassy (Mexico City), December 
16, 1913; 0'Shaughnessy to Secretary of State, December I8 , 
1913; Lind to Bryan, December 17» 1913» SDP.
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he remarked, "The Admiral has been cautioned, but both 
his and Carden's obtruseness nearly make me dispair: it
is a true instance of English pigheadedness and short-
30sightedness."
In early 1914 Grey finally became convinced that 
moving Carden to a new post was probably best for every­
one concerned. Unfortunately, the story that broke in 
the newspapers credited United States complaints with 
the Minister's transfer. This delayed Grey's plans, al­
though Carden was called to London for consultation, leav­
ing Mexico in late February 1914. On April 17, Sir 
Lionel's appointment as the new minister to Brazil was 
announced. He did, however, return to Mexico for several 
months and was in that country when General Victoriano 
Huerta with his back to the wall finally resigned and 
left his native country in July 1914. The new Mexican 
leader, Carranza, was not sympathetically inclined toward 
those foreign representatives whose governments had recog­
nized Huerta. The Constitutionalist Chief would, .have ex­
pelled Carden as persona non grata, but was finally per­
suaded that there was nothing to gain from twisting the 
Lion's tail. Carden voluntarily left Mexico in September
^^Tyrrell to Spring-Rice, January 21, 1914, F.O. 
1/24?, PRO. This letter was inadvertantly dated 1913 by 
Tyrrell, but since the month is January of the new year 
such was easily understandable.
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Admiral Cradock remained in Mexican waters until 
July 30, 1914, when the threat of World War caused his 
recall. Even though he and Admiral Fletcher differed on 
a number of points still there was a good deal of co­
operation between the two officers. Cradock served in 
western waters during the early months of the war. On 
October 1, 1914, in an engagement with a superior German 
squadron under the command of Admiral Count Maximilian 
von Spee, off Coronel, Chile, Sir Christopher Cradock 
went down with his flagship, the HMS Good Hope, her colors
flying.
Great Britain saw the need for their own naval 
units in Mexican waters and sent Admiral Cradock to pro­
tect British lives and property. After his arrival compli­
cations set in because of the seniority problem. He quick­
ly came under the influence of the British Minister, al­
though there was every indication that his criticism of 
United States policy in Mexico needed no prompting from
31Burton K. Hendrick, The Life and Letters of Walter 
H. Page (3 vols.; New York: Doubleday, Page & Company,
1924-1926), I, 219-3I; The Times (London), Weekly edition, 
March 6, l89d-190a; 20, 233b; April I7 , 1913, 309c. New 
York Times, many articles on Carden between January and 
August 1914; Robert E. Quirk, The Mexican Revolution, 
1914-1915 (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, I96O),
w l
^^New York Times, July 31, 1914, 3:7; H. W. C . Davis 
and J. R, H. Weaver, The Dictionary of National Biography 
(24 vols.; London: Oxford University Press, 1927), Supple-
ment 1912-1921, 131-33.
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Carden, Cradock's actions at Mexico City, his differ­
ences with Fletcher over the rank situation, the rumors 
attributed to him at Tampico, and the publicity given to 
his rather uncomplimentary reports about the United 
States, quickly brought him into disfavor with Washing­
ton. The United States was too far committed to permit 
a foreign naval officer, especially a critical one, to 
call the signals in the event of trouble in Mexico, and 
was able to get the British to promise to move him to 
prevent such a possibility. Thus, if action was required 
Admiral Fletcher would be in command.
The United States could have prevented some of the 
trouble it found itself in if it would have promoted 
Fletcher to vice admiral, or if it had sent a rear admiral 
to replace him who outranked Cradock. The administration 
did neither, and thus found itself in the position of 
asking the British to have Cradock waive his seniority.
It was obvious that Admiral Cradock was extremely sensi­
tive, and a less able person than Admiral Fletcher might 
well have created a major incident. As it was Fletcher 
was able to work with Cradock even though he did not 
necessarily agree with him on some matters. Cradock's 
criticism of the United States was not as severe as it 
might have been. Much of it was no doubt a reflection of 
the views he had heard expressed by the foreign repre­
sentatives in Mexico. As a military officer he probably
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sympathized with Huerta who was beset from all sides from 
within the country, and found his neighbor giving moral 
support, if not something more substantial, to his enemy.
At the same time, there is no evidence to substantiate 
Lind's accusations that sending Cradock was part of 
Britain's grand design for Mexico. He was the ranking
British officer in the area and was the natural choice.
Lind and 0'Shaughnessy were no doubt right about Carden's 
attitude toward the United States. He had disagreed with
its policy ever since he left England, and he had attempt­
ed to help work out some solution to the problem which 
Wilson had rejected without even so much as a "by your 
leave." Few people besides the Wilson coterie could see 
anything except anarchy in the policy which he had adopted. 
The Cradock episode was just the last in a series of diplo­
matic controversies over Mexico between the United States 
and Great Britain in 1913.
CHAPTER XI 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
One of the major side effects of the Mexican 
Revolution during 1913 was the diplomatic entanglement 
between the United States and Great Britain. The Re­
publicans were in their last days in office when Madero 
was overthrown. Ambassador Wilson was obviously pleased 
with the prospects that Huerta would restore order in the 
Republic, and with his British colleague, William F. 
Stronge, accepted the legality of the new administration 
and recommended recognition. Both governments delayed 
action--Great Britain until the diplomatic formalities 
could be correctly handled, and the United States because 
it at first hoped to use recognition as a lever to settle 
some of the outstanding problems with Mexico.
When Woodrow Wilson became President on March 4, 
1913, he brought to the White House a philosophy of inter­
national affairs based on moral principles. This was a 
highly ethical approach but from the British point of 
view it was not a very practical one. Ambassador Wilson 
wae of the commercial imperialistic school, and like the
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British never understood or appreciated the new diplomacy. 
British recognition soon followed while the United States 
marked time. The American Ambassador pleaded with Washing­
ton to recognize Huerta, but to no avail. He schemed in 
almost open collusion with the British Minister and the 
Mexican President to win his case, and was so obviously 
out of sympathy with the new administration that he was 
finally called home. The Ambassador had disagreed with 
the President. The rolls contain the names of several 
public servants who fell into disfavor with President 
Wilson because they opposed him, or attempted to offer 
him advice. To this list can be added the name of Henry 
Lane Wilson.
The President was assisted by Great Britain when 
he sent Governor John Lind to' Mexico. Lind would probably 
have waited much longer before he talked with Mexican 
officialdom, if it had not been for Stronge's intercession 
on his behalf. But the publicity surrounding the mission, 
and Lind's actions in Mexico were enough to spell defeat. 
Had the G^overnor been from any other country except the 
United States he would have been asked to leave. Lind 
was never able to negotiate any settlement with the Huerta 
government. He was constantly sending Bryan long harangues 
about the British machinations in Mexico. Cowdray and 
Carden were his principal targets, although Cradock came 
in for some criticism too. The evidence indicates that
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Lind was right to a considerable degree in his evaluations 
of Carden and Cradock» They both thought Wilson's policy 
was unenlightened and impractical. Lord Cowdray can not 
be classified in the same category. He showed the same 
interest in his property that anyone would whose multi­
million dollar investment was threatened. He could 
certainly not be blamed for wanting it protected. Accu­
sations have been made, but no evidence has come to light 
to prove that Lord Cowdray influenced British foreign 
policy. Nevertheless, Henry Clay Pierce through Gal­
braith convinced Lind that black gold meant more to Britain 
than United States policies. The administration reflected 
Lind's attitude.
Sir Lionel Carden came to Mexico in October with 
every intention of helping Huerta stay in power. His ob­
jectives were laid out in considerable detail before he 
left England, but he arrived at an inopportune time. After 
the Mexican Congress was dissolved he presented his cre­
dentials, and if this was not enough his open consort with 
the Mexican President brought charges that he was serving 
as an unofficial adviser. He and the Foreign Office agreed 
that Huerta was the only person in sight who might restore 
order. But Carden was not content to merely work behind 
the scenes, his criticisms of President Wilson's policies 
were published for all to see. Such action brought an 
official denial from London, although most people agreed
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he had made the statements attributed to him. He 
either helped plan, agreed, or knew that the presi­
dential elections of October 26 would be a farce and 
that Huerta would remain in office.
The evidence is unmistakable that Huerta intended 
to remain president of Mexico. Either the elections would 
be voided because an insufficient number of polls were in 
operation and he would stay on until new elections could 
be convoked perhaps in six months or a year, or he would 
receive a majority of those ballots cast in which event 
he might even be declared the new legal president of the 
Republic. Even before Woodrow Wilson knew the election 
results he was convinced that Huerta would not be dis­
placed, and he requested the European countries in par­
ticular to withhold recognition of the results until the 
United States had decided on a policy. Great Britain and 
other nations reluctantly agreed. In his notes of Novem­
ber 1 and 7> President Wilson declared his intention of 
forcing Huerta from office, and in the later message 
asked the foreign powers to use their influence to get 
the General to resign. Not one of those countries would 
do so until they knew who was going to take his place.
Great Britain, France, and Germany, sympathized 
with Wilson's policy toward Mexico, although they thought 
it was too idealistic and impractical. If foreigners in 
Mexico were to be protected the country needed a strong
24]
man at the helm. They certainly agreed that asking Huerta 
to resign without having some capable person to take over 
immediately was to invite trouble. Such action on their 
part would be interfering in the internal affairs of a 
sovereign nation, and they did not relish that idea. 
Nonetheless, Great Britain finally decided to advise 
Huerta that he could no longer rely on British support in 
his dispute with the United States, but Grey was hesitant 
to go any further.
What had caused this slight but definite change in 
the British policy? Ambassador Page believed that his 
efforts to convince the Foreign Office of the righteous­
ness of President Wilson's new moral philosophy toward 
foreign affairs was finally being understood and apprec­
iated. But perhaps closer to the truth was the fact that 
the British were convinced that the United States would 
not stop short of Huerta's removal even if it meant inter­
vention. It was a matter of choice--Mexico or the United 
States. With the situation in the Balkans, Great Britain 
could not chance alienating the United States. The 
British must drop Huerta and at least not openly oppose 
Wilson, But a second factor was the better understanding 
which resulted from Sir William Tyrrell's visit to the 
United States.
Tyrrell charmed House and the President. Wilson 
liked this kind of personal diplomacy. After talking with
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Sir William, the President was apparently convinced that 
the British were not opposing him in Mexico» Tyrrell was 
sure that Wilson was dedicated to a policy which would 
make Mexico a protectorate of the United States, but he 
admitted that Britain did not have the capability of 
doing anything about it. Under the circumstances it was 
better politics to cooperate with the United States.
There was no indication of a "deal," in which the British 
would support Wilson's Mexican policy in return for re­
peal of the exemption clause in the Panama Canal Act,
The President was committed to repeal, and Britain recog­
nized the futility of opposing Wilson's Mexican policy.
A policy the British could do nothing about anyway.
Great Britain hardly liked the new situation, but it was 
the only practical approach open.
Although cautioned on several occasions by Grey 
about offering his services, Carden was so certain that 
the United States was going to intervene that he decided 
to take matters into his own hands. Lind's ultimatum in 
regard to the dissolution of the newly elected Congress 
and President Wilson's threat of November l4 were the 
danger signals which moved the British Minister. Carden's 
influence with Huerta was quite evident when he got him to 
agree to at least two of Wilson's demands, retirement and 
a general election in which all Mexicans could participate'. 
This was more than Huerta had been willing to do in re­
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sponse to the ultimatums and demands made upon him by 
Lind and the President. But Wilson rejected Huerta's 
counterproposals and would not even dignify them with an 
answero The British had attempted mediation and had been 
rebuffedo Grey was now convinced that they could do no 
more .
Unfortunately, Wilson and Bryan, for a time anyway, 
thought that British policy in Mexico was motivated by 
oil. Lord Cowdray, the major stockholder in the Mexican 
Eagle Oil Company, was suspected of having influenced the 
Foreign Office in its decision to recognize Huerta. Then, 
when things looked bad in the summer, he was thought to 
have advocated sending Carden to Mexico to inaugurate a 
program to strengthen the Mexican President. Cowdray was 
concerned about the petroleum properties, and to have done 
otherwise would have been unnatural. No evidence has been 
uncovered to indicate that he influenced British policy in 
Mexico. The diplomatic situation became further compli­
cated when the Constitutionalists began their campaign in 
Veracruz to control the oil fields. American and British 
interests were so closely related geographically that a 
threat to one was a threat to the other.
The American navy had been in Mexican waters for 
months and Admiral Fletcher was directed to provide pro­
tection for the holdings of both American and British 
companies. The Mexican Eagle Oil Company had come in for
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its share of grief because the Constitutionalists believed 
the charges that they had influenced British recognition 
of Huertao More important to them was the possibility 
of collecting a war tax and of stopping the delivery of 
fuel oil to the Federal railroads. But, the Consti­
tutionalists could not carry out their threats without 
running afoul of the United States, and they did not want 
to lose the friendship of their northern neighbor. Recog­
nition of the belligerency and lifting the arms embargo 
were two possibilities that they did not want to forfeit.
The arrival of Admiral Cradock to protect British 
property presaged a new controversy. He was the ranking 
officer and would command the international fleet if it 
was required to send marines ashore. Fletcher was able 
to get him to yield his seniority for a few weeks, but 
his rather sensitive feelings caused him to reverse his 
earlier decision. The Admiralty was not pleased by the 
United States request that Cradock give way and instead 
made arrangements for him to absent himself in case of 
trouble. The rank problem and Cradock's criticism of 
United States policy created a temporary furor, but like 
other such incidents it soon blew over.
Wilson's threats grew more menacing as time passed. 
Foreigners prepared for intervention, but it did not come 
when expected. The fears of British investors were con­
firmed when the President announced on December 2, that he
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would continue his policy of "watchful waiting»" Huerta 
would now be starved out» The civil war was sure to be 
intensified and the danger to property interests and the 
lives of foreigners increased» Huerta would not resign, 
and the United States would not intervene. Great Britain 
was caught in tha middle.
The British were far more involved than has pre­
viously been suspected. Grey was not unaware that when 
Carden went to Mexico he intended to give Huerta all the 
support possible. This was not, however, a change in 
policy. Britain had recognized Huerta and had given him 
the normal assistance expected while Stronge was Minister. 
No one else was in sight in Mexico who could take Huerta's 
place and still provide some assurance that foreigners 
and their property would be protected. The only logical 
thing was to keep Huerta in office until a suitable re­
placement could be found. Hence, Carden's assignment.
The actions of the new minister were quite open. Lind 
and O 'Shaughnessy both complained about him but were 
never able to produce any evidence to prove that he was 
actually working to thwart United States policies in 
Mexico, But by mid-November, the Foreign Office was 
certain that Wilson intended to eliminate Huerta even if 
it meant intervention. If then elected a neutral position; 
not to support Huerta and not to mediate. Carden feared 
intervention would mean the destruction of British
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property,. Perhaps he could get Huerta to resign and 
thus avoid the possible destruction of commercial inter­
ests o His activities went beyond the neutral position 
that the Foreign Office preferred, and he actually served 
as a mediator. The proposals submitted through the Foreign 
Office provided for Huerta's resignation. But they were 
not an unconditional surrender to the demands of the United 
States, Huerta would step down but not very far, and he 
proposed to remain on in order to quell the rebellion.
But compromise was out of the question for Wilson. There 
was no compelling reason why he should negotiate as he 
was forced to do years later at the Paris Peace conference, 
Wilson was sure that he could keep the stranglehold on the 
Mexican President long enough to force him out. After Grey 
had somewhat unwillingly gone along with Carden's efforts 
to negotiate with Wilson, the British returned to a neutral 
position. They could not support Huerta against the United 
States nor could they insist on his retirement. The 
British position was not an enviable one, but Great Britain 
could not afford to alienate the United States.
Accepting the state of affairs in Mexico was not in 
the immediate best interest of Great Britain. The Consti­
tutionalists were obviously annoyed with the British recog­
nition of Huerta, and a Federal victory would eliminate 
this threat to British property. But, the acquiescence of 
Great Britain to United States policies in Mexico was a
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reflection of a larger and, for the British, a far more 
dangerous and pressing problem.
By 1913 Europe was once again divided into two 
camps, the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria, and Italy- 
and the Triple Entente of Great Britain, France, and 
Russia, The Anglo-German colonial, commercial and naval 
rivalry had grown in intensity since the turn of the 
century. The Balkan Wars of 1912-1913 had been a direct 
threat to European peace. Under the circumstances the 
British did not want to lose the - friendship of the most 
powerful country in the western hemisphere.
The evidence is also unmistakable that Great 
Britain had been withdrawing from Latin America, par­
ticularly Central America, ever since I85O. British 
willingness to negotiate the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty of 
1901, which permitted the United States to build and 
fortify an isthmian canal, is accepted as an indication 
of their loss of interest in the area.
Thus, concern for a threatening situation in 
Europe, and diminished interest and strength in Central 
America were significant reasons for Great Britain to 




National Archives, Washington, D. C.
Diplomatic, Legal and Fiscal Branch 
Navy and Military Service Branch 
Legislative Branch
Great Britain
Foreign Office Archives, Public Record Office, London,
England.
Germany
Politischen Archive des Auswartijgen Amts, Bonn, Germany.
France
Archives Diplomatiques et Documentation, Ministère des
Affaires Etrangères, Quai d'Orsay, Paris, France.
Manuscripts Collections
United States
Firestone Library, Princeton University, Princeton, New 
Jersey.
Woodrow Wilson Papers 
Houghton Library, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 
Walter Hines Page Papers
250
251
Yale University Library, Yale University, New Haven, 
Connecticut,
Edward M» House Papers
Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress, Washington,
Do Co
Ray Stannard Baker Papers 
William Jennings Bryan Papers 
Andrew Carnegie Papers 
Josephus Daniels Papers
John Bassett Moore Papers (Now located at Columbia 
University Library, New York City.)
Oscar S. Straus Papers 
William Howard Taft Papers 
Woodrow Wilson Papers
Great Britain
Weetman Dickinson Pearson, First Viscount Cowdray. Private 
Papers in possession of S. Pearson & Son, Ltd., 
London, England.
Published Diaries, Letters and Speeches
Baker, Ray Stannard. Woodrow Wilson, Life and Letters.
8 volSo Garden City: Doubleday, Page and Double­
day, Doran & Co., Inc., 1927-1939.
Cronon, E. David (ed.). The Cabinet Diaries of Josephus 
Daniels, 1913-1921. Lincoln: University of
Nebraska Press, 1963.
Davidson, John Wells (ed.). A Crossroads of Freedom: The
1912 Campaign Speeches of Woodrow Wilson. New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1958.
Gwynn, Stephen. The Letters and Friendships of Sir Cecil 
Spring Rice: A Record. 2 vols. Boston: Houghton
Mifflin Company, 1929.
Hendrick, Burton K. The Life and Letters of Walter H. Pa 
3 vols. New York: Doubleday, Page & Company, 192..................
1926.
Lodge, Henry Cabot. Selections from the Correspondence of 
Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge, 1884-1918. 
2 vols. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1925.
252
Seymour, Charles. The Intimate Papers of Colonel House»
4 vols, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1926-
1928.
Trevelyan, George Macaulay. Grey of Fallodon: The Life
and Letters of Sir Edvard Grey, afterwards Viscount 
Grey of Fallodon. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company,
1937.
Public Documents
Great Britain. Parliamentary Debates. (Commons.) Vol. LX 
(1914).
U. So Congressional Record. 62d and 63d Congresses.
Uo S. Congress, Senate. "Address of President Wd^lson at 
Swarthmore College, Swarthmore, Pennsylvania,
October 25, 1913»" 63d Cong., 1st Sess., Document 
No. 234.
o Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Re­
lations. Preliminary Report and Hearings. Invest­
igation of Mexican Affairs. Senate Document 285»
2 vols. 66th Cong., 2d Sess., 1920.
U. S. Department of State. Papers Relating to the Foreign 
Relations of the United States [1912]. Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1919.
. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the 
United States [1913]. Washington: Government Print- 
ing Office, 1920.
 ____ _. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the
United States [1914]. Washington; Government Print- 
ing Office, 1922.
Uo S. Statutes at Large. XXXVII and XXXVIII.
Published Documents
Fabela, Isidro (ed.). Documentes Historicos de la Revolucion 
Mexicana: Revolucion y Regimen Constitucionalista.
4 vols. Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Economica, I96O.
253
Soria, Fidencio So Las Tempestuosas v Mémorables Sesiones 
Habidas en la Camara de Diputados del Congreso de 
la Uni6n las Noches del 9 y 10 fle Octobre de 1913. 
Mexico: Tipografia de Fidencio So Soria, 1914.
Newspapers
Great Britain
The Times (London), 1913®
Mexico
El Imparcial (Mexico City). 1913®
Mexican Herald (Mexico City). 1912-1913-
United States
New York Times. 1913'S'1915-
Books
Betnis, Samuel Flagg. The Latin American Policy of the United 
States: An Historical Interpretation. New York:
Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 199%.
Cline, Howard F . The United States and Mexico. Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1953®
Cumberland, Charles Curtis. Mexican Revolution, Genesis 
under Madero. Austin: University of Texas Press,
1952.
Daniels, Josephus. The Wilson Era: Years of Peace, 1910-
1917. Chapel Hill; University of North Carolina 
Press, 1944.
Davenport, E. H . , and Cooke, Sidney Russell. The Oil Trusts 
and Anglo-American Relations. New York: The Mac-
millan Company, 1924.
Degener, Herman A. L. (ed.) Wer ist's? Leipzig: H. A.
Ludwig Degener, I908.
Fabela, Isidro. Historia Diplomatica de la Revolucion 
Mexicana. 2 vols. Mexico: Fondo de Cultura 
Economica, 1958.
254
Fisher, Ha, A« L. James Bryce Viscount Bryce of Dechroont,
Oo M . 2 volso New York: The Macmillan Company,
1927.
Fitzgibbon, Russell H. Cuba and the United States 1900- 
1935» Menasha, Wisconsin: George Banta Publish­
ing Company, 1935*
Garfias, Valentin R. Petroleum Resources of the Worldo 
New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1923.
Gibbs, George Sweet and Knowlton, Evelyn H. The Resurgent 
Years 1911-1927. Vol. II of History of Standard Oil 
Company (New Jersey). 2 vols. New York; Harper
and Brothers, 1956.
Hibben, Paxton. The Peerless Leader, William Jennings Bryan. 
New York: Farrar and Rinehart, Inc., 1929»
Hidy, Ralph W ., and Hidy, Muriel E. Pioneering in Big
Business 1882-1911. Vol. I of History of Standard 
Oil Company (New Jersey). 2 vols. New York:
Harper and Brothers, 1955.
Jessup, Philip C . Elihu Root. 2 vols. New York: Dodd,
Mead & Company, 1938.
Legg, La, G, Wickham, and Williams, E. T. (ed.) The 
Dictionary of National Biography. Supplement 
1941-1950. 24 vols. London: Oxford University
Press, 1959°
Link, Arthur S. Wilson the Diplomatist; A Look at his 
Major Foreign Policies. Baltimore: The Johns
Hopkins Press, 1957»
Wilson The New Freedom. Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1956.
Naranjo, FranciscOo Diccionario Biografico Revolucionario» 
Mexico: Imprénta Editorial "Cosmos," 1935»
New York World. The World Almanac and Encyclopedia 1914. 
New York: The Press Publishing Company, 1914.
0'Shaughnessy, Edith. A Diplomat's Wife..in Mexico. New 
York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, I9I6 .
Intimate Pages of Mexican History. New York:
George H. Doran Company, 1920.
255
Padelford, Norman J, The Panama Canal in Peace and War»
New York; The Macmillan Company, 1942.
Pletcher, David. Rails, Mines and Progress. Ithaca; 
Cornell University Press, 1958.
Quirk, Robert Eo An Affair of Honor; Woodrow Wilson and 
the Occupation of Veracruz. Lexington; University 
of Kentucky Press, 1962.
  a The Mexican Revolution, 1914-1915. Bloomington:
University of Indiana Press, I960.
Rodriquez, Juan Barragan. Historia del e.jercito y de la 
Revolucion Constitucionalista. 2 vols. Mexico; 
Talleres de la Editorial Stylo, 1946.
Ross, Stanley R. Francisco I. Madero Apostle of Mexican 
Democracy. New York; Columbia University Press, 
1955.
Spender, J. A. Weetman Pearson, First Viscount Cowdray, 
1856-1927. London; Cassell & Co., Ltd., 1930.
Stephenson, George M. John Lind of Minnesota. Minneapolis 
University of Minnesota Press, 1935.
Talbot, Frederick A. A. The Oil Conquest of the World. 
Philadelphia; J. B% Lippincott Company, 1914.
Tischendorf, Alfred. Great Britain and Mexico in the Era 
of Porfirio Diaz. Durham; Duke University Press, 
1961.
Valades, José E. Imaginacion y Realidad de Francisco I.
Madero » 2 vols. Mexico; Antigua Liberia Robredo,
I960.
Weaver, J. R. H. (ed.) The Dictionary of National
Biography. Supplement 1922-1930. 24 vols. London;
Oxford University Press, 1937.
White, Henry. The Roster of the Round Table Dining Club. 
New York; Privately printed, I926.
Who's Who 1907. London; Adam and Charles Black, 1907.
Wilson, Henry Lane. Diplomatic Episodes in Mexico, Belgium 
and Chile. Garden City; Doubleday, Page and 
Company, 1927.
256
Woodson, Urey (comp.). Official Report of the Proceedings 
of the Democratic National Convention. 1912. 
Baltimore: N, p., 1912,
Articles and Periodicals
’’British Accord with us in Mexico," The Literary Digest,
LXVII (November 8 , 1913), 863.
"England’s Policy on Mexico," Gaiko .jiho (Revue Diplomatique) . 
XVIII (December 1913), I289-I292.
Kennedy, J. M. "A Broken Treaty: The Panama Canal Tolls,"
The FortnightIv Review, XCV (May 1, 1914), 905-I3.
MacHugh, Ro J. "The Monroe Doctrine add the Latin-American 
Republics," The Fortnightly Review, XCV (January- 
June 1914), 671-81.
Rippy5 Jo Fred. "English Investments in Mexico: A Story
of Bonanzas and Heartbreaks," The Journal of Business 
of the Universitv of Chicago. XXV (October 1952), 
247-48.
Unpublished Dissertations
Lowry, Philip Holt. "The Mexican Policy of Woodrow Wilson."
Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Inter­
national Relations, Yale University, 1949.
Morton, Luis Meza. "The Close of an Era: Act One of the
Mexican Tragedy." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
Department of History, University of Texas, 1956.
